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Abstract 
The topic of this thesis is perceptual propositional knowledge. More specifically, the guiding 
question of this thesis will be, how do perceptual experiences figure in making knowledge 
of our environment available to perceivers? In general terms, the proposal that will be 
defended throughout this work is that perception figures as a source of reasons which can 
ground empirical knowledge. More specifically, we will defend the view that our perceptual 
awareness of the concrete entities which populate the world – entities such as blueberries, 
cats, the blueberry’s colour, the cat eating the blueberry, rainbows, shadows, etc. – affords 
us with reasons which have the potential to ground knowledge about those entities. The 
position I will be defending here has not received much attention in recent philosophical 
discussion. One of the things this thesis is set to achieve is to show that the relatively little 
attention this view has received is not justified. We will see that once the view has been 
fleshed out there are several discussions in the contemporary debate on perceptual 
knowledge which would benefit from engaging with the conception defended here – for the 
view can serve as the basis to advance original solutions to traditional problems. 
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Introduction 
The topic of this thesis is perceptual propositional knowledge. More specifically, the guiding 
question of this thesis will be, how do perceptual experiences figure in making knowledge of 
our environment available to perceivers? In general terms, the proposal that will be defended 
throughout this work is that perception figures as a source of reasons which can ground 
empirical knowledge. More specifically, we will defend the view that our perceptual 
awareness of the concrete entities which populate the world – entities such as blueberries, 
cats, the blueberry’s colour, the cat eating the blueberry, rainbows, shadows, etc. – affords 
us with reasons which have the potential to ground knowledge about those entities.  
 This position stands in contrast with at least two types of established epistemological 
alternatives. On the first hand, my preferred position stands in contrast with externalist 
epistemologies. One of the fundamental claims at the core of the externalist tradition in 
epistemology is that propositional knowledge (and other epistemic achievements) does not 
necessarily rest on the reasons the knower might possess in favour of the proposition known. 
For the externalist, a subject who lacks reasons in favour of her judgements, might 
nevertheless possess knowledge by virtue of the obtaining of facts which lie beyond the 
subject’s ken. The position we will defend here stands in contrast to externalism by 
maintaining that certain central instances of perceptual knowledge are grounded on reasons 
possessed by the subject. I will explore this contrast in chapter 5 and will advance arguments 
that favour my proposal. 
 On the other hand, my preferred view stands in contrast with the type of epistemology 
of perception championed by John McDowell – who claims his view has Kantian, Hegelian, 
and Sellarsian ancestry (McDowell, 2009). McDowell defends an epistemology of perception 
where perceptual knowledge is based on reasons possessed by the subject. Moreover, he 
maintains, like us, that the epistemological significance of perception consists in its making 
the subject aware of the reasons there might be to make world-directed judgements. The main 
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point of difference between our view and McDowell’s is that for him perception of concreta 
cannot possibly suffice to provide perceivers with the type of warrant required for acquiring 
knowledge. For McDowell, an appropriate epistemology of perception has to conceive of 
perceptual experience as involving the (passive) actualization of our conceptual capacities in 
experience. But the type of view I wish to defend here need not conceive of perceptual 
experience in this manner. On the conception I defend, perception of concreta affords us with 
reasons for making world-directed judgements because concreta constitute valid reasons for 
judging. I will explore this contrast in chapter 6 and will advance arguments that favour my 
proposal. 
 The position I will be defending here has not received much attention in recent 
philosophical discussion. One of the things this thesis is set to achieve is to show that the 
relatively little attention this view has received is not justified. We will see that once the view 
has been fleshed out there are several discussions in the contemporary debate on perceptual 
knowledge which would benefit from engaging with the conception defended here – for the 
view can serve as the basis to advance original solutions to traditional problems. The main 
source of inspiration for advancing this view is to be found in J.L. Austin’s remarks on 
perceptual knowledge, mainly located in Sense and Sensibilia (1962) and “Other Minds” 
(1946). A discussion of the epistemology of perception that I find in these texts (in chapter 
1) will be the springboard for the rest of the thesis. The main contemporary influence for the 
position I defend is Mark Kalderon’s “Before the Law” (2011). I use the epistemological 
picture he advances there to flesh out one aspect of the epistemology of perception I find in 
Austin. A good part of this thesis is devoted to defending some of the commitments that arise 
from endorsement of Austin’s and Kalderon’s positions. Another influence which should be 
acknowledge here is that of Charles Travis, whose work (2004, 2005, 2007) has contributed 
greatly to the development of the position I wish to defend here. 
In terms of the structure of this work, there are two big divisions in this thesis. The 
first part, comprising chapters 1 and 2, presents the epistemology of perception I find in 
Austin. Then, the position is applied to a contemporary debate on defeaters for perceptual 
warrant. The second part, comprising chapters 3-7, elaborates Austin’s contention that in 
central cases perceptual experience provides the perceiver with non-evidential warrant for 
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making world-directed judgements. We appeal to Kalderon’s work (2011) to flesh out this 
claim and advance arguments in favour of the resulting conception.  
We start in chapter 1 by looking more closely at the dialectical context in which 
Austin advances the remarks which form the basis of the epistemology of perception we find 
in his work. We find that much of Austin’s claims on the matter are advanced as a response 
to the problems he finds in A.J. Ayer’s account of perception and perceptual knowledge in 
Ayer’s The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940). We present Ayer’s position and 
Austin’s criticism of it. Then, we argue that it is possible to find an original conception of 
perceptual knowledge in the remarks Austin makes in responding to Ayer. We suggest that 
Austin’s epistemology of perception revolves around the idea that, in central cases, we enjoy 
perceptual knowledge because we are in the “best possible position” to make a perceptual 
judgement (Austin, 1962: 105-116). On my interpretation of the notion, being in this optimal 
position involves, on the one hand, that the subject enjoys successful perceptual experiences, 
and, on the other hand, that the subject has done enough to be able to exploit the epistemic 
warrant afforded to her by perception. 
In chapter 2 we explain how Austin’s position can allow us to solve a problem which 
arises for John McDowell’s epistemology of perception. We start by advancing a detailed 
exposition of McDowell’s position. We focus then on his treatment of some examples 
advanced by Tyler Burge (2011) to challenge McDowell’s position. The examples present 
situations in which subjects who seem to enjoy successful perceptual experiences are 
presented with reasons (or apparent reasons, depending on the case) to suspect that their 
perceptual capacities are not to be trusted in the operative circumstances. The examples are 
devised to put pressure on McDowell’s conception of the warrant afforded by perception as 
“conclusive,” i.e. as excluding the possibility that the warranted proposition be false. We 
suggest that McDowell’s treatment of the cases is unsatisfactory and advance an alternative 
inspired in the Austinian epistemology presented in chapter 1. We argue that the Austinian 
approach deals better with the examples that pose problems for McDowell. 
Chapter 3 is a hinge chapter. There, we begin our in-depth exploration of one aspect 
of Austin’s notion of being in the optimal position for making a perceptual judgement. We 
focus on the claim that in central cases perception provides subjects with non-evidential 
warrant for making perceptual judgements. We appeal to the position advanced recently by 
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Kalderon (2011), labelled here “Radical Anti-psychologism”, to flesh out this aspect of 
Austin’s epistemology of perception. Here, the focus is to explain how the position advanced 
by Kalderon can be used to do justice to the position we find in Austin. 
In chapter 4 we present systematically the Radical Anti-psychologist position and 
identify four core claims advanced by it. These are: a) among the things that we perceive we 
find “concreta” (entities such as blueberries, their colour, a cat eating a blueberry, shadows 
and rainbows), b) these concreta can be reasons for judging, c) perceptual experience is 
epistemologically significant partly because, at least in some cases, it makes us aware of 
concreta, which on this position are reasons for judging, and d) concreta are truthmakers for 
propositions judged in response to experience. The remainder of the thesis is devoted to a 
defence of the resulting radical Anti-psychologist position, claim by claim. In the second part 
of this chapter I begin this task by exploring the claim (a), that concreta can be objects of 
perceptual awareness. The main aim of the second part of this chapter is to advance a working 
definition of the notion of concretum. 
 Chapter 5 is devoted to a defence of the claim that perceptual knowledge is based on 
reasons possessed by the subject. Here, the contrast of our position with the externalist 
tradition in epistemology is brought to the foreground. The strategy deployed in that chapter 
consists in, first, advancing simple arguments to favour a reasons-based account of the 
perceptual knowledge enjoyed by adult humans. Then, we explore two standard arguments 
advanced from the externalist tradition which attempt to show that a reasons-based account 
of this type for perceptual knowledge would be untenable. Then, we respond to the criticisms, 
explaining explicitly how a Radical Anti-psychologist position has the resources to 
circumvent the problems allegedly raised by those arguments.  
The claims defended in chapters 4 and 5 are not claims distinctive to the Radical Anti-
psychologist position. It is explained in those chapters that other philosophical positions 
might endorse them. In chapter 6, nevertheless, we defend the most distinctive claim of the 
Radical Anti-psychologist position, namely that concreta can be reasons for judging. In the 
first part of the chapter, I situate the position within the contemporary debate on reasons, 
assuming an anti-psychologistic account of reasons. Then, I advance arguments for thinking 
that concreta have normative force and can play a motivational role, two key features that 
reasons are thought to exhibit in contemporary philosophical discussions of reasons. A core 
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idea in this defence is the claim that concreta can serve as reasons because they serve as 
truthmakers for the relevant propositions. The claim is controversial and I turn to a defence 
of it the final chapter. In the second part of the chapter, we defend the claim from the charge 
that it might fall prey to the Myth of the Given. We focus on McDowell’s version of this type 
of criticism and look carefully at various versions of this attack. Finally, we advance a 
proposal regarding the role that the agent might have in achieving perceptual recognition. 
We argue that this is one of the aspects in which our appeal to Austin might provide us with 
an original approach to a contemporary discussion. 
Chapter 7 explores the claim that concreta are truthmakers for many of the 
propositions knowable via perception. A core part of the idea defended in chapter 6 depended 
on the claim that concreta can serve as reasons because they are truthmakers for the relevant 
propositions. We explain the commitments of a truthmaker view and explore the versions of 
the view which might serve better the theoretical needs of the Radical Anti-psychologistic 
position. Here, I adopt a less direct approach than the one used in previous chapters. I 
concentrate my efforts in defending the truthmaker view - i.e. the theory that propositions are 
made true by virtue of the existence of some entities – from the recent attacks advanced by 
Julian Dodd. The result is that we merely advance a defensive move on behalf of the 
truthmaker view. We point out that that this is one of the task that should be completed 
elsewhere if we are to defend in a more exhaustive manner the Radical Anti-psychologism 
advocated in this thesis.   
In doing all this I hope to have shown that the Radical Anti-psychologistic position 
derived from Austin, Kalderon, and Travis is a live option, and worthy of serious 
consideration. Throughout the thesis I will flag up the several aspects of this defence which 
should be further developed, as well as the avenues of research which our position might 
open but which cannot be further pursued here. I will summarise these potential lines for 
future research in the conclusions of this work. 
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Chapter 1 - Austin on Perceptual Knowledge and Perceptual Experience 
In Sense and Sensibilia J.L. Austin attacks one incarnation of the sense-datum theory of 
perception. There Austin takes aim at the version of the view advanced by A. J. Ayer in The 
Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.1 Austin’s attack is comprehensive – it targets both the 
substantial tenets of Ayer’s doctrine as well as more peripheral issues, such as Ayer's 
motivations and background assumptions. In one of these seemingly peripheral attacks 
Austin accuses Ayer of placing too strong an emphasis on the epistemological significance 
of perceptual experience. This criticism is only seemingly peripheral for it reveals (in 
Austin’s view) the root of many of the problems faced by Ayer’s philosophical account of 
perception. Austin thinks that Ayer is not interested in the nature of perceptual experience at 
all – instead, Austin tells us, he is interested in developing an epistemology which has 
“incorrigible” knowledge grounded in perceptual experience at its foundation. For Ayer, the 
“incorrigibility” at play here is understood as deriving from the possession of a general 
infallible capacity to generate true judgements about the items encountered in perception – 
an unnecessarily demanding construal of “incorrigibility” for perceptual knowledge, 
according to Austin. Ayer’s aspiration to deliver this type of incorrigibility at the level of our 
perceptual knowledge, Austin suggests, leads him to endorse a deeply flawed account of 
perception, and to accept dubious arguments in its favour. We will explore how Austin rejects 
both the epistemological project which motivates Ayer, as well as the account of perception 
he arrives at. However, in Sense and Sensibilia little is said about the positive views which 
should be put in place of Ayer’s.  
 In the first part of this chapter I will explore Austin’s criticism of Ayer’s theory of 
perception and its epistemological motivations. I will argue that Austin hints at an alternative 
epistemology of perception, which is not committed to Ayer’s controversial sense-datum 
theory of perception. Moreover, Austin’s view intends to deliver “incorrigible” perceptual 
knowledge, provided we replace Ayer’s conception of incorrigibility with a less demanding 
understanding of that notion. In the second part of this chapter I will explore the positive 
                                                 
1 Although Austin also discusses some aspects of H. H. Price (1932) and G. J. Warnock's (1953) views on the 
matter, the bulk of attack is directed to Ayer's view. This choice of target is criticized by Snowdon (2014). 
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epistemology of perception sketched by Austin. The suggestion will be that it is possible to 
identify three distinguishable strands to his position. First, for Austin, being in the “best 
possible position” for making a perceptual judgment puts the subject in a position to acquire 
perceptual knowledge about her environment. Second, part of what puts subjects in said 
optimal position is the obtaining of a successful perceptual relation to her environment. Being 
in this perceptual relation affords subjects with “non-evidential” warrant for making world-
directed judgements. Third, part of what puts the subject in the optimal position is her 
exercising (or being disposed to exercise) relevant capacities which allows her to exploit that 
warrant. Among the capacities identified by Austin we find the capacity to pay attention to 
the objects of perception, the capacity to neutralize potential counter-considerations against 
her perceptual judgements, and the capacity to recognize the perceived objects as the objects 
they are. We will explore how these three strands fit together into a cohesive epistemology 
of perception.  
 
1.1 Ayer’s Epistemological Project and the Sense-datum Theory of Perception 
Ayer’s interest in securing an incorrigible foundation for all our empirical knowledge is an 
aspiration he inherited from the early views of the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle.2 
On this view, perceptual experience is to be credited as the most important, fundamental, 
source of justification for empirical knowledge: “How is it to be determined that any 
empirical propositions does… correspond to a fact? The answer is that, in the last resort it is 
always to be determined by actual observation” (Ayer, 1940: 108). On this conception, 
perceptual experience is the ultimate tribunal which determines whether or not an empirical 
                                                 
2 The pursuit of protocol sentences, on which all empirical human knowledge is supposed to rest, goes back to 
the Logical Empiricists’ early project of a Unified Science. It is worth noting, nevertheless, that their original 
project did not involve a commitment to the sort of representative realism endorse by Ayer in the form of a 
sense-datum theory. Thus, in the initial logical empiricist view, protocol sentences did not need to be about 
psychological reality. As Schlick clearly notes: “What was originally meant by ‘protocol statements,’ as the 
name indicates, are those statements which express the facts with absolute simplicity, without any moulding, 
alteration or addition, in whose elaboration every science consists, and which precede all knowing, every 
judgment of the world” (Schlick, 1934: 209-210). What is essential to the early logical empiricists’ 
verificationist picture is that all meaningful non-observational sentences should imply—and be implied by—a 
special kind of sentence which can be directly verified by observation alone. The idea that protocol sentences 
are necessarily about sense-data or about some aspect of psychological reality is a further step not present in 
the original view of the early logical empiricists. It is also important to note that not all logical empiricists 
held onto this project for the entirety of their careers. For instance, when Ayer wrote The Foundations of 
Empirical Knowledge he was already battling Otto Neurath (1932,3) coherentism and Rudolf Carnap’s (1932) 
conventionalism. 
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judgement is justified. Now, this fundamental tenet of empiricism, together with Ayer’s 
epistemological desideratum of securing an incorrigible foundation for empirical knowledge, 
gives rise to a challenge when we reflect on some examples which suggest that perception is 
inherently fallible – in the sense that the general policy of always taking perceptual 
experience, as it were, at face value is liable to give rise to false judgements. For instance, 
when we look at the Müller-Lyer illusion, taking our experience at face-value would produce 
a false judgement regarding the length of the lines. How are we to reconcile this ordinary 
aspect of perceptual experience (i.e. that we are liable to be misled by it) with the 
epistemological project of securing an incorrigible foundation for empirical knowledge? 
Ayer’s way of dissolving this tension consists in endorsing a version of the sense-datum 
theory of perception on which the items that we seem to be perceptually acquainted with 
cannot fail to exist nor can they fail to have the properties they seem to have. This means that 
the general policy, if restricted to sense-data, will never lead to false judgements. Let us now 
examine closely the examples which are meant to give rise to problems for Ayer’s 
epistemological project. We will leave for later a critical examination of the epistemological 
project which motivates Ayer. 
  
i) Ayer’s Argument from Illusion 
The examples that Ayer appeals to in order to advance his own version of a sense-datum 
theory are common-stock among philosophers of perception. These are usually advanced as 
the first step of the “argument from illusion”. They include, among others, the case of a 
straight stick that looks bent when it is partially submerged in water, the case of a coin that 
looks circular when seen from above but elliptical when seen from a skewed angle, among 
others.3 What is common to these cases is that in all of them “material things … present 
different appearances to different observers, or to the same observer in different conditions” 
(Ayer, 1940: 3).4 This would be a problem for someone who wished to attain the type of 
knowledge that Ayer is interested in securing. Ayer endorses a sense-datum theory of 
                                                 
3 For the full list see Ayer (1940: 3).  
4 Austin has reservations about Ayer’s use of the pair of terms “material object” and “sense-datum”. We will 
explore in chapters 3 and 4 Austin’s reasons for such reservations, which have to do with the idea that there 
are many objects we can perceive but which are not straightforwardly classifiable as material objects nor 
sense-data; here he is thinking about things such as rainbows, shadows, reflections, or flames.  
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perception to solve this problem. Nevertheless, in an Austinian spirit we could stop for a 
moment and ask ourselves why should these cases seem problematic at all? Surely, it is a 
common and absolutely normal occurrence that things can look, taste, or feel different in a 
variety of circumstances, and to different subjects. So why are these cases problematic for a 
philosophical account of perception? Here, Austin’s diagnosis of Ayer’s position (that it rests 
too heavily in an implicit epistemological program) can help us understand what is going on. 
The suggestion is that these examples are problematic only in the light of a particular 
understanding of what perception is required to deliver in terms of cognitive access to the 
world – an understanding which is not mandatory and may be challenged. 
Let us look closely at the way Ayer reasons from one of these examples to the positing 
of sense-data as objects of perception: 
Let us now consider one of these examples, say that of the stick which is refracted 
in water, and see what is to be inferred. For the present it must be assumed that 
the stick does not really change its shape when it is placed in water. […] Then it 
follows that at least one of the visual appearances of the stick is delusive; for it 
cannot be both crooked and straight. Nevertheless, even in the case where what 
we see is not the real quality of a material thing, it is supposed that we are still 
seeing something; and that it is convenient to give this a name. And it is for this 
purpose that philosophers have recourse to the term “sense-datum” (Ayer, 1940: 
4). 
Here Ayer’s suggestion seems to be that the conclusion that in “delusive” cases we are aware 
of sense-data (and not “material things”) follows ultimately from the fact that the stick cannot 
be both crooked and straight at the same time. Such a contradictory result seems to follow 
from endorsing a conception in which “material things” are always the objects of perceptual 
awareness. Ayer seems to suggest, then, that the natural way to avoid falling into this 
contradiction is by endorsing the claim that in some cases we are aware of sense-data. Once 
this much has been seemingly established Ayer will advance additional arguments to 
generalize the point and maintain that sense-data are the objects of perceptual awareness in 
all cases. We will not be analysing that generalizing step here. There is plenty of material in 
the reasoning advanced above.  
 
Ayer’s suggestion is that the “problematic” examples show that sense-data must be 
brought into the picture in order to avoid contradictory consequences, such as the stick being 
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both crooked and straight. But why would a view which does not introduce sense-data give 
rise to this contradictory result in the first place? The answer comes in the form of a version 
of the “phenomenal principle”. Once it has been established that one of the experiences of 
the stick must be delusive Ayer makes the following remark: “even in the case where what 
we see is not the real quality of a material thing, it is supposed that we are still seeing 
something”. Note that this version of the phenomenal principle is too weak for Ayer’s 
purposes. Ayer’s explicit version of the principle does not preclude us from maintaining that 
in both cases (when the stick seems straight to us and when it seems crooked to us) the object 
of awareness is the stick itself, not a sense-datum. In order to derive the required contradiction 
we need a stronger version of the phenomenal principle. For instance, we need a principle 
like this: “whenever it appears to a subject that there is something which possesses a 
particular quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess 
that quality.”5 This stronger principle, coupled with the claim that material things are always 
the objects of perceptual awareness, yields the problematic inference that the perceived stick 
is both crooked and straight. Now, we are in a position to evaluate Ayer’s version of the 
argument from illusion. Here is a more fully spelled out version of the argument, which will 
aid our discussion of it: 
1. We always perceive material things (assumption for reductio). 
2. In experience e1 a stick (a material thing) appears straight, and in experience e2 the same 
stick appears crooked (ex hypothesi). 
3. Thus, in both e1 and e2 the subject is aware of one and the same stick (from 1 and 2). 
4. Whenever it appears to a subject that there is something which possesses a particular 
quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that 
quality (phenomenal principle). 
5. Thus, in e1 the subject is aware of something straight, and in e2 the subject is aware of 
something crooked (from 2 and 4). 
6. Thus, the perceived stick is both crooked and straight (from 3 and 5).6 
7. Therefore, it is not the case that we always perceive material things (by reductio). 
                                                 
5 This version of the phenomenal principle follows very closely Howard Robinson’s (1994: 32) formulation of 
it.  
6 Notice that this inference seems to depend on a further premise to the effect that in the relevant experiences 
the subject is not aware of anything other than the stick. This premise might be challenged on good grounds, 
such as the fact that presumably we are also aware of the water and the glass (see Austin, 1962: 26). We will 
grant this implicit premise for the sake of the argument.  
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This part of the argument is meant to establish merely that we do not always perceive material 
objects. For in “delusive” cases (e.g. when the stick appears crooked to us) the object of 
awareness cannot be a material object, for the stick is straight. So, this part of the argument 
leaves open the issue of what is the object of perception in delusive cases. How do sense-
data come into the picture? The answer, again, might come from the phenomenal principle, 
for it requires that the object of perception in delusive cases has the qualities it seems to have. 
Here, Ayer suggests, an answer can be provided by the sense-datum theory of perception. 
Sense-data might have the qualities we seem to perceive in delusive cases. The stick might 
not be crooked, but the sense-datum we are aware of surely can be. In other words, since 
there is no material object which is both crooked and straight, we bring in a non-material 
object which has one of the otherwise conflicting properties.  
 Let us concentrate on the part of the argument which is meant to establish that at least 
sometimes the objects we are perceptually aware of are not material things (i.e. the argument 
from (1) to (7)). Austin challenges many aspects of this argument. For instance, he criticizes 
the examples Ayer employs to illustrate his argument (Austin 1962: 3), the use he makes of 
the notions of “illusion” and “delusion” (ibid. 20-32), as well as his use of the notions of 
“appearance” and “look” (ibid. 33-43). But here I will focus on Austin’s criticism of Ayer’s 
implicit understanding of the phenomenal principle. As we have seen Ayer’s version of this 
principle is instrumental in advancing the claim that we do not always perceive material 
objects, but also in advancing the claim that sense-data are the objects of perception in 
delusive cases.  
Austin seems to think that the natural reaction to the seemingly problematic cases 
would be to explain how really there is absolutely nothing problematic about them. Normally, 
no one in the circumstances described would be tempted to draw, for example, the conclusion 
that the stick must be both crooked and bent. All that follows from the example is that the 
stick looks bent when it is submerged in water and that it looks straight when it is not. Of 
course, we also know that the stick is straight; but this is hardly contradictory with the fact 
that it looks bent. Thus, Austin elaborates: “[w]hat is wrong, what is even faintly surprising, 
in the idea of a stick’s being straight but looking bent sometimes? Does anyone suppose that 
if something is straight, then it jolly well has to look straight at all times and in all 
circumstances? Obviously, no one seriously supposes this. So what mess are we supposed to 
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get into here, what is the difficulty?” (Austin, 1962: 29). Austin’s point here is that the “jejune 
examples” on which Ayer’s sense-datum theory depends, are so common and ordinary that 
there is no difficulty at all in explaining them without appeal to sense-data.  
Here Austin is challenging Ayer’s assumed version of the phenomenal principle. This 
is what allows him to claim that there is nothing problematic about the examples. Austin 
points out that, in general, there is nothing perplexing about something being one way (say, 
straight) but looking a different way (say, crooked). But this common conception of 
appearance and reality is at odds with Ayer’s implicit phenomenal principle. But what is the 
support for that principle? If there is nothing surprising about a stick being straight and 
looking crooked, then why the stick looking crooked implies that there must be something 
crooked that we are aware of? Here, Austin’s suggestion that Ayer’s real motivation for a 
sense-datum theory of perception is epistemological might help us understand just why Ayer 
assumes the phenomenal principle in the required strong reading. Let us remember that 
according to our interpretation of Ayer’s epistemological project, he is interested in securing 
an epistemological outlook in which we possess a general infallible capacity to attain true 
beliefs about the world. If perception were always of material things, then taking our 
experiences at face value would not be such an infallible capacity. For sometimes, e.g. when 
the stick appears crooked, taking experience at face value will yield false beliefs about the 
world.  
If we allowed for the possibility of experiences which, if taken at face-value, would 
yield false beliefs, we would lose the type of cognitive grasp on the world Ayer wishes to 
secure. In contrast, on Ayer’s account of perception, I cannot get things wrong when I 
describe how things seem to me. The strong version of the phenomenal principle actually 
requires from Ayer to advance a view in which when something appears to be F to us, there 
really is something that is F, of which we are perceptually aware.7 We might wonder whether 
there are any objects which might fit the bill. In response to this worry we find Ayer’s 
characterisation of sense-data. For Ayer a) sense-data cannot have a property they do not 
appear to have, or, positively, if a sense-datum has a property, then in our awareness of it, 
the sense-datum will appear to us to have that property and b) sense-data cannot appear to 
                                                 
7 We will explore in the following section Austin’s criticism that there are not any objects which might meet 
the stringent requirements imposed by the phenomenal principle. 
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have properties that they do not really have, or, positively, if it seems to us that a sense-datum 
has a property, then it has that property (Ayer, 1940: 117). Ayer maintains that he is entitled 
to adopt this characterisation of sense-data, since it accommodates the “basic facts about 
perception”; and moreover, we are free to adopt any characterisation of the objects of 
perception which accommodate these basic facts. In the end, which characterisation we adopt 
boils down to a linguistic choice (we will explore below the credentials of this “linguistic 
move”). Independently of the flaws or merits this understanding of sense-data might have, it 
is clear that something Ayer wishes to achieve by adopting such a conception is to attain 
incorrigibility at the level of the “foundation” of empirical knowledge. If being aware of a 
red and square sense-datum makes it impossible for the sense-datum to not be red and square, 
then it follows that taking my experience at face-value (i.e. if I judge the sense-datum to be 
red and square) will necessarily yield a true belief. For Ayer, the only possible source of error 
must be verbal, i.e. that I don’t know if “square” or “red” are the appropriate words to 
describe my experience. In the second part of this chapter we will explore whether there are 
any sense-data, so construed.  
We have, then, that Ayer’s philosophical account of perception follows from his wish 
to secure the epistemological project he has set for himself. In contrast, we find in Austin a 
very different approach to perception and the “problematic” examples. Austin does not share 
Ayer’s epistemological project – we will explore his reasons in the second part of this chapter 
– which takes away the motivation to endorse Ayer’s version of the phenomenal principle. 
As we will see, Austin’s position leaves the doors open for fallibility, i.e. for the thought that 
sometimes we will get things wrong if we take experience at face-value. But, for Austin, this 
is only a natural consequence of a correct understanding of perception and its role in 
underwriting knowledge. For Austin it is only natural that sometimes concrete objects will 
seem to have properties they do not really have. Moreover, that this is a common 
phenomenon only makes it natural that, sometimes, we will get things wrong. But does 
anyone suppose that our perceptual – and cognitive – capacities should be immune to this 
sort of error? It does not seem so. Actually, the opposite seems to be true instead: cases in 
which we are “deceived” by our experience are a very natural, everyday, phenomenon, which 
has to be acknowledged and explained by any plausible theory of perception. Why would 
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this be a problem? The suggestion is that this seems problematic only if we start by assuming 
an epistemological project where liability to error must be avoided at all costs.  
But before presenting Austin’s reaction to Ayer’s position let me address a couple of 
issues which might suggest that we have been unfair to Ayer in our assessment of his defence 
of a sense-datum theory of perception. First, one might wonder whether Austin’s assessment 
that Ayer is ultimately motivated by the epistemological project described above is correct. 
Second, it might be pointed out that Ayer himself thought that the argument from illusion 
failed to establish the sense-datum theory of perception. One might wonder, then, whether 
our treatment of his case as resting heavily on a version of that argument is correct. Let me 
address these issues in turn.  
 
ii) (Not-so-)Covert Epistemological Motivations and Linguistic Twists 
Admittedly, we do not find an explicit acknowledgement from Ayer in The Foundations of 
Empirical Knowledge that his real motivation for endorsing the sense-datum theory is the 
securing of an epistemological project with infallibility at his heart. Nor do we find an explicit 
admission that the real problem raised by the argument from illusion is that it jeopardizes our 
cognitive grasp of the world. Surely, Ayer does not make his project explicit in this way, 
although, as Austin points out, the title of Ayer’s book (The Foundations of Empirical 
Knowledge) serves as a clear indication of what Ayer really is after. Above we found a strong 
reason to think that this epistemological project must be at the base of Ayer’s motivations, 
for otherwise the arguments he advances in favour of his sense-datum theory of perception 
are found inconclusive. 
 Yet, it is possible to find a confirmation of sorts that Austin’s diagnosis is correct, 
from Ayer himself. A few years after the posthumous publication of Sense and Sensibilia 
Ayer took himself to the task of responding to the criticisms set forth there by Austin (Ayer, 
1967). It is quite telling that in his response, Ayer admits that if there is something that the 
argument from illusion clearly establishes it is an epistemological point which would be at 
odds with the incorrigible foundations picture he wishes to secure: “what the argument from 
illusion […] does clearly establish is the humdrum conclusion that there is not a perfect 
coincidence between appearance and reality. It shows that if we were always to take 
experiences as it were at face value we would sometimes go wrong” (Ayer, 1967: 129). Here, 
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Ayer acknowledges that the real problem raised by the argument from illusion is that our 
cognitive access to the world would be fallible if we insist to maintain that material things 
are the objects of perceptual awareness. This represents a problem for Ayer because he is 
after an epistemological project in which our empirical knowledge rests on a bed of 
perceptual knowledge derived from an infallible capacity to get things right.  
The second reason why it might be thought that we have been unfair to Ayer is that, 
strictly speaking, he thinks that the argument from illusion fails to establish the sense-datum 
theory of perception.8 Instead he thinks that endorsement of the claim that in perception we 
are aware of sense-data amounts to nothing but a “linguistic choice” made by the 
philosophical theorizer. According to him, as long as a characterisation of the objects of 
perception accommodates the “basic facts about perception”, then we are entitled to endorse 
that characterisation. That is, Ayer thinks that it is simply a matter of a linguistic choice to 
adopt a sense-datum theory of perception over a theory that prefers to say that in perception 
we are directly aware of material things. Nevertheless, it is not so clear that this move allows 
him to evade the problems we have discussed above.  
Ayer thinks that the argument from illusion simply restricts the linguistic choices a 
theorist of perception is allowed to make. In other words, the argument from illusion, from 
Ayer’s perspective, presents us with the following two options. On the one hand, we can 
claim that in perception we are directly aware of material things, as long as we are willing to 
reform the use of the term “material thing” to allow for material things to change their 
qualities so much as is required by perceptual appearances – i.e. one must be prepared to 
say that when I see a coin as elliptical it must be so because the coin really has changed its 
shape. Of course, this move involves a profound change of the way in which we conceive 
ordinary material objects. As Ayer himself admits, to put it mildly, this change involves 
thinking of material things as being “more variable and evanescent than we normally do” 
(Ayer, 1940: 17). On the other hand, we can maintain that in perceptual experience we are 
aware not of material objects, but sense-data. Ayer takes each option to be as adequate as the 
other. The issue is simply a matter of linguistic convenience, since both options are consistent 
with all the “empirical facts”. Austin rightly points out that this way of treating the “dispute” 
                                                 
8 See specially Ayer (1940: 11-19). 
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shows that Ayer is assuming something quite similar to a sense-datum theory of perception, 
for the “empirical facts” which have to be accommodated by any linguistic choice are 
actually facts about sense-data: 
It is not, [Ayer] says, (surprising as this may seem) a question of fact whether a 
penny, or any other “material thing”, does or does not constantly change its shape, 
its colour, its size, its location—here indeed we can say whatever we please. 
Where then are “empirical facts” to be found? And Ayer’s answer is quite clear—
they are facts about sense-data, or as he also puts it, ‘about the nature of the 
sensible appearances’, ‘the phenomena’; this is where we really encounter the 
‘empirical evidence’ (Austin, 1962: 60). 
According to this diagnosis, Ayer can claim that any dispute between a sense-datum theory 
of perception and an alternative where material things are the objects of perception is merely 
verbal, only because he assumes that there are no fundamental facts about material objects – 
the fundamental empirical facts can only be found at the level of “sensible appearances”. 
This suggests that Ayer’s own understanding of what the argument from illusion shows 
already presupposes his thesis that sense-data are the fundamental objects of perception.  
 But more importantly, even here it is possible to identify the influence of Ayer’s 
covert epistemological project. Why is it that in order to avoid the problems raised by the 
argument from illusion we could maintain that material objects change their shape, size, and 
location constantly as our appearances of them change? One immediate answer is that such 
a move would allow us to hold on to Ayer’s preferred conception of incorrigibility in basic 
empirical knowledge. If the stick really becomes crooked as it enters the bucket of water, 
then the general policy of taking our experience at face value would yield a true belief, i.e. 
that the stick is crooked. The two linguistic alternatives left open by the argument from 
illusion are alternatives which would secure Ayer’s epistemological project. So, even in the 
linguistic version of Ayer’s reasoning we find that his covert epistemological project is doing 
work in the background. 
 
*** 
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So far we have explored Austin’s suggestion that Ayer’s sense-datum theory of perception is 
ultimately motivated by his epistemological project of providing “incorrigible” foundations 
for our empirical knowledge. Austin’s suggestion allowed us to understand better some of 
the argumentative moves which might otherwise seem unwarranted in Ayer’s project. 
Nevertheless, it is Austin’s position that Ayer goes wrong, in the first place, in buying into 
such a stringent epistemological project – a project which requires that we have an infallible 
capacity to get things right within the realm of perception. In the following section we will 
explore Austin’s reasons against Ayer’s epistemological project. We will argue that in his 
criticism of Ayer, it is possible to find the sketch of an original and interesting epistemology 
of perception. The guiding theme of our exploration will be the development of an adequate 
notion of incorrigibility, devised precisely to avoid the problems that Ayer’s own notion falls 
into.  
 
 
1.2 Austin’s Epistemology of Perception 
As mentioned before, Austin’s exploration of the topic of perception in Sense and Sensibilia 
involves a comprehensive attack on Ayer’s version of the sense-datum theory of perception. 
The resulting text is a detailed scrutiny of Ayer’s view, in which almost every argumentative 
step is called into question and criticised. We find, therefore, on the surface of this text, a 
largely negative outlook; a fact which has not gone unnoticed by its readers. For instance, G. 
J. Warnock (one of the targets in Austin’s book) highlights this aspect in his monograph 
about Austin when he describes the book as “almost throughout undeviatingly negative, 
critical, even polemically critical” (Warnock, 1989: 11);9 although he immediately provides 
an explanation as to why this might be so. Sense and Sensibilia constitutes an exception in 
Austin’s oeuvre, Warnock tells us, not only in its being a largely negative work but also in 
terms of its origin, as it was reconstructed by Warnock himself from several sets of notes 
Austin made in preparation for the lectures he delivered on the topic of perception from 1947 
to 1959. Although it is possible that Austin planned to publish some of this material, he had 
not started preparing it for publication at the time of his death.10 Warnock’s suggestion is that 
                                                 
9 We can find a similar complaint in Ayer’s response to Austin. See Ayer (1967: 117). 
10 See Warnock (1989: 11-12) and Warnock (1962: vi). 
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had Austin prepared the material for publication, the resulting work would have advanced 
more explicitly a positive outlook. It is true that many of Austin’s published works, written 
as they were as contributions for symposia, contain extended critical and negative 
assessments of some of the views he was responding to; but this was done only to clear the 
way for the advancement of the particular view he favoured.11  
 Nevertheless, despite Sense and Sensibilia being a sustained criticism of a particular 
philosophical view (an admirably careful and thorough effort), it would be a mistake to think 
that its philosophical contribution is exhausted by these criticisms. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested relatively recently that the most enduring contribution made by Austin there is not 
his critique of Ayer’s views, or the sense-datum theory more generally – for there are good 
reasons to think that the scope of his attack is more limited than he took it to be – but rather 
the positive insights scattered throughout the work (Putnam, 1994; Martin, 2000, ms; Travis, 
2004, 2005). 
 It might be thought that Austin’s case against the sense-datum theory has been 
influential in subsequent philosophers of perception on the grounds that this theory has been 
abandoned almost completely by contemporary philosophers of mind.12 As Michael Martin 
points out, nowadays “a commitment to [sense-data] is taken rather to indicate that a 
philosopher must have gone wrong in their reasoning” (Martin, ms: 5). In a similar fashion, 
some paradigmatic versions of the argument from illusion, one of the main targets of Austin’s 
criticism, are now widely regarded as fallacious pieces of reasoning (Dancy 1995). But there 
are reasons to think that Austin’s attack may not have been as influential as it first seems. 
Hilary Putnam points out that while it is true that, after Austin, most philosophers refrained 
from describing perception in terms of sense-data, they simply replaced such talk with talk 
about “sensory experiences” or “representations,” notions which, Putnam thinks, play an 
equivalent role to that of sense-data, and do not address the real problem identified by Austin. 
For Putnam, these are merely “linguistic” moves and fail to appreciate the full extent of 
                                                 
11 Examples of this are “Other Minds” (1946), “Truth” (1950), “Pretending” (1958), and “Unfair to Facts” 
(1954). The last paper, despite not being a contribution to a symposium is, nevertheless, a response to 
Strawson’s response to Austin’s contribution to the 1950 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind 
Association’s symposium on the topic of truth, in which Austin himself contributed with his (1950). It is 
important to note that “Unfair to facts” is a version of parts of the lectures on which Sense and Sensibilia is 
based. 
12 Although, there’s a few remarkable exceptions, such as Howard Robinson, see specially his Perception 
(1994). 
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Austin’s criticism (Putnam, 1994: 454). Furthermore, Martin thinks that the real reasons why 
philosophers have come to reject the existence of sense-data are quite different from any of 
the reasons advanced by Austin. For instance, Martin suggest that one of the main reasons 
why contemporary philosophers of mind have tended to reject sense-data boils down to their 
commitment to a physicalist picture of reality. A picture which has tended to avoid 
commitments to the existence of “mental” entities, such as sense-data (provided these are 
construed as non-physical entities).13  
 These considerations might be taken to suggest that Austin’s work has been less 
influential in determining the current misfortune of sense-datum theories of perception than 
would appear at first glance. But it would be a mistake to think that there is nothing of 
philosophical interest left in Austin’s text. There are plenty positive proposals advanced by 
Austin throughout. In the remainder of this chapter I will be arguing that it is possible to find 
an original and interesting sketch of an epistemology of perception. Although what Austin 
has to say about perceptual knowledge in Sense and Sensibilia is brief and fragmented, when 
it is coupled with his general discussion of knowledge in “Other Minds” a sketch of a 
systematic epistemology of perception emerges into view, or so I want to argue.  
In what follows, I will identify three clear strands that stand out in Austin’s discussion 
of perceptual knowledge, which constitute, in my opinion, fundamental elements of a 
systematic and distinctive account of perceptual knowledge. We have, first, the claim that 
being in the optimal position for making a judgement makes available knowledge for the 
subject. Second, that successful perceptual experience is one element which contributes to 
the subject being in that optimal position. And, third, we have that the subject’s successful 
exercise of certain capacities (such as recognition, attention, and capacity to neutralize 
counter-consideration) also contributes to the subject putting herself in that optimal position.  
We will start our analysis of Austin’s epistemology by looking at the picture which Austin 
advances to challenge Ayer’s understanding of incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge.  
 
                                                 
13 Some have claimed, though, that the existence of sense-data is not inconsistent with a physicalist picture of 
the world, e.g. Cornman (1975). Moreover, not all sense-datum theorists have construed sense-data as non-
physical, mind-dependent entities. See, for instance, Moore (1903, 1913) for a construal of sense-data where 
these features are absent. 
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i) Intrinsic and Contextual Incorrigibility 
The quest for incorrigibility in human cognition is one of the pursuits that have been at the 
centre of epistemology as early as philosophical theorizing itself emerged, Austin tells us.14 
According to him, such a pursuit can be traced all the way back to Ancient Greece, and the 
form such pursuit took back then can be clearly distinguished from the form it has taken 
relatively recently with the dawn of Modern Philosophy.15 In Austin’s view the pursuit of 
certainty in Antiquity took the form of a search for “something that will be always true” 
(Austin, 1962: 104). Although Austin presents Plato as a prominent example of this take on 
incorrigibility, the urge for finding something that will be always true can be found even 
further back, in Heraclitus and Parmenides.16 During Modern Philosophy, in contrast, the 
quest has taken a rather different form – here we find a “hankering for something to be 
absolutely certain” (Austin, 1962: 104). Austin credits Descartes with the re-animation of 
the original quest in this new form, and thinks that the contemporaneous form the quest has 
taken can be traced back to this point in history.  
 Here, we will focus on incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge, as understood in 
modern times according to Austin’s reconstruction – i.e. as the pursuit of certainty in our 
worldview. On our favoured characterisation of the notion, a judgement is incorrigible when 
it is based on conclusive grounds, i.e. grounds whose obtaining is incompatible with the 
falsity of the proposition affirmed by means of the relevant judgement. On this 
understanding, incorrigible judgements are made on the basis of grounds which “prove” the 
truth of the relevant proposition.17 As the notion will be understood in this thesis, 
incompatibility of the grounds on which a judgement is based with the falsity of the relevant 
proposition is a minimal requirement for incorrigibility. We will see below how Austin goes 
beyond this minimal requirement and develops a more robust conception of incorrigibility. 
In due time, we will also consider the advantages of such a robust understanding. This 
                                                 
14 Following Aristotle’s traditional account of the early history of Philosophy in the initial chapters of the 
Metaphysics (1998), one would be tempted to think that pre-Socratic philosophers where mainly concerned 
about cosmological issues. Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to think that an interest in epistemological 
issues was already present in most pre-Socratic philosophers, see Lesher (1999). 
15 See Austin (1962: 104). 
16 See Heraclitus (B1, B80, B50), and Parmenides (B2:1-6, B8:25-31) in Graham (2010) 
17 The idea of knowledge as based on warrant akin to proof can be found in the views of the so-called Oxford 
Realists, views which had a strong influence in Austin’s philosophy. See Kalderon and Travis (2013), and 
Marion (2000, 2000b). 
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minimal conception of incorrigibility will serve, however, as a starting point to compare the 
different approaches to perceptual knowledge by Ayer and Austin. 
In order to sharpen our favoured construal of incorrigibility it will be useful to 
distinguish it from a completely different, yet natural and colloquial, way of understanding 
the notion of incorrigibility. On this alternative understanding, we say that a subject’s 
judgement is incorrigible when the subject is in no position to amend it. Accordingly, a 
judgement being incorrigible in this sense would be compatible with the subject being in a 
bad epistemic position with respect to the judged proposition. More specifically, on this 
understanding, the obtaining of the grounds on which an incorrigible judgement that p is 
based, would be consistent with the falsity of p. In contrast, our preferred conception of 
incorrigibly is one where the grounds on which an incorrigible judgement is based are 
inconsistent with the falsity of the relevant proposition.  
I will be arguing that we find in Austin a conception in which perception can yield 
incorrigible judgements, where the notion is understood as involving conclusive grounds, i.e. 
grounds which are incompatible with the falsity of the relevant proposition. We will explain 
how Austin’s conception of incorrigibility diverges from Ayer’s. But before addressing these 
issues, let me say something about a development in epistemology, recent enough to be 
beyond Austin’s brief characterisation of the history of epistemology as revolving around a 
preoccupation with incorrigibility. In recent decades, there has been a move away from 
seeking certainty in epistemology. This break with the long tradition identified by Austin 
might suggest that endorsing an approach like Austin’s (in which knowledge is conceived as 
incorrigible) is somehow outdated and long ago proven to be misguided. We will argue in 
the following chapter, that despite this shift in epistemological interests, the motivations for 
looking for incorrigibility remain in place. One way in which the move away from 
incorrigibility is evident is in a shift of focus in many epistemologist’s interest from 
knowledge to justified belief. This shift might have been at least partially caused by a 
generalised consensus that Gettier-style problems rendered impossible a reductive analysis 
of knowledge.18 This shift in focus sometimes brings with it a lack of preoccupation with 
                                                 
18 See Gettier (1963) for the original formulation of the problem and the Essays in Pappas and Swain (1978) 
for the impact that this problem had in epistemological discussions in the years after Gettier’s publication. 
Nevertheless, see Williamson (2000) for a view where knowledge takes a central place, inspired partly by the 
history of responses to the Gettier problem. 
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notions such as certainty or incorrigibility, which might be required for knowledge. For on 
this way of looking at things, the epistemological achievement which is the main focus of 
inquiry – i.e. justified belief – is compatible with lack of certainty. Being justified in believing 
something is consistent with being wrong about it, which means that one’s beliefs can be 
justified on the basis of grounds which fail to guarantee the truth of the relevant belief.19 A 
second way in which contemporary epistemology has steered away from the pursuit of 
incorrigibility is to be found in the adoption of a conception of knowledge, where the grounds 
on which putative pieces of knowledge rest are consistent with the falsity of the propositions 
known.20 Now, these relatively recent developments might call into question the tenability 
or desirability of an epistemological conception in which perceptual knowledge is 
incorrigible. We cannot address this worry – i.e. that Austin’s interest in incorrigibility is 
outdated – in the present chapter, for it would take us too far from our main interest, that of 
explaining Austin’s conception of incorrigibility. Here I merely want to recognize the 
existence of this potential worry and flag it up for further treatment in the following chapter 
(in section 2.1). There I will advance and endorse John McDowell’s reasons for thinking that 
a correct understanding of the notion of knowledge requires us to conceive it as being based 
on conclusive grounds. 
After this brief digression let us return to the main topic of this chapter – Austin’s 
epistemology of perception. In Chapter ten of Sense and Sensibilia, Austin is reacting to the 
particular way of articulating incorrigibility advanced by Ayer in his The Foundations of 
Empirical Knowledge. Now, we should not equate Austin’s strong criticism of Ayer’s take 
on incorrigibility with a rejection of the epistemological framework which calls for certainty. 
Rather we should see Austin’s rejection of Ayer’s picture as a criticism of one way of fleshing 
out the notion of incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge. Austin thinks that Ayer’s project 
of finding the incorrigible fails ultimately due to the adoption of an unnecessarily strong 
interpretation of the notion. In describing the form that the pursuit of the incorrigible has 
taken in Modern Philosophy, Austin remarks: “In some cases the motive seems to be a 
comparatively simple hankering for something to be absolutely certain—a hankering which 
                                                 
19 See Alston (1989), BonJour (1985) and Goldman (1979) for examples where a shift from knowledge to 
justification can be identified. See also Wright (1991) and Kaplan (1985).  
20 This kind of view can be found, among others, in the work of Ernest Sosa (2009), and Tyler Burge (2003). 
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can be difficult enough to satisfy if one rigs it so that certainty is absolutely unattainable” 
(Austin, 1962: 104, emphasis added). On my understanding of this remark, Austin claims 
that adoption of an overly demanding construal of certainty might place it out of reach for 
us. It is important to note, nevertheless, that Austin’s response does not involve jettisoning 
the whole project of finding the incorrigible in perceptual knowledge. Rather, he advances a 
proposal which involves a comparatively modest understanding of the notion. By introducing 
this modest notion Austin tries to counteract approaches like Ayer’s, in which incorrigibility 
seems unattainable.  
 In general terms, Ayer’s position consists in maintaining that our general capacity to 
make judgements about our current perceptual experiences is an infallible capacity. An 
infallible capacity in this sense is one that is successful every time the capacity is exercised. 
Let us assume that, for Ayer, the aim of the capacity to judge is that of producing true 
judgements. Thus, Ayer’s position that our capacity to judge is infallible, amounts to the idea 
that this capacity produces true judgement every time it is exercised. For Ayer, the 
incorrigibility of our judgements derives from the infallibility of this capacity. If the capacity 
is infallible, then that amounts to a guarantee that a particular exercise will produce true 
judgements. In Ayer’s picture, the possibility of falsehood is excluded by the infallibility of 
the general capacity which produces the relevant judgements. Now, Ayer’s position is not 
that our capacity to judge is unrestrictedly infallible – as we have seen, he is open to the idea 
that we might be liable to error in the judgements we make about material objects. His claim 
is that our capacity to make judgements about the sense-data we perceive is an infallible 
capacity. More specifically, this general capacity is infallible partly because in making these 
judgements the subject makes use of the most cautious sentences to describe their current 
perceptual experiences, which guarantees the truth of the relevant judgements. The 
infallibility of this capacity derives, in Ayer’s view, from the security of the sentences 
exploited for making the relevant judgements – these sentences are especially secure in that 
they are non-committal about the external reality which might cause our perceptual 
appearances. In other words, our general capacity to make judgements about our current 
experiences is an infallible one, and its particular exercises are incorrigible – for they are 
supposedly based on grounds which exclude the possibility of falsity (see Ayer, 1940: 80-
84). Below, following Austin, we will challenge some of the main tenets of this picture. We 
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will call into question Ayer’s idea that a general (human) capacity like this can indeed be 
infallible. We will also see how Austin challenges the existence of such specific capacity by 
rejecting the idea that using the most cautious sentences in making judgements about our 
perceptual experiences can deliver the required infallibility. Before that, let us present in 
more detail Ayer’s case. 
In the Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, Ayer advances an epistemology of 
perception in which all empirical knowledge is to be derived from beliefs which describe the 
subject’s experiential states. Having inherited the logical empiricists’ early project of finding 
an incorrigible foundation for empirical science, Ayer’s take on the pursuit of the incorrigible 
takes the form of a search for a special kind of sentence, the use of which would give rise to 
incorrigible statements and judgements. In addition, given Ayer’s allegedly independent case 
for endorsing a sense-datum theory of perceptual experience, we have the result that the 
special sentences which serve as the foundation for all empirical knowledge are sentences 
about sense-data. According to Austin, one of Ayer’s main mistakes in his approach to 
incorrigibility consists in thinking that the way to find the incorrigible is by identifying the 
most cautious kind of sentence. This reasoning leads him to the idea that statements about 
how things seem to us must be incorrigible, for they make use of the most cautious sentences 
to be found – they are so cautious that in stating them no error could be made to misrepresent 
the experiences that are so described, or so Ayer argues. It should be noted, though, that at 
different points in his career Ayer was ambivalent on whether other types of error in 
describing our own experiences were possible, such as errors from inattention or incapacity 
to discriminate (Ayer, 1967: 137-8; 1956: 65). Yet, in The Foundations of Empirical 
Knowledge he tries to rule out such possibilities by appeal to his characterisation of sense-
data explored above. Let us remember that Ayer’s characterisation had it that sense-data must 
have all properties they seem to have, and that they cannot have properties they do not appear 
to have. But we have already challenged the plausibility of this characterisation of sense-data 
in the first part of this chapter.21 We argued above that Ayer’s case for his characterisation 
                                                 
21 See pp. 14-16. 
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of sense data is inconclusive, for it rests on the assumption that sense-data are the 
fundamental objects of perception.22  
Let us go back to Ayer’s reasoning for the possibility of infallibility in the realm of 
perceptual appearances. The case for the claim that statements of how things seem to us are 
incorrigible starts by noting the perfectly innocuous phenomenon that some forms of words 
are more cautious than others. For instance, in saying that the painting in Sofía’s living room 
is a Picasso, there are several ways in which I could be proven wrong – just consider the 
following: highlighting my ignorance in artistic matters Sofía points out it is not a Picasso, 
but a Juan Gris. If, instead, I were to say that the object hanging in Sofía’s living room is a 
painting, its not being a Picasso could no longer be used to show I made a mistake. Yet, there 
are still several ways in which I could be proven wrong – Sofía takes the “painting” from the 
wall and shows me it is not really a painting but a print she got from the cubist exhibition in 
London a few years ago. But, the line of reasoning continues, if instead I were to say that 
that looks to me like a painting by Picasso, then its not being a painting (let alone its not 
being a Picasso) would have left my statement unscathed. This shows merely that one can 
very well take refuge from error by advancing particularly cautious forms of words – nothing 
seems to be wrong in this observation. The problem with Ayer’s case for incorrigible 
statements is that it takes this phenomenon one step further: “reflections of this kind 
apparently give rise to the idea that there is or could be a kind of sentence in the utterance of 
which I take no chances at all, my commitment is absolutely minimal; so that in principle 
nothing could show that I had made a mistake, and my remark would be ‘incorrigible’” (see 
Austin, 1962: 112; Ayer, 1940: 82-85). The idea Ayer is chasing here is that of finding the 
safest possible formulae, such that no mistake whatsoever could be made in uttering them. If 
a statement is such that it is impossible to show that it is wrong in virtue of using the most 
cautious kind of sentence, we’ll say that the statement is “intrinsically incorrigible”.  
As mentioned before, Ayer’s position is that we have a general capacity – the capacity 
to make judgements about our experiences using the most cautious sentences possible – 
which is infallible. One ground on which Ayer’s position could be challenged is by calling 
into question its very commitment to the existence of a general (human) capacity which is 
                                                 
22 See Pears (1979) for a useful discussion of Ayer on sense-datum statements and a comparison with Austin’s 
criticisms.  
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infallible. A capacity to judge, as described here, is a general capacity, i.e. a capacity which 
finds application across several circumstances. Its generality derives from the fact that such 
a capacity involves the subsumption of different situations under conceptual generalities. 
Now, there is nothing in a capacity like this which implies that the capacity will be successful 
in every application. Moreover, once the capacity has been characterised as general, there are 
prima facie reasons for thinking that no such general capacity could be infallible. On the one 
hand, natural limitations on the part of human cognitive capacities opens the possibility for 
mistakes. On the other hand, the indefinite number of particular situations in which the 
general capacity might be applied increases the likelihood of error. It would seem that 
excluding the possibility of error in the many applications of a general capacity, in the way 
required by Ayer, would require perfect tracking and discrimination capacities from the 
judging subject – capacities which there is reason to think are far from perfect in humans. 
Austin’s case against Ayer’s notion of incorrigibility can be seen as an application of 
this general criticism. His criticism places a heavy emphasis on the idea that using a cautious 
sentence in advancing one’s judgements fails to deliver the required infallibility for the 
general capacity. It is important to note that the mere fact that there are forms of words which 
are more cautious than others, and that in general statements about how things seem to us 
are among the most cautious ones, do not show that it is possible to find a kind of sentence 
so cautious that no mistake could possibly be made in using them to describe our own 
experiences. Austin thinks that reflecting on the examples advanced by Ayer shows that not 
even the most cautious formulae imaginable could be used to produce intrinsically 
incorrigible statements, for it is possible to devise situations in which the relevant statements 
should be “amended or retracted” (Austin, 1962: 112). Ayer thinks that the only sort of 
mistake that could be made in producing a statement that reports how things seem to us is a 
verbal mistake – that of producing the wrong word in describing the experience (e.g. saying 
“lemon” meaning to say “lime”).  But Austin’s retort consists in showing that there is 
definitely more room for error than Ayer is prepared to admit: 
I may say ‘Magenta’ wrongly either by a mere slip, having meant to say 
‘Vermilion’; or because I don’t know quite what ‘magenta’ means, what shade of 
colour is called magenta; or again, because I was unable to, or perhaps just didn’t, 
really notice or attend to or properly size up the colour before me… And this 
holds for the case in which I say, ‘It seems, to me personally, here and now, as if 
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I were seeing something magenta’, just as much as for the case in which I say, 
‘That is magenta.’ The first formula may be more cautious, but it isn’t incorrigible 
(Austin: 1962: 111). 
In describing an experience (the way things seem to us, here and now) one can produce a 
misdescription in several different ways and not only through slips of the tongue. I might 
make a mistake because I did not learn correctly the meaning of the word “magenta” and as 
a result I misdescribe my experience when I encounter a magenta object. Or, looking at the 
thing only superficially I hastily announce that my experience is as of a magenta cup. Yet 
had I paid closer attention to the cup and to my experience of it, I would have realised it was 
not an experience of a magenta cup, but of a vermilion one. Or, being unable to tell the 
difference between cyan and turquoise, when I see a turquoise cup I announce confidently 
that it seems to me as if there was a cyan cup. But had I been able to tell the difference I 
would have described my experience as of a turquoise cup instead. Austin’s point in 
advancing these examples is that in describing one’s own experience one can make mistakes 
due to lack of knowledge of the meaning of words, inattention, or a general incapacity to 
discriminate. Furthermore, one could go wrong in all these ways irrespective of how cautious 
the description is. Saying “that looks cyan” is as susceptible to these kinds of error as saying 
“it seems to me, personally, here and now, that this is cyan”. A general capacity to describe 
our experiences veridically would be infallible only if we had a particular reason to think that 
these possibilities of error are closed. Unfortunately, it seems that the opposite is true of 
creatures like us: our knowledge of the words of a language is not perfect, we are incapable 
of paying full attention to all aspects of our experience, and it is not true that we are capable 
of discriminating all possible differences between any given experiences, or any given 
aspects of an experience. 
 But this does not mean we must abandon the pursuit of the incorrigible. For Austin 
one reason why Ayer’s project fails is that it starts with too strict a notion of incorrigibility. 
Austin’s position rejects the existence of general infallible capacities to judge, but maintains 
that there is still space for incorrigibility. How is this balance achieved? For Austin, there is 
no non-analytic statement which is intrinsically incorrigible (Austin, 1962: 111). That is, no 
statement can be guaranteed to be true on the basis of the kind of sentence used to make it. 
But this does not mean that there are not alternative ways of construing the notion of 
incorrigibility which will yield more promising results. After finding Ayer’s notion of 
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incorrigibility too strict, Austin suggests a weaker reading of the notion which might yield 
better results:  
Yes, but, it may be said, even if such cautious formulae are not intrinsically 
incorrigible, surely there will be plenty of cases in which what we say by their 
utterance will in fact be incorrigible—cases in which… nothing whatever could 
be produced as a cogent ground for retracting them… For if, when I make some 
statement, it is true that nothing whatever could in fact be produced as a cogent 
ground for retracting it, this can only be because I am in, have got myself into, 
the very best possible position for making that statement—I have, and am entitled 
to have, complete confidence in it when I make it. But whether this is so or not is 
not a matter of what kind of sentence I use in making my statement, but of what 
the circumstances are in which I make it (Austin, 1962: 114).  
This passage contains a lot of interesting suggestion from Austin. I want to highlight Austin’s 
proposal on how to understand the notion of incorrigibility without positing an infallible 
general capacity to judge. On Austin’s proposed construal, a statement will be incorrigible 
not when we use the most cautious sentence imaginable to make it; instead a statement will 
be incorrigible when the circumstances in which it is made are such that there is no good 
reason to retract it. Making use of the most cautious sentence in making a statement will not 
guard the subject from the possibility of error. As the examples presented by Austin show, it 
is always possible to devise a situation in which a subject could make a mistake in describing 
their experiences, regardless of how cautious the sentences used are. Reflection about Ayer’s 
failures leads Austin to the suggestion that some statements might be incorrigible if the 
circumstances in which the statement is made are appropriate (irrespective of which kind of 
sentence is used). Let us call a statement “contextually incorrigible” when it is incorrigible 
in this sense. 
 Given that this notion of contextual incorrigibility is at the centre of Austin’s 
epistemological project, the notion of being in the “best possible position” for making a 
judgement becomes crucial. For Austin, the circumstances in which judgements can be 
considered contextually incorrigible are grouped under the heading of being in the “optimal 
position” for making a judgement. There are several suggestions I want to make about this 
central notion and its place in Austin’s epistemology of perception. First, I want to suggest 
that being in the optimal position for judging is, for Austin, incompatible with the falsity of 
the relevant proposition. For instance, if one is in the optimal position to judge that there is a 
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pig before one, being in that position is incompatible with the falsity of the proposition that 
there is a pig before one (Austin, 1962: 115). This claim will be further defended in the 
following section. In the meantime we can say that if this is a correct interpretation, then 
Austin’s conception of incorrigibility qualifies as a view which meets the minimal 
requirement for incorrigibility described at the outset of this section. For this is a view in 
which the grounds one has for making certain perceptual judgements are such that they 
exclude the possibility of falsity of those judgements. In other words, Austin’s view is one 
where there is space for conclusive warrant. Importantly, and in contrast to Ayer’s notion, 
Austin’s position does not imply that we have an infallible capacity to judge. On Austin’s 
position, our capacity to be in the optimal position to make judgements about our perceived 
environment is a fallible capacity to get into positions where our grounds for judgement are 
conclusive.  
 The reasons why being in the optimal position is incompatible with the falsity of the 
relevant proposition have to do with the way in which the notion of “optimal position” is 
fleshed out. The second suggestion is about how to understand the notion of being in the 
optimal position. My suggestion is that being in such a position involves two distinguishable 
contributions. In the passage Austin says that one “finds oneself” in the optimal position, but 
also that one “gets oneself into” that position. This characterisation of the two distinguishable 
contributions suggests that, on the one hand, certain things must happen to a subject for her 
to be in the optimal position, and, on the other hand, that the subject must do something to 
be in that position. One central example advanced by Austin will help us understand these 
contributions better. For Austin the best possible position for making a judgement about our 
perceived surroundings is one in which the relevant items in our environment are in plain 
view and we have plenty of opportunity to inspect it. Thus, the optimal position for judging 
that there is a pig before us is characterised as follows: 
If I watch for some time an animal a few feet in front of me, in a good light, if I 
prod perhaps, sniff, and take note of the noises it makes, I may say, ‘That’s a pig’; 
and this too will be ‘incorrigible’, nothing could be produced that would show 
that I had made a mistake (Austin, 1962: 114).  
My suggestion is that the first contribution to the optimal position is provided by the 
perceptual awareness of the pig itself, and its position in relation to the perceiver, as well as 
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the adequacy of the environmental conditions for sight. That is why the optimal position, in 
this case, is one in which the perceiver can see the animal, which is a few feet in front of her, 
the light is good, and the perceiver has enough time to watch it. A suggestion which will be 
developed below is that perceptual awareness provides the subject with “non-evidential” 
warrant for making the relevant judgement. We will advance a detailed characterisation of 
this type of warrant below, but we can anticipate that possessing this warrant is inconsistent 
with the falsity of the relevant propositions. For this warrant that we possess has the capacity 
to “settle” the question of whether a pig is before us (Austin, 1962: 115). The suggestion will 
be that being in this perceptual relation implies the existence of the relevant object of 
perception (e.g. the pig), which in turn makes true the relevant proposition (e.g. that there is 
a pig). On the other hand, the second contribution to the optimal position, involves the active 
engagement from the perceiver in order to be able to exploit the non-evidential warrant 
afforded to her by perception. This is why Austin characterises this contribution as “getting 
oneself into” the optimal position. In the passage about the pig Austin suggests that the 
perceiver must pay attention and inspect the animal in order to make sure it is a pig. Below, 
we will characterise this contribution more fully and will argue that Austin suggests that the 
subject must exercise (or be disposed to exercise) additional capacities in order to be in said 
optimal position. We will argue that, for Austin, being in the optimal position involves 
exercise of our capacities for perceptual recognition, as well as being able to neutralize 
potential counter-considerations which might arise against the perceptual judgements we 
make.  
Thus, it becomes clear why we remarked before that Austin provides us with a notion 
of incorrigibility which is more robust than the minimal conception. The minimal conception 
maintains that a judgement is incorrigible when it is based on conclusive grounds. For Austin, 
possession of conclusive warrant does not suffice to render a judgement incorrigible. 
Additionally, the subject must position herself in a way that she can exploit said warrant in 
the judgments she actually makes. We will explain more fully these two elements in the 
remaining sections of this chapter. This will bring Austin’s epistemology of perception into 
full view. But before doing so let us conclude our discussion of Austin’s conception of 
incorrigibility as a response to Ayer’s. 
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On Austin’s conception, then, whether a statement or a judgement are incorrigible 
depends on the circumstances in which the statement or judgement are made. Note that this 
approach is consistent with the claim that our general capacity to make judgements about our 
perceptual experiences is fallible. But, importantly, accepting that this general capacity is a 
fallible one does not force us into accepting the claim that its particular exercises fail to be 
incorrigible.23 That a general capacity is fallible only implies that we are liable to make 
mistakes. That is consistent with the capacity being successful at times. And moreover, all of 
this by itself cannot rule out the possibility that when the capacity is successful it puts subjects 
in possession of conclusive warrant. We pointed out that, on Austin’s view, Ayer’s quest to 
find incorrigibility is thwarted by the endorsement of too strict an interpretation of the notion. 
Ayer’s position on perceptual knowledge fails partly because he commits himself to the 
existence of an infallible judging capacity. Ayer buys into an unnecessarily strict conception 
of incorrigibility (i.e. one that commits him to infallible judging capacities). But Austin’s 
proposal shows that it is possible to articulate an understanding of perceptual knowledge 
without endorsement of infallible judging capacities. In the following chapter we will put 
Austin’s conception of incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge to the test by placing it in a 
contemporary debate about defeaters for perceptual judgements. There we will also explore 
John McDowell’s reasons in favour of a view where perception is conceived as a fallible 
capacity to put subjects in possession of conclusive warrant for world-directed judgements.  
The task in the remainder of the chapter will be to explore the two remaining aspects 
of Austin’s epistemology of perception. First, that perception provides subjects with non-
evidential warrant for world-directed judgements, and, second, that there are several things 
the subject must do (or be disposed to do) in order to exploit said warrant.  
 
ii) Non-evidential Warrant 
Much of Austin’s positive stance with respect to perceptual knowledge is advanced as an 
alternative to Ayer’s own proposal on the matter. As we saw in the previous section, a central 
goal in Ayer’s epistemological program is to establish that we have an infallible capacity to 
describe truly our own experiences. On Ayer’s view, any statement which merely reports the 
                                                 
23 See McDowell (2011) for an extended defence of this general line of reasoning against Tyler Burge (2003). 
We will explore this dispute in detail in the following chapter.  
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way things seem to a subject – i.e. insofar as they report the sense-data the subject is aware 
of – will be incorrigible. The sentences used in such statements are labelled by Ayer, 
following standard logical empiricist terminology, “observation-sentences”. In Ayer’s 
picture, observation statements are incorrigible, but they also have the exclusive role of being 
evidence-providers for the rest of the subject’s empirical judgements. Austin challenges 
Ayer’s understanding of evidence and in so doing, I will suggest, sketches a conception of 
perception as a source of non-evidential warrant.  
 For Ayer, observation-sentences can be used to formulate the incorrigible judgements 
which form the basis for the rest of our empirical knowledge. Moreover, on Ayer’s 
foundational picture, all our empirical knowledge is supposed to rest on – i.e. be inferentially 
derived from – the incorrigible foundations. This means that sentences about sense-data, 
insofar as they are the only ones which give rise to incorrigible judgements, formulate the 
evidence in favour of all other empirical statements, e.g. statements about “material objects”. 
It is precisely this contention – i.e. that “there is a special subclass of sentences whose 
business is to count as evidence… for other sentences” and “whose special feature it is to be 
incorrigible” (Austin, 1962: 110; see Ayer, 1940: 80-84, 108-112) – which is the focus of 
Austin’s attack at least when it comes to the epistemological part of Ayer’s text. We have 
already discussed the incorrigibility contention in Ayer’s position. In this section, we turn 
the focus to Ayer’s doctrine on evidence, although considerations of incorrigibility will 
continue to surface, as both features are often addressed in the same breath by Austin. We 
start by looking at Austin’s criticisms of Ayer. 
 Austin targets mainly two claims in Ayer’s doctrine on evidence. The first is that 
observation-sentences have the exclusive right to formulate the evidence for all our empirical 
knowledge. The second is that all our judgements about material objects must rest, ultimately, 
on the evidence formulated by observation-sentences. Let us start with the former claim. 
Austin provides us with a general reason to doubt that it is possible to identify a class of 
sentence whose role is to formulate the evidence for all our empirical knowledge: 
[I]f you just take a bunch of sentences… impeccably formulated in some language 
or other, there can be no question of sorting them out into those that are true and 
those that are false; for… the question of truth and falsehood does not turn only 
on what a sentence is, nor yet on what it means, but on, speaking very broadly, 
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the circumstances in which it is uttered. Sentences are not as such either true or 
false. But it is really equally clear, when one comes to think of it, that for much 
the same reasons there could be no question of picking out from one’s bunch of 
sentences those that are evidence for others, those that are ‘testable’, or those that 
are ‘incorrigible’ (Austin, 1962: 111). 
It is important to pinpoint exactly what Austin is claiming in this passage, because it is more 
subtle than it might first appear. In the first part of the passage Austin is making a point about 
the truth and falsity of sentences, and then, in the second part, he extends his reasoning to the 
capacity of sentences to formulate evidence (among other properties). In the first part, he 
points out that it would be impossible to sort out, from a group of well-formed sentences in 
a given language, without further information, those sentences that are true from those that 
are false. For there is no characteristic that we could use to pick out the true sentences from 
the false ones.  
But there is more to Austin’s point in this first part of the passage, for there he insists 
that the circumstance in which one utters a sentence will make a difference to whether the 
resulting statement is to be considered true or false. The context dependency of the notion of 
truth and falsehood, according to Austin, goes further than a simple point about 
correspondence (see Austin, 1950: 124, fn. 1). For Austin, knowledge of the meaning of a 
sentence and a confrontation of such meaning with the facts might be insufficient to yield a 
definite answer to the question of whether such a sentence is true or false, for we also need 
to know the context in which the sentence is uttered. For instance, if the sentence “the Spanish 
conquest of Tenochtitlán was the result of the conquistadors’ intensive siege” occurs in a 
primary school textbook then it would be reasonable to count it as a true sentence; but if the 
same sentence is made in the course of a work of historical research on the Spanish conquest 
of Mesoamerica, then it might be reasonable to say that, at best, it is an oversimplification, if 
not an outright falsity.24 Austin’s point here is that the issue of whether a statement is taken 
to be an accurate or inaccurate description of reality will depend, at least partly, on the intents 
and purposes with which the statement is made.  
                                                 
24 On this point see Austin (1962b: 143-5). 
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In the second part of the passage (“for much the same reasons…”) Austin extends this 
reasoning to the issue of incorrigibility, testability, and the capacity to provide evidence. It is 
not possible to tell whether any given sentence has any of these properties independently of 
the context of utterance, and the intents and purposes behind the statement, Austin tells us. 
There are no syntactical, semantical, or otherwise perceivable properties of sentences which 
can reveal which ones are incorrigible, which ones are evidence-providing, and so on. 
Moreover, consideration of particular cases suggests that the evidence-providing relation is 
not unidirectional between types of sentences. For instance, it is true that, in some cases, 
claims about how things are are based on claims about how things look, e.g. that the painting 
hanging in Sofía’s living room is crooked might be grounded on the basis that it looks 
crooked. But “if the circumstances were appropriate”, Austin tells us, the relation could very 
well be reversed. I might say that the painting looks crooked on the basis that I put it up, and 
made sure it was crooked.25 For similar reasons not all evidence for “material objects” 
statements is provided by observation-sentences. In many cases it would be entirely natural 
and acceptable to provide evidence for “material-object” statements in terms of other 
“material-object” statements. For instance, the cat hair in the sofa, the cat food in the kitchen, 
and the cat toys lying around in the living room all constitute good evidence for thinking that 
there is a cat in the house. In most cases it would be entirely normal if someone were to 
provide as their evidence for thinking there is a cat in the house the statement that these 
material objects are to be found in the house. And in many contexts, this will do perfectly 
well – we would not insist that the subject carry on providing further and further evidence 
until they reach evidence which is formulated in terms observation-sentences. The thought 
is, then, that the issue of whether a statement finds itself in need of evidential support, and 
which kind of sentence is to be used to formulate the evidence for a given statement, is 
something that will depend on the context in which the relevant statements are made.  
 Now, a possible way in which Ayer could respond to this criticism is by pointing out 
that his view is only committed to the idea that every statement about material objects should 
ultimately be grounded in statements which use “observation-sentences”. The fact that in an 
everyday context we provide evidence for statements about material objects by appealing to 
other statements about material objects is neither here nor there. In other words, Ayer’s view 
                                                 
25 See Austin (1962: 116-7). 
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could be reformulated as the claim that in the context of looking for the ultimate ground for 
a material object statement, we are always bound to find that an observation-sentence 
formulates our grounds – our evidence.  
 This possible response in behalf of Ayer leads us to consider the second claim in 
Ayer’s doctrine about evidence, namely that all material object statements are based, 
ultimately, on evidence which is formulated by observation-sentences (Ayer, 1940: 108) In 
response to this position, Austin advances his most distinctive proposal in the epistemology 
of perception, namely that in central cases perceptual knowledge is based on non-evidential 
warrant. Austin thinks that this aspect of Ayer’s doctrine on evidence can be proved wrong 
by focusing on certain central cases of perceptual knowledge. For Austin, the correct thing 
to say in those circumstances is that perceptual knowledge is not based on any evidence 
whatsoever. The cases he has in mind are cases in which a subject who is currently 
undergoing a perceptual experience of a certain object comes to know something, on the 
basis of that experience, about that very object. It is precisely in reflecting about exactly what 
makes these cases epistemically distinctive that the most positive aspects of Austin’s 
epistemology of perception are advanced. We have cases where our perceptual knowledge 
seems not to be based on evidence: 
 [t]he situation in which I would properly be said to have evidence for the 
statement that some animal is a pig is that, for example, in which the beast itself 
is not actually on view, but I can see plenty of pig-like marks on the ground 
outside its retreat. If I find a few buckets of pig-food, that’s a bit more evidence, 
and the noises and the smell may provide better evidence still. But if the animal 
then emerges and stands there plainly in view, there is no longer any question of 
collecting evidence; its coming into view doesn’t provide me with more evidence 
that it’s a pig, I can now just see that it is, the question is settled. And of course, I 
might in different circumstances, have just seen this in the first place, and not had 
to bother with collecting evidence at all (Austin, 1962: 115). 
In this passage, Austin contrasts two ways in which we might come to know the same 
proposition, e.g. that there is a pig roaming in the farm, on the basis of perception. On one 
occasion, our knowledge that there is a pig around is grounded on the evidence delivered by 
our perceptual experiences – this is the case in which we see signs of porcine presence. On 
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the other hand, when the pig is in plain view in front of us, our knowledge of the same 
proposition is not grounded on evidence of porcine presence afforded to us by perception. In 
these circumstances experience makes us aware not of evidence of porcine presence, rather 
it makes us aware of the pig itself. Both are cases of perceptually based knowledge, 
nevertheless the nature of the epistemic warrant provided in the two cases is radically 
different. Austin notes that when the pig comes out of its hiding place the issue of collecting 
evidence suddenly becomes irrelevant, and had I seen the pig from the beginning, the need 
to collect evidence would not have arisen in the first place. When we know that there is a pig 
roaming in the farm on the basis of seeing it we have particularly strong warrant for making 
the relevant judgement (“the question is settled”). Moreover, there is something distinctive 
about the warrant we have in these cases – there is some sort of immediacy, not present in 
the evidential case, in coming to know that there is a pig in front of us in virtue of seeing it 
(“I can now just see that it is”). This immediacy is cashed out in terms of the idea that, in 
these circumstances, we come to know the relevant propositions in a non-evidential manner. 
The suggestion I want to advance is that in the central cases described by Austin, perception 
affords the subject with non-evidential warrant, a type of warrant which will be characterised 
more fully in the following.  
 Elucidating exactly why Austin characterises the use of the notion of “evidence” as a 
“gross misuse” in the relevant examples will help us get an idea of what Austin has in mind 
when he talks about non-evidential warrant.26 The pig’s hoofmarks and the pig food are 
evidence of there being a pig somewhere in the farm, insofar as they are an indication of the 
presence of a pig. But it would be a “gross” mischaracterisation to say that the pig itself 
standing there in front of us is also evidence for thinking that there is a pig somewhere in the 
farm, for the pig itself is not merely an indication of the presence of a pig.27 Nevertheless, the 
error involved in talking of evidence when the thing itself is present is not characterised by 
Austin as something that is straightforwardly false to say. Instead, he calls it misleading: it is 
“misleading to lump together … all the characteristic features of any casual item as ‘signs’ 
                                                 
26 There might be worries about whether or not Austin’s considerations suffice to establish that the central 
cases of perceptual knowledge involve no evidence. It might be argued that Austin only establishes something 
about the way we ordinarily speak about evidence. We will address these worries in the first part of chapter 3. 
27 For more on the idea that we only talk about evidence, signs or symptoms of something when the thing 
itself is absent, see Austin (1946: 105-108). 
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or ‘symptoms’ of if” (Austin, 1946: 106) – it is misleading, but not strictly speaking false, 
then, to call the pig itself, with all its observable features, a sign of porcine presence. My 
contention is that Austin avoids talking of outright falsity here because there are some 
similarities between the case in which we merely see the pig’s traces and the case in which 
we see the pig itself. My suggestion is that the similarities amount to the fact that in both 
cases our perceptual experience puts us in a good epistemic position with respect to the 
subject matter of whether there is a pig in the farm – i.e. in both cases we are in possession 
of warrant for making that judgement. But why would characterizing an encounter with the 
pig itself as a case where we have evidence be an inept or misleading way of looking at 
things? My suggestion is that this characterisation is misleading because, in those 
circumstances, we have something better than mere evidence – not merely particularly strong 
evidence, but a type of warrant altogether different from evidential warrant: 
Once you know the murderer, you don’t get any more clues, only what were or 
would have been clues: nor is a confession or an eye-witness’s view of the crime 
a particularly good clue – these are something different altogether (Austin, 1946: 
106, my emphasis).  
Seeing a pig or witnessing a crime, then, do not provide the subject with evidence for making 
the relevant judgements, but with an altogether different sort of epistemic warrant. A 
suggestion I want to make here is that we should understand these remarks as maintaining 
that the type of warrant we find in non-evidential cases is different in kind from evidential 
warrant. Moreover, insofar as the warrant involved in non-evidential cases has the capacity 
to settle issues (and render superfluous the gathering of evidence), non-evidential warrant 
should be characterised as conclusive.  
Let us refer to the claim that the warrant involved in non-evidential instances of 
perceptual knowledge is distinctive as “Austin’s insight”. Now it should be obvious from our 
interpretation of Austin that it is possible to distinguish two associated claims with Austin’s 
insight – a positive and a negative claim. The negative claim maintains that non-evidential 
warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant. That, for Austin, non-evidential warrant 
is different in kind from evidential warrant is supported by his contention that witnessing a 
shooting and having evidence for thinking someone shot someone else are entirely different 
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grounds for judging that a shooting occurred. On the other hand, the positive claim says that 
there is something distinctively good, from an epistemic point of view, about non-evidential 
warrant. Non-evidential warrant is tantamount to proof – possessing it excludes the 
possibility of the relevant proposition being false. That non-evidential warrant is, on Austin’s 
view, conclusive is supported by Austin’s remarks that seeing the pig has the capacity to 
settle the issue of whether a pig is present, in a way which renders the acquisition of evidence 
superfluous. In other words, we could say that Austin’s insight about the distinctiveness of 
non-evidential warrant can be broken down into its being both distinct from evidential 
warrant (i.e. different in kind), and distinctively good from an epistemic point of view. 
Now, important and original as it might be, Austin’s insight and its associated positive 
and negative claims fall short of providing us with a detailed epistemological picture of 
perceptual non-evidential knowledge. For instance, Austin’s insight is silent on what exactly 
constitutes non-evidential warrant. When I see a pig in front of me, why am I in a position to 
come to know that there is a pig in front of me? Given the negative claim of Austin’s insight, 
the explanation cannot be that I am in possession of evidence for so thinking. So what 
constitutes the warrant I possess for thinking that there is a pig when I enjoy a visual 
experience of the pig? These are questions to which Austin’s insight does not provide a 
straightforward answer on its own.  
As a way of contrast, it would be relatively simple to provide the start of an answer 
to similar questions with respect to evidential warrant. For in this case we have a ready 
response in the following form: when I am perceptually aware of evidence of porcine 
presence, I might be in a position to know that there is a pig around precisely because I am 
aware of evidence for so thinking, i.e. I am aware of something that points to (or reliably 
indicates) the truth of the relevant propositions. Of course, a further question of what exactly 
constitutes the evidence in such cases could be raised. Consider the case in which the murder 
weapon is found in someone’s flat. On the assumption that such circumstance amounts to 
finding evidence for thinking the dweller committed the murder, we could ask what 
constitutes the evidence in said case. Different responses could be advanced. For example, it 
could be proposed that the gun itself constitutes the evidence, or, alternatively, it could be 
said that the proposition that the gun was found in the flat constitutes the evidence (see 
Williamson, 2000). Regardless of how we answer the latter question, it is possible to give at 
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least the start of an answer to the question of what constitutes our evidential warrant in those 
cases. We cannot answer the equivalent question for non-evidential cases merely by turning 
to Austin’s insight – for the insight and its associated positive and negative claims are silent 
on that respect.  
Now, this observation should not be interpreted as a criticism of Austinian 
epistemology, but merely as a way of pointing out to the limitations of the view, as advanced 
by Austin himself. Again, it is important to note that Austin main aim in the passages 
analysed is not to advance a detailed epistemology of perception, but rather to challenge some 
of the epistemological claims advanced by Ayer. The importance of Austin’s insight and 
other aspects of his epistemology lie not so much in the details of the view – for it is, 
admittedly, underdeveloped – but on the originality and the attractiveness of the proposal. 
The discussion in the previous paragraphs has helped us uncover one of the tasks that should 
be undertaken by any attempt to defend an Austinian epistemology. We have to advance a 
framework that can be used to explain why subjects in non-evidential cases find themselves 
in a position to acquire knowledge of their environment and has a plausible answer to the 
question of what constitutes the non-evidential warrant possessed by them.  
Let me sketch briefly the kind of view that I will be advancing to substantiate the 
position I find in Austin whilst addressing independent epistemological worries which arise 
from the contemporaneous philosophical landscape. A full exposition of the view and a 
defence of it will be carried out from chapter 3. I will endorse a view recently advanced by 
Mark Kalderon (2011), which I label Radical Anti-psychologism. In a nutshell, this view 
maintains that everyday objects of perception (e.g. tomatoes, pigs, shadows, the tomato’s 
redness, or the pig walking across the field) are reasons for judging. These objects are reasons 
for making judgements because they stand in truthmaking relations to certain propositions – 
i.e. the very propositions they are reasons for us to judge. When we enjoy a perceptual 
experience of these objects we find ourselves in possession of a reason for thinking that 
certain propositions are true. For example, in seeing a tomato we are entitled to judge that 
there is a red tomato, for we are aware of the tomato, and the tomato stands in the truthmaking 
relation with respect to the proposition that there is a red tomato. Endorsing this Radical Anti-
psychologistic picture would provide us with the elements to respond to the questions 
advanced above. We could say that the warrant in non-evidential cases is constituted by the 
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very objects of perception. For example, in having the pig in plain view I am in a position to 
know that there is a pig in front of me because I have non-evidential warrant for so thinking. 
My warrant in such a case is constituted by the pig itself.  
Of course, endorsing Radical Anti-psychologism as a way of fleshing out the 
Austinian epistemology goes beyond what is strictly speaking proposed by Austin. This 
move brings with it its own set of theoretical tasks. For example, we have to show that the 
Radical Anti-psychologist position is a plausible way of developing Austin’s epistemology. 
In particular, we have to explain with more detail how Radical Anti-psychologism can make 
sense of Austin’s insight and its associated claims.28 In addition, the Radical Anti-
psychologist position makes a series of philosophical commitments which are not free of 
controversy. If the resulting view is to be tenable, we have to address these commitments and 
defend them against objections. This work will be carried out in chapters 4-7. By placing an 
Austin-inspired epistemology in the arena of contemporary epistemology we should also 
contrast it with competing accounts of the way in which perceptual experiences provide us 
with knowledge of our environment to establish if it is in any way a plausible view vis-à-vis 
competing accounts of perceptual knowledge. These are tasks, nevertheless, to be undertaken 
in the following chapters.  
Before bringing our discussion of non-evidential warrant in Austin to a close, I would 
like to go back to the theme of the previous section – incorrigibility and the optimal position 
for making perceptual judgements. We saw before that Austin’s conception of incorrigibility 
is characterised by the claim that a perceptual judgement can be incorrigible if the subject 
finds herself in the optimal position for making that judgement. We advanced the suggestion 
that being in the optimal position, for perceptual cases, is constituted by two elements: a 
passive and an active one. The discussion in this section allows us to add more detail to the 
passive element in the optimal position. The passive element is constituted by the subject 
being in a relation of perceptual awareness with the relevant aspects of the mind-independent 
environment. On the Radical Anti-psychologist interpretation advanced here, we have the 
result that being in this perceptual state of awareness provides the subject with non-
evidential, conclusive, warrant for judging. Thus, the Austinian position defended here 
                                                 
28 This task will be undertaken in chapter 3.  
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maintains that being in the optimal position to judge involves possession of conclusive 
warrant afforded by perceptual experiences. But, in addition, the subject must exercise certain 
capacities in order to be in a position to exploit the non-evidential warrant afforded to her by 
perception. In the final section of this chapter we will try to flesh out what is involved, for 
Austin, in the active contribution to the optimal position. 
 There is one last clarification point I would like to discuss before moving on to a 
discussion of the active contribution to the optimal position. It has to do with other 
epistemological proposal which also appeals to the notion of non-evidential warrant. Crispin 
Wright has argued, in his discussion about the Epistemic Warrant Transmission Principle, 
that we come to know certain “heavyweight propositions” – i.e. propositions which do not 
seem to be knowable by reason alone, nor by perception aided by reason (Zalabardo, 2012) 
– on the basis of non-evidential warrant. Paradigmatic examples of heavyweight propositions 
are the negation of sceptical hypotheses, e.g. “I am not a brain in a vat”. For Wright, the only 
way out of certain sceptical challenges consists in maintaining that we have default warrant 
in favour of such propositions. We lack non-question-begging evidence in favour of 
heavyweight propositions, but we are nevertheless epistemically entitled to regard them as 
true. Rather schematically, this is the sort of non-evidential warrant he has been advocating 
recently in a series of papers (Wright; 2004, 2014). To avoid confusion, it is important to 
note that Austin’s own take on non-evidential warrant is nothing like Wright’s. The kind of 
non-evidential warrant that Austin proposes is completely different to Wright’s 
“entitlement”. Firstly, for Austin it is possible to have this kind of non-evidential warrant in 
favour of “lightweight” propositions. Secondly, and more importantly, the non-evidential 
warrant Austin identifies is not possessed by the subject by default. Austin’s non-evidential 
warrant is had by the subject in virtue of being in a perceptual state with respect to a relevant 
object. Thus, although both Austin and Wright appeal to a form of non-evidential warrant to 
deal with the phenomena they are concerned there is little in common between their 
proposals, apart from appealing to a type of warrant which is not constituted by evidence 
possessed by the subject. 
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iii) Epistemic Perceptual Agency 
In the final section of this chapter we turn to the active element in the optimal position for 
making a perceptual judgement. On our interpretation of the Austinian picture, perceptual 
awareness is the crucial aspect in the passive element of the optimal position. But the issue 
of identifying what factors contribute to the active element is not such a straightforward 
matter. On our picture, perceptual awareness provides us with non-evidential warrant for 
making world-directed judgements. But there are several things which might be required 
from the subject to do in order to be able to exploit such warrant. What is required from the 
subject will depend, in many cases, on the details about the situation. Suppose that I find 
myself in a situation where I can clearly see an American goldfinch standing on a tree. 
Suppose further that, in the area I find myself, there are other birds which look like American 
goldfinches, such as the female scarlet tanager. Now, being in this situation, one obvious 
thing I should do if I am to be in the optimal position to judge that the bird is an American 
goldfinch is to discard the possibility that it is a female scarlet tanager. Perhaps I can do so 
by paying closer attention to its head or by getting closer to it. But arguably I would not have 
to do any of this if I found myself in a setting with no female scarlet tanagers (or other similar-
looking birds) around. There might be many things a potential knower must be prepared to 
do if she is to be able to exploit the non-evidential warrant afforded to her by perception. The 
suggestion I want to advance here is that a subject finds herself in the optimal position only 
if she has done enough to put herself in a position to exploit that warrant. Thus, being in the 
optimal position means possessing conclusive warrant and getting oneself into a position 
where one can exploit it. It does not mean that the subject must do every conceivable thing 
to make sure her judgement is correct. What should a subject do in a particular situation to 
be in that position is something that will depend on the particular circumstances.  
 Nevertheless, there might be other things subjects must do put themselves in the 
optimal position, which have general applicability for perceptual cases. Here I want to focus 
on three such things which, I argue, can be identified in Austin’s position. First, subjects must 
pay attention to the relevant aspects of their perceived environment. Second, subjects must 
be able to neutralize potential counter-consideration against their perceptual judgements. 
Third, subjects must be able to recognize the things perceived as the things they are. I suggest 
that the full force of the Austinian position comes into view when we elucidate both aspects 
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of the optimal position – the passive and active elements. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
here that in this thesis I will not have the space to explore and defend in detail the active 
element in the Austinian position. This is a task which should be left for another occasion. 
Nevertheless, here I will sketch the aspects mentioned above. I will also appeal to them in 
different parts in this thesis (mainly in chapters 2 and 6) although they will not be the focus 
of the investigation.  
 In Sense and Sensibilia Austin says explicitly that someone who is in the optimal 
position to make a perceptual judgement should pay attention to the scene before her. Here, 
again, I suggest, contextual considerations rule. What is the extent to which I should pay 
attention might depend on the circumstances. Not being familiar with pigs, failing to pay 
close attention to the pig before me might prevent me from exploiting the warrant afforded 
to me by perception. I might need to pay close attention to the animal in order to be able to 
judge that the animal before me is a pig. But a farmer who encounters pigs every day might 
not need to attend so scrupulously as I might, in order to be able to exploit her warrant. This 
treatment of the issue leaves open the possibility that someone who does not pay attention 
might be able to exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception. Again, I do not want to 
deny that there might be contexts in which this would be possible. What I want to highlight 
here is merely the suggestion that in some cases paying attention is something that we are in 
a position to do, which would allow us to exploit some perceptual warrant, which otherwise 
might not be available to us.  
 In “Other Minds” we find two further suggestions which might be considered aspects 
which contribute to the subject getting herself into the optimal position to make a perceptual 
judgement. First, the subject must be able to neutralize potential challenges to her claim to 
know. Secondly, the subject must be able to recognize the things she perceives as the things 
they are. Let us look at these considerations in turn. I suggest that the former requirement 
should take a relatively undemanding form in order to capture Austin’s suggestion that a 
knower need not be able to neutralize just any conceivable counter-consideration. Austin 
makes various suggestions aimed at limiting the type of challenge which would be considered 
valid, and therefore a challenge that a knower must be able to neutralize. For instance, he 
maintains that the challenge has to be specific. Considering a case where someone who 
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claims to know that the bird on a tree is a goldfinch. Austin says the following about a 
possible challenge that the subject’s grounds are not enough to prove it is a goldfinch:  
If you say ‘that’s not enough’, then you must have in mind some more or less 
definite lack. ‘To be a goldfinch, besides having a red head it must also have the 
characteristic eye-markings’ … If there is no definite lack, which you are at least 
prepared to specify on being pressed, then it’s silly (outrageous) just to go on 
saying ‘That’s not enough’ (Austin, 1946: 84).  
Moreover, within the class of specific challenges which might be directed against a claim to 
know, not all of them are going to be considered valid ones. A potential knower should only 
be expected to be able to neutralize those which are relevant for the present context:  
Enough is enough: it doesn’t mean everything. Enough means enough to show 
that (within reason, and for present intents and purposes) it ‘can’t’ be anything 
else, there is no room for an alternative, competing description of it. It does not 
mean, for example, enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch (Austin 1947: 84, 
emphasis added).  
For Austin, if a subject is to be in a position where she can exploit the warrant afforded to 
her by perception, she must be in a position to neutralize specific challenges which are 
relevant for the operative circumstances. Austin’s position contrasts with positions which 
might require from knowers that they be able to neutralize just any possible counter-
consideration there might be.29 Austin thinks that epistemic responsibility cannot demand 
from us, for instance, that in order to know that the bird is a goldfinch that we are capable of 
discarding possibilities which there are no good reason to think that obtain. It would be 
absurd to demand that the subject be able to discard the possibility that the animal is a similar-
looking bird we are highly unlikely to encounter here, or a type of bird which is thought to 
be extinct. This position is consistent with the thought that in cases where no valid counter-
considerations are in the offing merely being sensitive to potential counter-considerations 
suffices for the subject to be in a position where she can exploit the warrant afforded to her 
by perception. Notice that this position is also consistent with the possibility that in some 
cases the subject might be unable to discard a valid counter-consideration. For instance, think 
                                                 
29 See Pryor (2000, 2004) for a discussion of these requirements for knowledge. See Wright (2007) and 
Stroud (1984) for defences of these commitments.  
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of a case in which the bird flies away before we can ascertain that it is not a woodpecker. In 
such cases the subject might be unable to acquire perceptual knowledge.  
 The final suggestion to be considered here is the contribution made by the subject’s 
capacities to recognize the items perceived as the items they are. I should clarify that Austin 
does not explicitly subsume recognition under the things that a subject should do in order to 
exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception.30 This issue will be taken up again and 
looked into in detail in chapter 6. Austin’s remarks regarding recognitional capacities emerge 
from his discussion about how we can answer the question “how do you know?” (Austin, 
1946: 75-83). Now, in asking the question “how do you know?” in a paradigmatic case, e.g. 
when someone comes to know that there is a bittern in the tree on the basis of a perceptual, 
say visual, experience of a bittern, Austin says we could disambiguate the question in the 
following way: 
I may take you to have been asking: 
(Q1) How do I come to be in a position to know about bitterns? 
(Q2) How do I come to be in a position to say there’s a bittern here and now? 
(Q3) How do (can) I tell bitterns? 
(Q4) How do (can) I tell the thing here and now as a bittern? (Austin, 1946: 79) 
Possible answers to these questions would have to specify the following: 
(A1) [I must have] been trained in an environment where I could become familiar 
with bitterns 
(A2) [I must have] had certain opportunity in the current case 
(A3) [I must have] learned to recognize or tell bitterns 
(A4) [I must have] succeeded in recognizing or telling this as a bittern (Austin, 
1946: 80). 
The list of conditions (A1)-(A4) give us a brief explanation of the different ways in which 
perceptually based knowledge relies on the successful exercise, and acquisition, of 
                                                 
30 Although he does advance in passing the following remark: “certainly ‘recognizing’ is not a highly 
voluntary activity of ours” (Austin, 1946: 97). In one reading of it, the remark suggests that recognizing is an 
activity of ours, just not a highly voluntary one.  
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recognitional capacities. (A1) seems to specify some of the conditions on which a successful 
acquisition of the relevant recognitional capacity could ensue. (A2) seems to say that in order 
for a recognitional capacity to be successfully deployed certain conditions (independent of 
the capacity and its application) should obtain. (A3) simply states that in order for someone 
to know, say, that a particular bird that she sees is a bittern, the subject must possess the 
capacity to recognize bitterns by sight; more generally, for the subject to know that the object 
perceived is X the subject must have the capacity to recognize Xs by perception. (A4) seems 
to state that in order for a particular instance to be, say, a case of knowing that a bird is a 
bittern, the relevant recognitional capacity must be successfully deployed in the particular 
case in question.  
 A lot of questions can be asked about each of these conditions. For example, it is not 
clear exactly what is involved in the condition specified in (A1). In order to be in possession 
of the capacity to tell bitterns by sight one must have been trained to do so in an environment 
suitable for acquiring the capacity, i.e. an environment in which one could become familiar 
with bitterns. The ambiguous element in this condition is the notion of “familiarity”. Clearly 
an aviary with many bitterns will classify as a suitable environment, but what about the case 
in which I am trained at the library using highly specialized books on bitterns? Can I become 
familiar with bitterns in such a case? Now, although it is not clear what Austin means by 
“having a certain opportunity” in (A2), one could easily try to specify the notion by 
considering what he says about perceptual knowledge in Sense and Sensibilia. For one to 
have an opportunity to recognize the bird in front of us we have to have a good view of the 
animal, the conditions of observation should be adequate, and we should have enough time 
to carefully attend and inspect it. There are also questions regarding when a subject possesses 
a perceptual capacity and when it is successfully exercised. Not all of these questions will be 
further addressed here. But they do point out to avenues of future research which should be 
explored in advancing a more developed account of recognitional capacities in an Austinian 
epistemology.  Yet, some of the questions raised in this paragraph will deserve a closer 
inspection in this thesis. In chapter 6 we will explore in what way recognition can be 
considered something that the subject does. In providing a potential account of the agential 
involvement in recognition we will appeal to Austin’s idea that one’s capacity to recognize 
depends on suitable training (A1, A3). We will also consider whether the subject might be 
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involved in getting the process of achieving recognition in motion and on whether the subject 
can affect, perhaps in an indirect manner, the result of a particular process of achieving 
recognition.  
   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have explored how Austin’s epistemology of perception arises mainly as 
a response to Ayer’s conception of perceptual knowledge. We explored Austin’s criticism of 
Ayer’s epistemology for advancing an overly demanding conception of incorrigibility. 
Ayer’s conception required that we have a general infallible capacity to describe truly our 
own experiences. In response, we argued, Austin advances a conception of incorrigibility 
which does not require infallible capacities. We explained that, on Austin’s view, our 
perceptual knowledge can be incorrigible when it is made on the basis of being in the best 
possible position for making that judgement. We suggested that Austin’s position can be read 
as involving the contribution of an active and a passive element to be in that optimal position. 
On our interpretation, the passive element involves, mainly, successful perceptual awareness 
of the relevant aspects of the mind-independent environment. Whereas the active element is 
something which can only be determined in a more precise manner in function of the 
operative particular circumstances. Yet, we suggested that there are some general things 
which might find applicability in many instances of perceptual knowledge. These are: paying 
attention to certain elements in the perceived scene, being able to neutralize potential (valid) 
counter-considerations for our judgements, and being able to recognize the items we perceive 
as the items they are.  
It is now time to see whether the epistemology of perception we find in Austin can be 
put to use in contemporary epistemology. In the following chapter, we will apply Austin’s 
position on incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge to a recent dispute between Tyler Burge 
and John McDowell. Then, in the remaining chapters, we will flesh out Austin’s suggestion 
that in successful exercises of perception subjects are afforded with non-evidential warrant 
for judging. We will defend the resulting position and argue that it provides us with an 
original and interesting epistemology of perception.   
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Chapter 2 – Conclusive Warrant and Perceptual Knowledge 
In the previous chapter, we explored some of Austin’s remarks on perceptual knowledge and 
argued that it is possible to find there the sketch of an original epistemology of perception. 
Our interpretation of Austin’s epistemology was centred around his notion of being in the 
optimal position for making a perceptual judgement. On this interpretation of Austin, when 
a subject is in the optimal position, her resulting judgement will be incorrigible, i.e. grounded 
on warrant which is incompatible with the falsity of the propositions judged.  
 The main aim of this chapter is to show how the type of view advanced by Austin can 
be put to use in the contemporary philosophical landscape. In particular, we will explore one 
aspect of the account of perceptual knowledge which has been advanced by John McDowell 
(1982, 2010, 2011, 2012b, 2013). The first part of this chapter will be devoted to a detailed 
exposition of McDowell’s view. I will start by advancing in general terms McDowell’s 
position, the main arguments in its favour, as well as some standard arguments against it (2.1-
2.2). I present the McDowellian approach in detail because a detailed exposition of his view 
will be useful in subsequent chapters, mainly chapters 3, 5, and 6, where the McDowellian 
approach will again be contrasted with the view inspired in Austin advocated here. Moreover, 
as will become clear in the following, McDowell’s approach has a lot in common with the 
Austinian approach we endorse here. For instance, both Austin and McDowell try to make 
space for a conception in which our fallible perceptual capacities put us in position to possess 
conclusive warrant, a similarity which will be explored in this chapter. In chapters 3 and 5, 
we will explore further respects in which the views are similar. In addition, McDowell’s view 
is one of the more sophisticated and developed accounts of perceptual knowledge in offer in 
the contemporary epistemological landscape, so it is a good point of comparison for our 
proposal. Ultimately, we will find, in chapter 6, that there is a fundamental locus of 
disagreement between McDowell’s view and the position we will articulate in the following 
chapters. The locus of disagreement is that our position would be classified by McDowell as 
a view which endorses the “Myth of the Given”. 
 Although a good part of this chapter will be devoted to a detailed exposition of 
McDowell’s view we should not lose from sight that the main aim of this chapter is to put to 
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use the view we found in Austin in the previous chapter. In the second part of this chapter 
we will look closely at McDowell’s treatment of some cases in which subjects who are 
perceptually aware of their surroundings are provided with reasons to doubt their perceptual 
experiences. I will argue that McDowell’s view struggles to accommodate one of these 
examples. I will suggest that a view inspired by Austin can provide an alternative, and more 
satisfying, account of the cases McDowell struggles with (2.3-2.4). The suggestion I advance, 
inspired by Austin, is compatible with the fundamental tenets of McDowell’s position, and 
could be incorporated into his view, or so I argue.  
  
2.1 McDowell’s Epistemological Disjunctivism 
Recently McDowell has characterised his epistemology of perception as a view on which 
human perceptual capacities are categorized as general capacities to attain knowledge – not 
any sort of knowledge, but the sophisticated kind of knowledge enjoyed by self-conscious 
rational beings (see McDowell, 2011: 9-11). For McDowell, knowledge had by self-
conscious rational beings means knowledge based on reasons that the subject possesses. We 
will assess the merits of this conception of the knowledge enjoyed by self-conscious rational 
beings in chapter 5. For the time being, we will concentrate on McDowell’s position. For 
McDowell, the epistemological significance of perception derives from its role in affording 
self-conscious rational subjects with this kind of knowledge (McDowell, 2006:127). But 
what exactly is involved in an epistemological project which conceives of perception as a 
general capacity, the successful exercise of which results in this kind of knowledge? This is 
not a straightforward matter, which is shown by the fact that a literal reading of that 
formulation cannot be what McDowell has in mind.  
On a literal reading, the claim that perception is a capacity for knowledge means that 
the successful exercises of perceptual capacities are to be identified with states of knowing. 
But McDowell cannot be holding the thesis that perception is a capacity for knowledge in 
this sense, for he explicitly rejects a view in which the deliverances of perception are to be 
identified with knowledge or belief. For McDowell a subject’s perceptual capacities might 
be successfully exercised whilst the subject lacks the knowledge which is made available to 
her by that experience. In support of this claim McDowell cites reasons which are familiar 
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from discussions about the plausibility of belief-acquisition theories of perception.31 On 
McDowell’s conception, it is up to the subject whether to make a judgement on the basis of 
a perceptual experience. A point which is illustrated by well-known cases of illusion. For 
instance, subjects familiar with the Müller-Lyer illusion will abstain from judging that the 
seen lines are unequal in length, despite undergoing an experience in which it seems that they 
are unequal (see McDowell, 1996: 11; 1982: 385; and Fish, 2010: 56-9). Admittedly, this 
example presents us with a case where the subject’s perceptual capacities are not exercised 
successfully. But these cases of illusion do show that it is possible to disassociate perceptual 
experiences from the corresponding judgements. This suggests, then, that the literal reading 
of the claim that perception is a capacity for knowledge cannot be right. For even when our 
perceptual capacities are successfully exercised we can refrain from making the 
corresponding judgement, in which case a successful perception need not yield knowledge. 
But if successful exercise of perceptual experience do not guarantee knowledge in this sense, 
what is its connection with knowledge acquisition? What does it mean to say that perception 
is a capacity for knowledge, then, if the strict reading of that claim has been discarded? 
A natural suggestion would be to hold that perception is a capacity for knowledge in 
the sense that, at least in central circumstances, successful exercises of perception are 
necessary for the subject’s acquisition of perceptual knowledge. Note that this view is 
consistent with the claim that success in acquisition of knowledge is not to be attributed 
entirely to the successful exercise of the perceptual capacity. On the view suggested here, 
perceptual experience makes an indispensable contribution to our knowledge of our 
perceived surroundings. Following McDowell’s terminology, we can say that perception is 
a capacity to make knowledge of our surroundings available to the perceiver, or, 
alternatively, that perception is a capacity to put the subject in a position to know things about 
their surroundings. Crucially, on this conception, perception can put one in a position to know 
something and yet one might fail to acquire that knowledge.32 A subject’s perceptual 
experience might make the knowledge that there are seven tomatoes in the kitchen table 
available to her, yet she might fail to acquire that knowledge, for instance, because she did 
                                                 
31 See Pitcher (1971) for a defence of this account of perception, and see Dretske (1969) for criticism.  
32 McDowell explicitly acknowledges the possibility of failing to know something that one’s perceptual 
capacities put one in a position to know. See McDowell (1982: 390, fn. 39), and McDowell (2010, 246). See 
also Williamson (1996), and Kalderon (2011). 
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not take the time to count the tomatoes. That is, when the capacity is successfully exercised, 
the subject is in a position to know – i.e. knowledge is made available to them.  
But if we want to defend a view on which successful exercises of perceptual capacities 
make an indispensable contribution to perceptual knowledge, we should give a detailed 
account of the nature of this contribution. In what way does perception put subjects in a 
position to know things about their surroundings? McDowell’s suggestion is that they do so 
by providing the subject with conclusive warrant in favour of a judgment which describes the 
way things seem to the subject in perception. This aspect of McDowell’s theory places his 
view on the side of epistemological conceptions which look for incorrigibility in perceptual 
knowledge, as described at the outset of the previous chapter. For McDowell, the conclusive 
warrant a perceiving subject possesses in favour of, say, p, is such that her having that warrant 
is incompatible with the falsity of p. We will explore below in what ways McDowell’s 
approach to incorrigibility differs from Ayer’s and Austin’s. But before doing so, let us 
consider a possible argument which might challenge the idea that in successful exercises of 
her perceptual capacities the perceiver has conclusive warrant for making a world-directed 
judgement. 
McDowell’s conception of successful exercises as affording the subject with 
conclusive warrant could be challenged by an argument which attempts to exploit the fact 
that our ability to tell successful from unsuccessful exercises is fallible. The possibility of 
there being defective exercises which are subjectively indistinguishable from successful 
exercises is exploited in this argument. Here, our understanding of a subjectively 
indistinguishable experience is as follows: a defective exercise of the perceptual capacity is 
subjectively indistinguishable from a successful exercise just in case being in the former 
situation hinders one from coming to know that the capacity has not been exercised 
successfully.33 Note that this conception of the subjective indistinguishability of bad cases 
does not imply a commitment to the idea that when the capacity is successfully exercised one 
is not in a position to tell that the capacity has been exercised successfully.34 The argument 
against McDowell’s position could go as follows: 
                                                 
33 See Soteriou (2016) for a similar characterisation of the subjective indistinguishability relevant for 
McDowell’s project.  
34 Bernard Williams (1978) advanced good reasons to think that, in general, this implication does not hold. 
We will have a chance to explore these reasons below.  
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1. Defective exercises of perceptual capacities afford subjects with, at most, less 
than conclusive warrant for a corresponding world-directed judgement. 
2. The warrant afforded to subjects by successful exercises of their perceptual 
capacities cannot be stronger, or better, than the warrant provided by a 
subjectively undistinguishable defective exercise of these capacities.  
3. Thus, successful exercises of perceptual capacities can afford the subject with no 
more than less than conclusive warrant in favour of the corresponding world-
directed judgements.  
 
Premise (1) of the argument would likely be conceded by McDowell. But premise (2) in this 
argument is a formulation of the “Highest Common Factor” (HCF) claim identified by him 
in his (1982) – a claim which he rejects. The Highest Common Factor claim maintains that 
successful and unsuccessful exercises of perceptual capacities must provide the subject with 
the same type of warrant. Since, as it has been conceded, defective exercises provide subjects 
with less than conclusive warrant, then, by HCF, it follows that the warrant afforded to the 
subject in successful cases is less than conclusive. A natural response to this argument would 
be to challenge its appeal to the HCF claim. A rejection of it would allow us to reject the 
argument’s conclusion, which would leave open the door for the claim that there is an 
epistemic asymmetry between successful and (subjectively indistinguishable) defective 
exercises of our perceptual capacities. This asymmetry could then be cashed out in terms of 
the claim that, in successful exercises, subjects possess conclusive warrant for the 
corresponding world directed judgements.  
Now, there are good reasons to be sceptical of the HCF claim. In order to establish 
the HCF claim, proponents of it seem to reason from the fact that defective exercises are 
indistinguishable from successful ones to the claim that successful exercises are 
indistinguishable from defective ones. But this is precisely the inferential step that McDowell 
invites us to challenge (see McDowell 1982: 386). It seems that, in general, it is not the case 
that the inability to tell that an exercise of a capacity is defective implies that one should 
therefore be unable to tell when a successful exercise of it is not defective. Which is to say 
that, in general, the subjective indistinguishability of “bad cases” (defective exercises of the 
capacity) from “good cases” (successful exercises of the capacity) imply a match in their 
epistemic significance. This general point can be illustrated bringing forward certain 
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considerations from Bernard Williams (1978). Williams invites us to consider pairs of good 
case / bad case situations in which a match in epistemic significance clearly fails to obtain. 
He asks us to consider pairs such as being alive / being dead, or being sober / being severely 
drunk (see Williams, 1978: 310-311). In these scenarios, bad cases are subjectively 
indistinguishable from the good cases in the stipulated sense. That is, when someone is dead 
they cannot come to know that they are not alive, and similarly when someone is severely 
drunk they cannot come to know that they are not sober. Crucially, in both cases the mere 
indistinguishability of the bad cases from the good ones does not imply that subjects in good 
cases are in an epistemic position comparable to that of subjects in bad cases. In particular, 
it is obvious that subjects can know that they are alive when they are, and that they are sober 
when they are. These cases show that the inference from subjective indistinguishability to a 
match in epistemic significance is flawed. One explanation as to why this epistemic 
asymmetry obtains might be that the indistinguishability of the bad cases from good ones 
does not imply that good cases are indistinguishable from the bad ones.  
These examples raise doubts for the inference from indistinguishability of bad cases 
with respect to good ones, to a match in their epistemic significance, in general. But it could 
be argued that does not suffice to show that there is an epistemic asymmetry in successful 
and defective exercises of perceptual capacities. An argument for this idea, i.e. that there is 
no epistemic asymmetry in in these cases, could be mounted along the following lines. In the 
cases advanced by Williams, there is a straightforward explanation of why there is an 
epistemic asymmetry between good and bad cases. When one is dead one does not exist to 
make any judgements, and when one is severely drunk one’s capacity to make rational 
judgements is impaired (see Williams, 1978: 310). But is it possible to advance a similar 
explanation as to why in the perceptual case the alleged epistemic asymmetry obtains? In 
order to answer this question, it might be useful to consider whether the epistemological 
disjunctivist can resist the following argument:35 
a) Let us assume, for reductio, that there is an epistemic asymmetry between 
successful and (subjectively indistinguishable) defective exercises of perceptual 
capacities, i.e. that in successful exercises we have access to conclusive warrant 
for world-directed judgements, a type of warrant which is absent in defective 
exercises.  
                                                 
35 This is an adapted version of an argument analysed by Soteriou (2016: 123).  
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b) Now, if (a) was correct, then in a (subjectively indistinguishable) defective 
exercise of her capacity the subject would be able to tell that they lacked 
conclusive warrant for the corresponding world directed judgement; this would 
allow them to know that the exercise is not a successful one.  
c) But in defective exercises which are subjectively indistinguishable from 
successful exercises, the subjects are incapable of coming to know that the 
exercise is not a successful one. This contradicts (b). 
d) To avoid contradiction, we should reject the initial assumption, i.e. we should 
reject the claim that there is an epistemic asymmetry between successful and 
(subjectively indistinguishable) defective exercises of perceptual capacities.  
 
Advancing a way to resist this argument might give us a clue of how to answer the question 
of whether there is a good explanation of why there might be an epistemic asymmetry 
between successful and defective exercises of perceptual capacities. One way in which the 
argument might be challenged is by rejecting the move from (a) to (b). We can claim that 
there being a difference in the warrant afforded to subjects by two different experiences does 
not imply that the subject will always be able to tell that such a difference obtains – although 
the subject might be able to tell sometimes that there is a difference. The implication would 
hold only if a strong assumption is in play with respect to our introspective capacities to 
reveal the nature of our experiences. The assumption being that no difference in the epistemic 
standing of two experiences could go unnoticed to introspection. Such a strong position on 
the powers of introspection is not obviously true and it has indeed been consistently 
challenged in the philosophical literature on introspection.36  
On McDowell’s view, we can consistently maintain the following two claims. First, 
that in a (subjectively indistinguishable) defective exercise of her perceptual capacities a 
subject would be unable to tell she lacks conclusive warrant for the corresponding world-
directed judgement. And second, that there is an epistemic asymmetry between defective and 
successful exercises of a subject’s perceptual capacities. McDowell’s explanation of why in 
the defective cases subjects would be unable to notice their lack of conclusive warrant rests 
on the idea that, despite their differences, there is something in common between successful 
and (subjectively indistinguishable) defective exercises of perceptual capacities. Namely, 
both cases share the appearance that things in the subject’s surroundings are thus and so (see 
                                                 
36 See Pears (1979), Williamson (1996). 
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McDowell, 2010: 244, and 2013: 260). In other words, both exercises are similar in that they 
share “an appearance, a state of a subject that consists in her having it appear to her that 
things are a certain way” (McDowell, 2010: 244). This commonality would explain why in 
the bad case a subject would be unable to tell their warrant is not conclusive: it seems to her 
that it is! Yet she lacks conclusive warrant, for the environmental reality is not made manifest 
to her; that is why it merely appears to her as if she had conclusive warrant. On the other 
hand, successfully perceiving subjects are, in addition, aware of their environment (that 
aspect of reality is made manifest to them in experience); that is why it appears to them that 
they have conclusive warrant for the corresponding world-directed judgements.37 
 The success of this line of defence opens the path to maintain an epistemological 
disjunctivist position, i.e. a view in which there is an asymmetry in the epistemic significance 
of successful and defective exercises of perceptual capacities. On McDowell’s view, the 
epistemic significance of successful exercises amounts to possession of conclusive warrant. 
But nothing in our defence showed that this was the correct characterisation of the epistemic 
position in successful exercises of perceptual capacities. I take it that the main achievement 
of this line of defence is a rejection of the HCF claim. Note that rejection of this claim is 
consistent with the idea that the warrant provided by successful exercises of perceptual 
capacities is better or stronger than the warrant afforded by defective exercises, and yet less 
than conclusive. The claim that successful exercises provide subjects with conclusive warrant 
is an additional step in the argument. What are the grounds for the extra step? 
 One flat-footed response would be that this option is available once we have rejected 
the HCF claim. And given our interest in exploring the prospects of an epistemology where 
perceptual knowledge is based on conclusive warrant we should exploit the available option 
which most helps us secure that conception. Although such a response might be dialectically 
efficacious in the present context, it runs the risk of concealing the fact that there are 
independent reasons in favour of a conception where perceptual knowledge is based on 
conclusive warrant. McDowell himself has advanced independent reasons for thinking that 
an account where perceptual knowledge is incorrigible is desirable in epistemology. 
                                                 
37 See Soteriou (2016), ch. 5 for a detailed articulation of this line of defence for the epistemological 
disjunctivist.  
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McDowell maintains that a correct understanding of the notion of knowledge implies 
that having knowledge is inconsistent with it being grounded on inconclusive warrant – i.e. 
warrant the obtaining of which is consistent with the falsity of the warranted proposition. We 
can find an expression of this position in the following passage, where McDowell discusses 
the specific case of knowledge acquired through testimony: 
I have been exploiting a principle to this effect: if we want to be able to suppose the 
title of a belief to count as knowledge is constituted by the believer’s possession of 
an argument to its truth, it had better not be the case that the best argument he has 
at his disposal leaves it open that things are not as he believes them to be. If it does, 
what we are picturing is an epistemic position in which, for all the subject knows, 
things are not as he takes them to be; and that is not a picture of something that 
might intelligibly amount to knowing that they are that way. The argument would 
need to be conclusive. If you know something, you cannot be wrong about it 
(McDowell, 1994: 421). 
Although the dialectical context in this passage is convoluted, its main point is that 
knowledge, in general, cannot be based on inconclusive grounds. For having knowledge 
implies that one cannot be wrong about what one knows. Now, the passage makes this point 
through the consideration (and subsequent rejection) of an inferential account of testimonial 
knowledge. McDowell argues that if this type of knowledge was grounded on an argument, 
then the argument should be conclusive, i.e. it should not leave open the possibility that the 
conclusion be false. For if the argument leaves open the possibility that the conclusion be 
false, then the judgement or belief based on that argument could not count as a piece of 
knowledge.38 What is crucial to our discussion here is that McDowell is articulating a view 
of knowledge according to which one cannot know something if the grounds one has for 
believing the corresponding proposition are consistent with the falsity of that proposition.   
The intuition behind McDowell’s construal of knowledge can be made salient by 
considering the well-known lottery cases. Suppose I buy a ticket for a lottery in which the 
odds of winning are extremely low for any individual ticket, and I know this. Now, suppose 
that on this basis I form the belief that I will lose the lottery. Nevertheless, it seems natural 
to say that, despite being justified in holding this belief, I do not know that I will not win the 
lottery, for my evidence fails to rule out the possibility – however remote – that I possess a 
winning ticket. It is not until the lottery is drawn and I learn that my ticket is not the winning 
                                                 
38 McDowell’s ultimate conclusion in this context is that testimonial knowledge is not based on an argument 
to its truth, for there can be no conclusive argument for the case of testimony. See McDowell (1994). 
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one that I come to know that I have not won the lottery. One way of explaining this intuition 
appeals to adoption of the claim that knowledge can only be acquired on the back of 
conclusive warrant. The statistical evidence I possessed for thinking I would lose the lottery 
before it was drawn was inconclusive (albeit, still very good evidence). My evidence was 
consistent with the falsity of the proposition that I would not win the lottery. This is the 
reason why it was inappropriate to say – in advance of the draw – that I knew I would lose 
the lottery. Nevertheless, after I learn that my ticket is not the winning ticket I have acquired 
conclusive evidence for the relevant proposition. Only then – once conclusive grounds are 
acquired – can we say that we know.  
Now, this is merely a prima facie reason to favour McDowell’s construal of 
knowledge as requiring conclusive warrant. For the above line of reasoning depends on the 
intuition that in lottery cases we lack knowledge of the relevant proposition. But such an 
intuition can be challenged. Providing a response to views which challenge the intuition 
would put us back again in a defensive position. Unfortunately, here I lack the space to pursue 
this issue further. For my main aim is to present McDowell’s position in order to argue that 
the view benefits from the incorporation of some insights from Austin. But I want to conclude 
my exposition of McDowell’s view with a consideration in favour of his construal of 
knowledge which looks at the issue from a different angle.  
McDowell thinks that the availability of alternative epistemological views in which 
knowledge can be had on the basis of inconclusive warrant is not a real threat to his account. 
For he thinks that as long as a position like his is tenable, it clearly is to be preferred over a 
view in which knowledge can be had on the basis of inconclusive warrant. This kind of 
argument can be found in the following passage, where he attacks “hybrid conceptions” of 
knowledge, i.e. conceptions according to which the epistemic standing which grounds 
relevant knowledge fails to guarantee the truth of the warranted belief: 
A hybrid conception of knowledge is often taken to be obvious… What makes the 
hybrid conception seem obvious is that … this view of knowledge seems to be the 
only alternative to scepticism. But this is one of those set-ups that are familiar in 
philosophy, in which a supposedly exhaustive choice confers a spurious plausibility 
on a philosophical position. The apparent plausibility is not intrinsic to the position, 
but reflects an assumed framework; when one looks at the position on its own, the 
plausibility crumbles away… (McDowell, 1995: 404). 
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McDowell argues that “hybrid conceptions” of knowledge in general can only seem attractive 
in a framework in which conclusive warrant is not available. In the passage, McDowell 
implies that his own proposal constitutes a plausible response to scepticism which offers an 
alternative to the hybrid conception. Nevertheless, note that the mere fact that his proposal 
constitutes an alternative to scepticism is not what makes the view preferable to a hybrid 
conception. The assumption that conclusive warrant is not available is what makes the hybrid 
conception seem attractive at all. Once a view in which conclusive warrant is available enters 
the scene, the plausibility of the hybrid conception is lost. Here, the argument seems to rest 
ultimately on the idea that a conception where knowledge is based on conclusive warrant is 
a more attractive view than one in which knowledge is based on inconclusive warrant. A 
hybrid view is only attractive under the assumption that a view where knowledge is based on 
conclusive warrant is not available. But we have explained how such a conception is tenable 
in the contemporary philosophical debate. Given that such a view is available, then the 
reasons to go for a hybrid view fade away.39 
 In Summary, McDowell’s case for favouring a view in which perceptual knowledge 
is incorrigible depends on the following two ideas. First, the conception of knowledge as 
requiring conclusive grounds seems desirable from an epistemological point of view, as it 
voices certain intuitions we have regarding knowledge – for instance, it allows us to 
accommodate intuitions about knowledge in lottery scenarios. Second, hybrid views, where 
knowledge is had on the basis of inconclusive warrant, only seem attractive on the 
assumption that alternative views – where knowledge rests on conclusive grounds – are not 
available. These two points provide us with good prima facie reasons to favour a view in 
which successful exercises of perceptual capacities provide subjects with conclusive warrant. 
Establishing this case would require to defend these ideas from potential challenges. But that 
is something which has not been done here. McDowell’s position, nevertheless, remains a 
plausible view in the current debate – my aim here has not been to establish it, but merely to 
present it in detail. Ultimately, in the final section of this chapter, we will suggest one way 
in which McDowell’s view could be improved by appeal to Austin’s epistemology.  
                                                 
39 Against this line of reasoning it could be argued that McDowell’s view, i.e. that perception provides us with 
conclusive warrant, is not a tenable position. See Wright (2008) and Logue (2011). 
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2.2 Fallible Capacities, Indefeasible Warrant 
In the previous chapter we explained how Ayer tried to secure incorrigibility in perceptual 
knowledge by arguing that we have a general infallible capacity to tell what our experiences 
are like. There, we endorsed the reasons advanced by Austin to think that it is implausible to 
think we have such a capacity. Importantly Austin’s case against the possibility of such an 
infallible capacity, left room for a conception where perceptual knowledge is grounded on 
conclusive grounds.  
 McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism is a way of articulating such a position. 
For McDowell, perceptual capacities (characterised as capacities to provide the subject with 
conclusive warrant) are not infallible, i.e. they are liable to fail. This means that there will be 
some exercises of the capacity – defective exercises – where the subject will not thereby be 
afforded with conclusive warrant for corresponding world-directed judgements. Yet, that the 
capacity is fallible in this way does not preclude that in successful exercises of the capacity 
the subject is thereby afforded with conclusive warrant (see McDowell, 2011: 38). This 
framework allows that fallible perceptual capacities sometimes afford subjects with 
conclusive warrant. We should now consider whether such a characterisation is correct. In 
particular, we will look more closely at the characterisation of successful exercises of 
perceptual capacities in order to determine on what grounds it can be maintained that such 
exercises provide conclusive warrant to perceiving subjects.  
In his epistemology of perception McDowell makes space for a special kind of 
perceptual episode which plays a central role in explaining how rational subjects acquire 
perceptual knowledge. McDowell characterises such episodes as ones in which the subject’s 
perceptual state makes an environmental reality manifest to her. These are successful 
exercises of perceptual capacities, or good cases. A paradigmatic example of a perceptual 
episode of this sort is that of seeing – when a subject sees, say, that a cat is on the mat, that 
fact is made manifest to the subject. Being in this state affords the subject which conclusive 
warrant and, thereby, puts the subject in a position to know that the relevant fact obtains. On 
the McDowellian picture, these cases are to be contrasted with cases in which it merely seems 
to the subject as if an environmental reality were made manifest to them. These are defective 
exercises of the capacities, or bad cases.  
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As we have seen, one of the distinctive features of a good case is that they put subjects 
in a position to know that the fact which is made manifest to them in perception actually 
obtains. Now, the notion of being in a position to know something is not entirely conspicuous. 
It is important to spend some time clarifying in what way the notion is used by McDowell, 
for this will be relevant in a later stage of this chapter. The notion could be understood at 
least in the following two different ways: 
i) A subject is in a position to know that p if and only if all the subject should 
do to acquire knowledge is to judge that p.40 
ii) A subject is in a position to know that p if and only if the subject is in 
possession of grounds which guarantee the truth of p. 
McDowell chooses to characterise the notion along the lines of (ii) (McDowell, 2010: 246). 
Here, it is important to remember a point mentioned earlier, namely that on the operative 
conception, being in a position to know something does not imply actually knowing it – i.e. 
one can be in a position to know something and not know it. Thus, not knowing something 
does not suffice to show that someone is not in a position to know it. On McDowell’s view, 
the successful exercise of a subject’s perceptual capacities put her in position to know things 
about their surroundings by virtue of providing her with conclusive warrant for 
corresponding judgements. 
Now, why is it that in successful exercises of perceptual capacities the subject has 
conclusive warrant? Why is that a correct characterisation of the capacity? In short, 
McDowell’s response is that the conclusiveness of the warrant is guaranteed by the fact that 
the possession of that warrant is grounded in a state of affairs the obtaining of which is 
incompatible with the falsity of the relevant propositions warranted. McDowell thinks that a 
successful perceptual exercise provides subjects with indefeasible or conclusive warrant for 
making world-directed judgements because the following description is true of this kind of 
perceptual exercise: 
If a perceptual state makes a feature of the environment present to a perceiver’s 
rationally self-conscious awareness, there is no possibility, compatibly with 
someone’s being in that state, that things are not as the state would warrant her in 
believing that they are, in a belief that would simply register the presence of that 
                                                 
40 Timothy Williamson advances this conception of being in a position to know in his (1996).  
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feature of the environment. The warrant for belief that the state provides is 
indefeasible; it cannot be undermined (McDowell, 2011: 31).41  
That is, when a subject undergoes a successful perceptual episode, an episode of, say, seeing 
that a cat is before her, the warrant thereby provided to them for thinking that there is a cat 
in front of her is conclusive because the subject couldn’t possibly be in that state and the 
relevant proposition (i.e. that there is a cat in front of them) be false. Ultimately, it is the 
holding of this connection between successful exercises and the truth of certain propositions 
which grounds the conclusiveness of the warrants provided by successful perceptions.  
 
2.3 Indefeasible warrant? 
Now I want to call attention to the fact that in the passage quoted before McDowell presents 
his view in terms of “indefeasible” warrant. This has led some philosophers to think that, for 
McDowell, someone who forms a judgement on the basis of being in this kind of perceptual 
episode could not possibly be presented with counter-considerations which would lead her 
to retract her judgement (see Burge 2011).42 This interpretation might be suggested by the 
last sentence of the passage: the warrant provided by successful perceptions is such that “it 
cannot be undermined”. But McDowell maintains that this is not the correct reading of his 
contention that perception provides subjects with indefeasible warrant. He concedes that 
when an aspect of the environment is made manifest to a subject, some considerations could 
be advanced which would compel the subject to retract her claim to know.43 McDowell 
addresses these worries by reformulating his claim. Where he used to talk about indefeasible 
warrant he talks now of conclusive warrant: “I do not need that word [i.e. indefeasibility] to 
express the notion I explained. I could make my claim like this: non-defective acts of 
perceptual capacities are experiences in which environmental realities are perceptually 
present to subjects, so that the experiences warrant associated beliefs conclusively 
(McDowell, 2013: 267).  
 I want to suggest that, nevertheless, some of the worries raised by Burge are not 
appropriately addressed by McDowell’s change in vocabulary. One might still wonder 
                                                 
41 See also McDowell (2010: 245). 
42 See Wright (2008) for a similar criticism to McDowell’s view. 
43 This is an aspect which was already present in McDowell’s conception as early as his (1982), see especially 
p. 390, fn. 37. 
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whether the warrant provided to subjects in successful exercises of perceptual capacities 
could be undermined by counter-considerations. This is precisely one of the points that Tyler 
Burge (2011) presses on in his response to McDowell (2010). Burge argues that “well-known 
counterexamples” show that the warrant provided by successful exercises of perceptual 
capacities is open to defeat by counter-considerations: 
The individual could have had the same successful perceptual belief, resting on the 
same successful perception. But the individual could have been given 
overwhelming reason – from induction or from expert testimony – to think 
(mistakenly), immediately after forming the belief, that his or her perception or 
belief-formation process was inaccurate or unreliable in the circumstances (Burge, 
2011: 59).  
To illustrate the point made by Burge let me use two examples advanced by McDowell 
himself, which differ slightly from Burge’s general characterisation (I favour McDowell’s 
characterisation of the problematic cases because it is more fine-grained than Burge’s).  
• Scenario (1): Suppose a subject is misled by a trustworthy experimenter into thinking 
that she finds herself in the following experimental setting: 50% of the time the 
lighting conditions in the laboratory will be such that, provided the subject’s 
perceptual system is working properly, she would be able to tell the colour of the 
objects in front of her. The other 50% of the time the lighting conditions will be such 
that the subject would be unable to tell the colour of the things in front of her, despite 
the proper working of her perceptual systems. But the subject is misled into thinking 
she is in this situation. As a matter of fact she finds herself in a normal setting where 
the lighting conditions are appropriate all of the time. In other words, the subject in 
this scenario is provided with persuasive but misleading evidence to not trust their 
apparent perceptions. Unbeknownst to her, in any given occasion the situation will 
be such that the lighting conditions are appropriate for telling the colours of objects. 
• Scenario (2): Suppose a subject actually finds herself in the experimental setting 
described in the previous paragraph. Imagine that the subject has been informed about 
the way the experiment she is participating in works, but is not informed in any given 
occasion what is the state of the lighting conditions. Thus, in any given occasion the 
subject does not know whether the lighting conditions are appropriate for telling the 
colours of things, for she knows she finds herself in this experimental setting. In other 
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words, the information she is given by the experimenter constitutes good reason to 
not trust their apparent perceptions. 
The question which arises from these examples is whether in a given circumstance O, 
where the lighting conditions are appropriate for telling the colour of objects, subjects in 
scenarios (1) and (2) are in a position to know, say, that there is a green sphere before them? 
In other words, are such subjects in possession of conclusive warrant for thinking that there 
is a green sphere before them? If an affirmative answer is given to these questions do the 
counter-considerations presented by the experimenters effectively defeat the conclusive 
warrant the subjects enjoy? Interestingly, McDowell gives different verdicts for the two 
cases. He thinks that whether the information provided by the experimenters constitutes 
“good reason” or “misleading evidence” makes all the difference in these cases. For scenario 
(1) McDowell advances the following verdict: 
Suppose someone has an experience that makes a certain environmental reality 
perceptually present to her, but she is dissuaded by misleading evidence from taking 
that to be so. In that case, her perceptual state leaves open no possibility that a 
suitably related belief is false, but she is deprived of awareness that she is in such a 
position … But that leaves unchallenged the claim that the warrant her experience 
gives her … is conclusive (McDowell, 2013: 269). 
Whereas for the second kind of case his verdict is as follows: 
An experience had in circumstances in which there is good reason to believe 
apparent perceptions are untrustworthy is not an experience of perceiving, even if 
it happens to be veridical. So if our subject had been in such a situation, her 
experience would not have been an experience of perceiving, and it would not have 
provided her with conclusive warrant for the belief (McDowell, 2013: 269). 
Let us look closely at the two situations and McDowell’s verdicts about them. Let us start 
with scenario (1). It seems clear that if a subject were to judge, in that situation, that there is 
a green sphere before her, her judgement would not be knowledgeable. Why not? A natural 
response would be that the counter-considerations effectively undermine the subject’s 
capacity to exploit the warrant afforded by her experience. How do they to this? One 
suggestion is that these counter-considerations make it so that it would be irresponsible from 
the subject to judge that the sphere is green in the operative circumstances. Let us assume 
that a subject can only acquire knowledge if she has formed the relevant judgement in an 
epistemically responsible fashion. This is a claim which would be endorsed by McDowell 
  
64 
himself: “If one’s taking things to be thus and so are to be cases of knowledge, they must be 
sensitive to the requirements of doxastic responsibility” (McDowell, 1994: 429). Ignoring 
independent, seemingly trustworthy evidence which suggests that one’s source of epistemic 
warrant might not function appropriately would be epistemically irresponsible. As scenario 
(1) was set up, it seems that it would be irresponsible from the subject to ignore the 
information given to the subject by the experimenters. If the subject in scenario (1) would be 
breaking her epistemic obligations by judging that the sphere is green, then her resulting 
judgement cannot constitute knowledge.  
These are considerations which might lead us to think that if the subject in scenario 
(1) where to judge that the sphere is green, her judgement would not constitute knowledge. 
But is this a reason for thinking that this subject would not be in a position to know that 
proposition, i.e. that the subject would not possess conclusive warrant? It seems not. Let us 
remember that a subject not knowing something does not imply that she is not in a position 
to know that. Let us remember also that McDowell has chosen to flesh out the notion of being 
in a position to know in terms of possessing conclusive warrant.44 According to McDowell, 
in a particular occasion O, where the subject in scenario (1) is presented with a green sphere, 
the subject is thereby provided with warrant for thinking there is a green sphere, and the 
obtaining of that perceptual episode is incompatible with the falsity of the warranted 
proposition. So, there seems to be no reason to deny that the subject indeed has conclusive 
warrant. Nevertheless, being in possession of conclusive warrant does not license “one in 
refusing to consider apparent grounds for supposing that one’s experience is not one of 
perceiving” (McDowell, 2013: 270). This is the reason why the subject in scenario (1) would 
not know that there is a green sphere before them. Importantly, for McDowell, the warrant 
afforded by perception has not been undermined by the misleading information: the subject 
is in possession of conclusive warrant in virtue of being in that perceptual state. The counter-
considerations prevent the subject from exploiting the warrant she possesses.  
But McDowell’s verdict is very different in scenario (2). Surprisingly, his position 
with respect to this type of case is that even in a particular occasion O, when the lighting 
                                                 
44 These considerations might suggest that McDowell’s construal of the notion of “being in a position to 
know” is inappropriate, for in the relevant circumstances it seems that the subject’s position precludes her 
from knowing. This is a criticism I will not pursue here at the moment. 
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conditions are appropriate, and a green sphere is before her, the subject’s experience is not 
one of perceiving. In other words, in such an occasion the exercise of the subject’s perceptual 
capacities is defective. What is the rationale behind this claim? In a similar fashion to the 
situation considered in the previous paragraphs, a subject undergoing O in scenario (2) would 
not acquire knowledge if they made the judgement that there is a green sphere before them. 
As in scenario (1), this would be partly due to the fact that making that judgement would be 
epistemically irresponsible. And we have assumed that knowledge is incompatible with 
epistemic irresponsibility. Nevertheless, the one salient difference in scenario (2) with 
respect to scenario (1) is that this is not the only reason why a subject would not know (had 
they made the judgement that there is a green sphere before them). Unlike scenario (1), in 
scenario (2) the information provided by the experimenters is not misleading, it actually 
constitutes good evidence for thinking that one should not trust their senses in this context. 
That the subject finds herself as a matter of fact in that experimental setting brings forth a 
further reason which prevents her from knowing that the sphere is green. Namely, that she is 
in a setting where her judgements about the colour of things would be, at best, true by luck – 
a kind of luck which is incompatible with the relevant judgment constituting knowledge. 
And, as pointed out by Matthew Soteriou, the subject finds herself in this situation 
independently of her awareness that she is in this situation: “in the kind of experimental 
conditions I described, the subject’s perceptual experiences are untrustworthy, and the fact 
that they are untrustworthy is independent of the subject’s being appraised of that fact” 
(Soteriou, 2016: 143). In other words, in scenario (2) there is more than one reason why the 
subject would not know that the sphere is green (had they made the relevant judgement). In 
situation O, the subject’s judgement would be epistemically irresponsible; and even if true, 
it would have been true by luck.  
Nevertheless, it is not clear at all that this feature of scenario (2) should suffice to 
sustain a verdict different to the one advanced in scenario (1). All that has been shown by 
our discussion of scenario (2) is that the subject in this scenario would not know that there is 
a green sphere before them (had they made the relevant judgement). But, as we saw before, 
not knowing something does not imply that someone is not in a position to know it. 
Moreover, in a particular occasion O, where the subject in scenario (2) is perceptually aware 
of the green sphere, what would be the reason to deny that the subject is thereby provided 
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with conclusive warrant for thinking that there is a green sphere? After all, the obtaining of 
that perceptual episode is incompatible with the falsity of the warranted proposition. What 
are McDowell’s reasons for thinking that, in these circumstances, the exercise of the subject’s 
perceptual capacities would be defective? If the only reason for thinking that the subject in 
scenario (2) does not perceive the green sphere (and thus, lacks conclusive warrant for so 
thinking), is that the subject’s judgement that the sphere is green in those circumstances 
would not amount to knowledge, then McDowell’s case is not definitive. For we have seen 
that a subject can be in possession of conclusive warrant whilst not knowing the proposition 
that she has warrant for. We cannot infer from the subject’s lack of knowledge that they also 
lack conclusive warrant. Moreover, one reason advanced by McDowell to say that in scenario 
(1) the subject in situation O does possess conclusive warrant is that her having that 
experience excludes the possibility that the relevant judgement be false: “it is still the case 
that her experience leaves open no possibility that things are not as they would be believed 
to be in the belief she would have been misled into thinking she is not in a position to form” 
(McDowell, 2013: 270). But this is something that holds also for the subject in scenario (2), 
in O. If this is a good ground to maintain that the subject in scenario (1) possesses conclusive 
warrant, it should also be a good ground for maintaining the same thing about a subject in 
scenario (2).  
The last paragraph shows that there seems to be no good reason to maintain that 
subjects in scenarios like (2), in a situation type O, lack conclusive perceptual warrant. There 
is no good reason for this restriction especially within a view like McDowell’s, in which 
subjects in scenarios like (1), in a situation type O, are considered to possess conclusive 
warrant. Given these reasons to doubt McDowell’s verdict of scenario (2), we should 
consider whether an alternative, and more satisfactory, explanation is available. One natural 
suggestion would be to advance a conception in which subjects in scenarios like (2), in a 
situation type O, do possess conclusive warrant. On such a conception, we could maintain 
that the effect the operative counter-considerations have is that they render the subject unable 
to exploit the warrant her perceptual experience provides her with.  
So we are presented with two alternative accounts of scenario (2). On McDowell’s 
account the subject’s exercise of her perceptual capacities in O is defective – the subject is 
not provided with conclusive warrant. This would explain why the subject in O would not 
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know if she were to judge that the sphere before her is green. On our alternative account, the 
subject’s exercise of her perceptual capacities in O is successful – the subject is provided 
with conclusive warrant. Our explanation of why the subject would not know if she were to 
judge that the sphere is green has to do with the fact that there are two obstacles which prevent 
her from exploiting her perceptual conclusive warrant. These obstacles are: the trustworthy 
information given by the experimenters, which would render her potential judgement 
irresponsible; and the fact that she finds herself in a situation such that if she were to judge 
that the sphere is green, her judgement would be true by luck. 
Perhaps an additional twist to the story could help us see the plausibility that our 
alternative account has over McDowell’s. Imagine that after the experiment is over the chief 
experimenter informs you that in occasion O the lighting conditions were appropriate. Could 
you then acquire knowledge that there was a green sphere before you in O? It seems 
reasonable to respond affirmatively to this question. After being told that the situation was 
normal in O, one could come to know that the sphere was green after all. A straightforward 
explanation of why this additional information allows us to acquire knowledge about the 
previously experienced situation is that the obstacle which hindered the subject from 
exploiting the warrant afforded to her by perception has been now dismantled. The subject 
would not be epistemically irresponsible anymore if she were to judge that the sphere was 
green. And, moreover, even when it was partly due to luck that in that particular situation, O, 
the lighting conditions were appropriate, it was not due to luck that in that situation her 
judgement was true – after all the situation was such that it excluded the possibility that the 
judgement be false. The additional information puts the subject in a position to show that the 
luck involved in O does not prevent her from knowing. After being informed by an authority 
that this is the only real barn in barn-façade County, one might be able to know that the 
structure before one is a barn. For one has the elements to neutralize the luck involved in 
being in barn-façade country vis-à-vis judging that the structure before one is a barn.45 We 
have, then, a straightforward way of explaining how a subject could acquire knowledge about 
O, after the experiment is over and she acquires the additional information about O. The 
explanation is this: the subject had conclusive warrant all along. The information provided 
to her after the experiment is over allows her to exploit that warrant and acquire the 
                                                 
45 The barn façade example is due to Goldman (1976). 
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knowledge that was available to her all along. This information allows her to exploit the 
warrant because it dismantles the obstacles that prevented the subject from exploiting that 
warrant.  
But within McDowell’s account we cannot advance this explanation. For McDowell, 
the subject’s perceptual capacities are exercised defectively in scenario (2), in situation O. 
Which means that the subject lacks conclusive warrant for thinking that the sphere before her 
in O was green. Thus, the additional information that in O the lighting conditions were 
appropriate to tell colours cannot enable the subject to exploit the warrant afforded to her by 
perception – for her perception did not provide her with any warrant she could exploit in a 
judgement. One suggestion which could be advanced on behalf of McDowell would be to 
say that a subject in scenario (2), in situation O, lacked conclusive warrant for thinking that 
the sphere was green. Nevertheless, it could be claimed that her perceptual experience 
afforded her with less than conclusive warrant in that situation. When the subject is informed 
by the chief experimenter that in situation O the lights were appropriate to tell the colours of 
things, then the subject is in a position to exploit her less than conclusive warrant, afforded 
to her by perception. Nevertheless, this would not get McDowell too far, for he is committed 
to a conception according to which knowledge has to rest on conclusive grounds if it is to be 
considered knowledge at all. But if the suggestion is that perceptual experiences could afford 
a subject in scenario (2), in situation O, at most with less than conclusive warrant, then he 
cannot make sense of the idea that such a subject could attain knowledge when she is 
provided with the additional information regarding O. At this stage several options open for 
McDowell. First, he can reject the claim that in the latest twist to the story the subject would 
know that the sphere was green if she were to make that judgement. Second, he could claim 
that her less than conclusive warrant, supplemented with the additional information regarding 
O, constitute conclusive warrant for thinking that the sphere was green. Third, he could revise 
his account of scenario (2) and embrace our proposal to concede that a subject in O would 
possess conclusive warrant for thinking that the sphere was green.  
Here I will not look closely at the plausibility of the first two options. I will say a few 
things about them in order to suggest that the best option available for McDowell is to 
endorse the alternative account of scenario (2) advanced by us. The first two options involve 
holding on to the account of scenario (2) given by McDowell, according to which the exercise 
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of the subject’s perceptual capacities are defective and fail to provide her with conclusive 
warrant. But, we saw before that such an approach lacks adequate motivation, for the only 
reasons in its favour were found to be indecisive. Moreover, the first strategy would involve 
rejecting the intuition that subjects in the latest twist of the story could acquire knowledge 
were they to judge that the sphere was green. This intuition would have to be explained away 
if the first strategy is going to be successful. The second strategy would involve serious 
theoretical work to explain how the situation described in the latest twist to the story could 
give rise to conclusive warrant for the subject. Given these considerations, I want to suggest 
that the more economical reaction from McDowell would be to embrace the third strategy 
and adopt our account of scenario (2), according to which the subject in O does have 
conclusive warrant for thinking that the sphere was green.  
In the final section of this chapter I want to suggest that our treatment of scenario (2) 
is not a just-so story, but that it actually follows from the Austinian approach to perceptual 
knowledge that we wish to defend in this thesis. That Austin’s epistemology finds 
applicability in this discussion, and helps us deal better with the scenarios that are 
problematic for McDowell’s view, is a strong indication to think that Austin’s approach to 
perceptual knowledge has a lot to offer in the contemporary philosophical landscape.  
 
2.4 Back to Austin – the Optimal position for Making a Perceptual Judgement 
Let us remember that in our interpretation of Austin, a judgement made on the basis of 
perception, on a given circumstance, is incorrigible only if the subject who does it finds 
herself in the optimal position to make that judgement. An important aspect of this 
interpretation of Austin is that being in this optimal position to make a perceptually based 
judgement is not exhausted by the subject being in a given perceptual state:   
 [I]f when I make a statement, it is true that nothing whatever could in fact be 
produced as a cogent ground for retracting it, this can only be because I am in, have 
got myself into, the very best possible position for making that statement (Austin, 
1962: 114). 
On the assumption that Austin’s remarks extend to judgements, when someone finds herself 
in the best possible position for judging that there is a green sphere in front of them, this is 
not merely because they are in, say, a state of seeing the green sphere. Being in the optimal 
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position for making a judgement also involves the subject having done something to be in 
that position, i.e. to be in a position in which they can exploit the warrant afforded to her by 
perception. A suggestion made in the previous chapter was that, on Austin’s picture, there 
are two elements which contribute to the optimal position for making a judgement: a passive 
and an active element.  
 Both Austin and McDowell would agree that the successful exercise of perceptual 
capacities provide subjects with a distinctive kind of warrant for world-directed judgements. 
But the Austinian approach we have advanced incorporates explicitly an agential element. 
Depending on the circumstances, different things will be required from the perceiver in order 
to exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception. This is why Austin remarks that one 
“gets oneself into” the optimal position to make a judgement. Let us consider a simple case 
in which the subject has not done enough to place themselves in that position. Consider, for 
instance, a case in which there are plenty of tapirs and pigs roaming in the farm and the 
subject has a quick glimpse of a pig. The subject’s perceptual experience provides her with 
conclusive warrant for thinking that the animal is a pig – after all the subject being in that 
perceptual state is inconsistent with the falsity of the relevant proposition. But despite 
possessing conclusive warrant, the subject might not be in a position to rationally judge this, 
let alone know it. Let us suppose that the subject did not pay enough attention to the animal 
to ascertain that it indeed was a pig. For Austin, this means that the subject did not do what 
she had to do to be in a position to exploit the warrant afforded to her by her perceptual 
experience. Given the presence of ringers, it might be required from the subject to do more 
than having a quick glimpse on the animal in order to be able to exploit the warrant afforded 
to her by perception.   
 On Austin’s position, a failure to know in cases where perceptual capacities are 
exercised does not necessarily mean that the exercise has been defective. There are plenty of 
alternative reasons as to why, in a particular case, the subject might be unable to acquire 
knowledge. For, depending on the case, there are many things the subject might need to do 
in order to be able to exploit the conclusive warrant afforded to her by perception. For 
instance, in “Other Minds” (1946: 82-97), Austin suggests that one can know that a bird in a 
branch is a goldfinch only if one is prepared to deal with potential counter-considerations. 
Moreover, when a specific counter-consideration does arise, if one is to retain the claim to 
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knowledge one must be able to neutralize that counter-consideration. It is important to note 
that Austin’s position is not as demanding as this characterisation makes it sound. For 
Austin’s position in that paper is that for one to be knowledgeable one need not be able to 
neutralize just any possible counter-considerations. Thus, for instance, one need not be 
worried if my claim that the bird is a goldfinch is challenged on the basis that my grounds 
(say, that it has a red head) for so thinking are “not enough”. If no further specification is 
advanced, then the challenge that my grounds are not enough fails to gain any traction. A 
valid challenge must specify in what sense my grounds are not enough. You might point out, 
for instance, that other birds in the vicinity have red heads too (Austin, 1946: 84). Thus, for 
Austin, the requirement that the subject be able to deal with potential counter-considerations 
is limited by the many different ways in which a challenge might turn out to be “invalid”. 
Yet, the suggestion is that a subject can exploit the warrant afford to her by perception only 
if she is able to neutralize valid challenges.  
 The account we advanced of scenario (2) in the previous section seems natural from 
the Austinian perspective we have developed. This approach makes space for the possibility 
that the subject in scenario (2), in O, successfully perceives her environment and that, 
therefore, has conclusive warrant for thinking that the sphere is green. Yet, we can explain 
their lack of knowledge on the basis that the subject has not done enough to place herself in 
a position where she can exploit that warrant. The information given by the experimenter 
amounts to a valid challenge to her potential judgement that the sphere is green. Unless the 
subject has a way to neutralize those counter-considerations, she will be unable to exploit 
that warrant. The additional information described in the latest twist to the story, provides 
the subject with the elements to dismantle the obstacle which prevented her from exploiting 
the conclusive warrant afforded to her by perception.46    
 These considerations show that our account of scenario (2) follows naturally from the 
Austinian epistemology we are defending in this thesis. This means that our account is not a 
                                                 
46 It is important to note that the Austinian approach advanced here is consistent with saying that there might 
be circumstances in which there is nothing the subject could have done to put herself in a position in which she 
could exploit a warrant afforded to her by perception. Consider, for instance a case in which we can see a 
goldfinch standing on a tree, only for it to immediately fly away. The position is not incompatible with the fact 
that sometimes, despite possessing conclusive warrant, there simply is nothing the subject could do to exploit 
that warrant (see Austin, 1946: 88).  
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just-so story invoked in the face of the problems which arise for McDowell’s position, rather 
it is a well-motivated account. I would like to finish this chapter by highlighting something 
which was mentioned before already. Namely, that our case for favouring our account of 
scenario (2) should not be considered a knock down argument against McDowell’s position. 
Quite the opposite. My suggestion is that McDowell’s position would be improved if it 
incorporated the account we advanced of scenario (2). The issue of whether there is a further 
aspect of McDowell’s position which makes it incompatible with embracing this account 
cannot be addressed here.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have explored one way in which an Austin-inspired epistemology could 
be put to use in the contemporary epistemological landscape. We explained how embracing 
an aspect of that Austinian approach would allow us to provide a plausible explanation of the 
cases that McDowell struggles with. In order to do this we engaged in detailed exposition of 
McDowell’s position in the first part of the chapter. This work will be useful in future 
chapters where we will again contrast our position to McDowell’s. In order to address the 
problems raised by the examples presented by Burge we appealed to the optimal position for 
making a judgement which figures in Austin’s epistemology. I suggested that this provided 
us with good reason to think that the Austinian approach can be effectively put to use in the 
contemporary epistemological landscape. In the remainder of this thesis we will look closer 
at Austin’s suggestion that in successful exercises of perceptual experience subjects are 
afforded with non-evidential warrant for making world-directed judgements. In the following 
chapter we propose that this aspect of Austin’s epistemology can be fleshed out by the 
Radical Anti-psychologism advanced by Mark Kalderon in a recent paper (Kalderon, 2011).  
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Chapter 3 – Austin’s Insight and Radical Anti-psychologism 
In the previous chapter we discussed Austin’s conception of incorrigibility in central cases 
of perceptual knowledge. There, I argued that, for Austin, incorrigibility in those central cases 
stems from the subject’s being in the best possible position for making the relevant 
judgement. Two components make up such an optimal position. On the one hand successful 
perceptual experiences make available conclusive warrant for the perceiving subject. This 
was characterised as the passive element in the optimal position. On the other hand, there is 
a set of things the subject should do in order to be able to exploit the warrant afforded to her 
by perception. This was characterised as the active element in the optimal position. In the 
previous chapter, we identified and discussed one such condition of the active element. For 
Austin, the subject must be able to neutralize valid counter-considerations to her judgement. 
In other words, the subject must be disposed to act accordingly – i.e. in an epistemically 
responsible manner – in the face of counter-considerations to her judgement. Further 
conditions which contribute to the active element in the optimal position might include 
paying careful attention to the relevant perceived aspects of the environment, and 
successfully recognizing those elements as the things they are. In the previous chapter we 
noted the difficulties in characterizing these capacities (attention, recognition, and sensitivity 
to counter-considerations) as active capacities.  
The focus for the remainder of this thesis will be the passive element of the optimal 
position. Advancing a detailed elucidation and defence of this will provide us with enough 
material for this thesis. Unfortunately, then, a detailed elucidation and defence of the active 
element will be set aside. It is important, nevertheless, to bear in mind that the passive 
element in the optimal position is only one part of the Austinian story about perceptual 
knowledge. Recognition that there is an active element in this epistemological story will be 
relevant for our purposes – i.e. elucidating the passive element – at certain points. Thus, 
something brief will be said about the active element, although it will not be the focus of the 
present enquiry, nor will we develop a full account of it. For instance, we have already said 
something about sensitivity to counter-considerations in the previous chapter, and we will 
say something brief about recognitional capacities in chapters 5 and 6.  
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 More specifically, the focus in the remainder of the thesis will be what we called 
“Austin’s insight” in chapter 1. That is the claim that the warrant on which certain 
paradigmatic instances of perceptual knowledge are based is a distinctive kind of warrant. 
There, the warrant in question was characterised as non-evidential. We identified two claims 
associated with the insight – a positive one, and a negative one. According to the negative 
claim, the non-evidential warrant possessed by a subject in paradigmatic cases is different in 
kind from the warrant possessed by the subject in cases of evidential perceptual knowledge. 
According to the positive claim, the warrant possessed by subjects in non-evidential cases is 
distinctively good, epistemologically speaking. More specifically, non-evidential warrant is 
tantamount to proof, in the sense that it has the capacity to settle an issue. The emphasis in 
this and the following chapters will be on elucidating and defending of a specific 
interpretation of these claims. The theoretical framework that will be used to provide this 
elucidation is the Radical Anti-psychologism advanced recently by Mark Kalderon (2011). 
In the first part of this chapter we will address a worry which might arise at a 
fundamental level with respect to Austin’s insight. That is, the worry that the insight amounts 
to no more than a linguistic observation which has little or no philosophical significance for 
an epistemological account of perception. We will argue that such an accusation rests on a 
misunderstanding of the Austinian method. The second part of this chapter will be devoted 
to an articulation of Austin’s insight along Radical Anti-psychologist lines. The adoption of 
this position will provide us with the elements to explain how non-evidential warrant can be 
different in kind from evidential warrant, as well as how perception can provide subjects with 
conclusive warrant. In that section, we will also contrast our favoured interpretation of 
Austin’s insight with two possible alternatives – one based on Timothy Williamson’s remarks 
on evidence (2000), and one based on McDowell’s (1982, 2011) conception of the 
epistemological significance of perception.  
 
3.1 Austin’s insight. Linguistic Observation or Epistemological Claim? 
We have argued that a distinctive and attractive epistemology of perception can be found in 
Austin’s writings, and our overall aim in this thesis is to start articulating a detailed 
epistemology of perception which takes its cue from Austin’s observations. This approach to 
Austin’s epistemology and to Austin’s Insight assumes that something philosophically 
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significant has been uncovered by him in his discussion of evidential and non-evidential 
perceptual knowledge. Nevertheless, this assumption could be challenged by someone who 
is sceptical of Austin’s methodology on the basis that its excessive reliance on the analysis 
of our ordinary use of language prevents him from appreciating the genuinely philosophical 
problems that lie behind ordinary talk. In this section, we will pay close attention to this form 
of criticism. This will serve as a springboard for the following section. Once we have made 
a case for thinking that Austin’s insight indeed uncovers something philosophically 
significant we will advance an epistemological picture which fleshes out Austin’s insight.  
As we saw in the first chapter, Austin appeals to a couple of examples to establish the 
claim that in certain circumstances our perceptual knowledge is non-evidentially warranted. 
He does so by drawing a distinction between two different ways in which we could come to 
know something on the basis of perception. For instance, he says, we would properly talk of 
evidence for thinking that there is a pig somewhere in the farm when we saw pig hoofprints 
on the ground, but not when the pig itself was in plain view in front of us. Similarly, we do 
not say that we have evidence for thinking that a man shot another if we have witnessed the 
shooting ourselves. This way of talking – i.e. talk of evidence – is reserved for cases such as 
the one in which we find the murder weapon covered in the murderer’s fingerprints. Note 
that this is consistent with the claim that someone in the position of the witness can provide 
evidence for someone less well-placed. That is, an eyewitness can produce evidence for 
someone else in the form of their testimony, for instance in a court of law. But, importantly, 
this does not entail that the witness’ knowledge that the shooting occurred rests on evidence 
– she does not need evidence, she has witnessed the shooting.47 The notions of “signs” and 
“symptoms” exhibit a behaviour similar to that of “evidence”. According to Austin, “we 
never talk of ‘symptoms’ or ‘signs’ except by way of implied contrast with inspection of the 
item itself” (Austin, 1946: 105). This is illustrated by means of another example: looking 
from a window, it would be improper to say that there are signs of a storm when we can see 
that it is pouring with rain outside. Instead, talk of signs of a storm are reserved for cases in 
which the storm is not currently present, for example if it were approaching in the horizon 
                                                 
47 This is not an uncontroversial way of understanding the epistemic significance of testimony. See, for 
instance Moran (2005), for a view in which the epistemic role of testimony is not to provide the hearer with 
evidence, but with a distinctive kind of reason for belief. 
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(Cfr. Austin, 1946: 106). Now, that at least this contrast is marked, or at least implied, in 
ordinary talk should be obvious from the examples. Nevertheless, it is not so clear what is 
the best way to flesh out the distinction and what, if any, is its epistemological significance.48  
 Let us consider the position of someone critical of the Austinian approach – i.e. 
someone who would be sceptical of the philosophical significance of the distinction 
identified by Austin. A criticism of this kind could be mounted by making use of a more 
general line of reasoning commonly employed against Austin’s methodological approach. 
This line of argument targets Austin’s methodology by claiming that as illuminating as it 
might be to identify certain ways in which the philosophical use of certain expressions differs 
– sometimes wildly – from their everyday use, such observations generally lack interesting 
philosophical consequences.49 The critic could concede that Austin has successfully 
identified both the circumstances in which we would say that we have evidence for something 
being the case; as well as the circumstances in which it would not be appropriate to say that 
we have evidence for – or that there are signs of – something being the case. The examples 
of the pig, the shooting, and the storm should make this vivid. But all that Austin has achieved 
in so doing, the opponent could argue, is to provide an accurate description of a linguistic 
practice. The opponent could go on to question whether the linguistic point made by Austin 
has any epistemological consequences. Why think the linguistic phenomena reveals 
something about the underlying epistemology?  
 This criticism rests on a conception of Austin’s general approach to philosophical 
disputes, according to which his unwillingness or incapacity to appreciate the concerns which 
motivate traditional philosophical theorising prevents him from gathering (linguistic) data 
which is actually relevant for the relevant philosophical inquiry. This conception of Austin’s 
approach is found, for instance, in Jonathan Bennett’s early criticism of Austin’s 
methodology. Regarding Austin’s survey of the different uses of the term “real” in chapter 
                                                 
48 Here, Austin’s underlying strategy of reading semantical distinctions from distinctions in use could be 
challenged. For instance, a Gricean might suggest that our unwillingness to characterise one’s position when 
one sees the pig as involving evidence is to be explained by the fact that talking of evidence in those cases 
might carry unwanted implicatures (see Grice, 1975). This potential challenge to Austin will have to be set 
aside in this thesis. But an exhaustive defence of his position should advance a response to this worry.  
49 See Bennett (1966) and Ayer (1967) for this type of criticism to Austin’s methodology. See also Urmson 
(1965), Glendinning (2011), Gustafsson (2011), Longworth (2013), and Cavell (1965) for different views on 
Austin’s methodology. For a different angle in criticism of Austin’s methodology see Stroud (1984) and 
Kaplan (2000) for a response to that criticism. 
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VIII of Sense and Sensibilia, Bennett complains that the survey is useless because Austin is 
unwilling to see the motivations driving the philosophical debate: “in order to show that 
philosophers are neglecting data relevant to their concerns, one needs to understand what 
their concerns are; and such understanding requires some measure of intellectual sympathy 
with modes of thought whose largeness one may find distasteful” (Bennett, 1966: 514). On 
Bennett’s view, Austin’s incapacity to appreciate the concerns of philosophers worried about 
the relation between reality and appearance prevents him from carrying out a linguistic 
survey which is relevant to the established philosophical debate. On such a conception, then, 
the irrelevance of Austin’s linguistic findings derives from his lack of understanding or 
sympathy towards what drives philosophical debates. This is the “popular conception” of 
Austin’s methodology that Michael Martin finds in critical engagements with Austin: “a 
somewhat ad hoc and pedantic focus on how words are actually used in ordinary or common 
language; an obstinate refusal to look at the phenomena which genuinely motivate 
philosophical concerns, and an insistence that all one must do is use one’s words carefully” 
(Martin, ms, 1).  
 If this were a correct conception of the Austinian methodology, then one would be 
well-advised to call into question the relevance for philosophical theorising of Austin’s 
observations regarding our common use of words. We will argue that the “popular 
conception” is a caricature, and that the criticism mounted on it can be dismissed safely. We 
can see that the popular conception is not fair to Austin if we focus on the way in which Ayer 
himself uses it in his reaction to Sense and Sensibilia.50 There, Ayer claims several times that 
Austin’s (largely correct) linguistic observations fall short of engaging with the properly 
philosophical points he was interested in making. For instance, Ayer agrees with Austin in 
his observation that it is inappropriate to classify all cases in which subjects might be 
deceived by appearances as “illusions”. Yet, Ayer goes on to claim that “these points are 
unimportant” (Ayer, 1967: 128), for they fail to engage with the properly philosophical point 
of whether the argument from illusion shows something of philosophical interest. Elsewhere, 
Ayer concedes that Austin is right in pointing out that the words “look”, “appear”, and 
“seem” are not synonymous – contrary to the way some sense-datum theorist use them. But, 
again, this point is dismissed by Ayer as irrelevant: “[Austin] has some interesting things to 
                                                 
50 Ayer (1967).  
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say on this topic, but nothing that is relevant to the main argument” (Ayer, 1967: 130). As 
long as the technical sense of “seems” advanced by sense-datum theorists is legitimate, Ayer 
claims, the linguistic observations made by Austin can be dismissed safely. Nevertheless, 
what Ayer fails to acknowledge is that Austin’s discussion in chapter IX of Sense and 
Sensibilia is largely devoted to challenging the legitimacy of the technical sense of “seems” 
introduced by Ayer and other sense-datum theorists. There, Austin’s challenge is based on 
the claim that the technical term, as advanced by Ayer, presupposes what the argument from 
illusion is intended to prove, i.e. that sense-data are the proper objects of perception.51 Ayer 
omits this aspect of Austin’s work in his response, and makes it seem as if all Austin did was 
to jot down the different ways “seem”, “appear”, and “look” are ordinarily used. 
 Arguably, in the two cases described in the previous paragraph a case is to be made 
in favour of the relevance of Austin’s remarks with respect to the philosophical discussion at 
hand. Let us focus, nevertheless, on the third instance in which Ayer dismisses Austin’s 
remarks on ordinary language on the grounds that they are irrelevant for the philosophical 
discussion at hand. This dismissal has to do with Austin’s remarks regarding the 
evidential/non-evidential distinction. After reviewing Austin’s discussion on the topic, Ayer 
remarks: 
All this may be accepted, as a comment on ordinary usage. As a general rule, wen 
one speaks of having evidence for a proposition p, one expects it to be understood 
that one is not entirely convinced of the truth of p […] It would, however, be rash 
to lay any weight upon this in the present context, since my knowing that p is 
certainly not inconsistent with my having good evidence for it. On the contrary, 
in very many instances it would not be proper for me to claim to know that p 
unless I did have such evidence (Ayer, 1967: 121).  
In this response, Ayer seems to read Austin as arguing that one cannot know p on the basis 
of evidence, but fails to provide sound grounds for such a claim. For Ayer, a survey of the 
different uses of “evidence” is irrelevant because this survey fails to show that we cannot 
know that p on the basis of evidence. Nevertheless, that is not Austin’s target – his discussion 
of the use of “evidence” is not intended to prove that we cannot know on the basis of 
evidence. For him, a subject can know about the presence of a pig in, at least, two different 
ways: by gathering evidence of its presence, or by encountering the beast itself. This is why 
                                                 
51 See chapter 1, section 1.1.ii of this thesis for detailed discussion of this aspect of Ayer’s view. 
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he says that “one who says ‘it’s a pig’ will sometimes have evidence for saying so, sometimes 
not” (Austin, 1962a: 116).  
 Thus, in this instance, it seems Ayer has misidentified the target of Austin’s criticism. 
But what is the target of the discussion, then? And do Austin’s observations succeed in 
engaging with that philosophical discussion? A reasonable construal is that Austin’s target 
in this passage is a doctrine about knowledge which seems to be implicit in Ayer’s position: 
“In a nutshell, the doctrine about […] ‘empirical’ knowledge, is that it has foundations. It is 
a structure the upper tiers of which are reached by inferences, and the foundations are the 
data on which these inferences are based” (Austin 1962a: 105). With respect to this doctrine, 
it is the purpose of Austin’s discussion to put in doubt the assumption that knowledge has 
foundations – when this crucial notion is interpreted in terms of “evidence”. Once the target 
has been characterised along these lines, we can see that Austin’s discussion of the everyday 
use of the notion of “evidence” is indeed relevant for the philosophical discussion. If the 
upshot of his linguistic survey is that sometimes knowledge (in particular, perceptual 
knowledge) is not based on evidence, then the “doctrine about empirical knowledge” looks 
less secure. On this reading, Austin’s target is a much more fundamental point to the one 
identified (wrongly) by Ayer. And it is only when the proper target is brought to the 
foreground that we can see clearly that Austin’s discussion is relevant to the philosophical 
debate.52 One might complain still that Austin’s discussion of “evidence” might be irrelevant 
because ordinary use of a term is insufficient to establish that the term tracks an ontological 
category. This point should be obvious from terms like “witch”. We will see that Austin 
would agree with this remark. His point is not that distinctions in ordinary language establish 
matters in philosophy (or other theoretical enterprises), his point is merely that the ordinary 
distinctions can be used as data which has to be explained by our philosophical theories.  
 We are well advised, then, not to confuse Austin’s attempt to challenge some of the 
most basic assumption on which traditional debates rest, with an unwillingness or an 
incapacity to understand the debates, or the concerns which motivate them. Perhaps this 
seeming lack of interest in engaging in philosophical debates – an element central in the 
“popular conception” of Austin – is better understood merely as a refusal to accept the terms 
                                                 
52 See Glendinning (2011) for a similar account of the main target of Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia.  
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of the debate as they are set. Austin’s methodology, then, can be seen as an invitation to step 
back, slow down and re-consider what is it that we are trying to achieve with our 
philosophical theories. One of many ways in which such re-considerations can be promoted 
is by looking closely at the different ways in which we ordinarily talk of the phenomena we 
are trying to understand. These considerations give us reason to put in doubt the “popular 
conception” of Austin’s philosophical method. A positive characterisation of Austin’s 
linguistic method, especially its role in philosophical theorising, will help us understand with 
more detail what is the basis to think that the evidential/non-evidential distinction identified 
by Austin reveals something of interest to an epistemologist of perception.  
  
i) Some Remarks on Austin’s Methodology 
It is patently true that Austin’s philosophical approach is characterised by a careful analysis 
of the different ways in which words and expressions are used in ordinary, non-philosophical, 
contexts. But there is more to Austin’s philosophical methodology. Austin himself explicitly 
acknowledges that such method is just one in the philosopher’s arsenal: the method of 
“examining what we should say when” is characterised by himself as “one philosophical 
method” (Austin, 1957: 181, my emphasis). Yet, the philosopher’s practice should not be 
limited to analysing (and accepting) ordinary linguistic practices as they stand. What then is 
then the role of the careful analysis of the ordinary use of language characteristic of Austin’s 
philosophy? In one way of understanding the Austinian method, the analysis of ordinary 
language is propaedeutic work necessary for proper philosophical theorising: 
First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools, we 
should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves 
against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their 
own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, 
to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies 
and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more 
hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have 
found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely 
to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the 
survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably 
practical matters, than any of you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of 
an afternoon—the most favoured alternative method (Austin, 1957: 181-182). 
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Austin is making several claims here in an attempt both to characterise, in general, the 
methodological role of common language analysis, as well as to present the advantages this 
method can report to philosophy. One claim being made in this passage (“First…”) is that 
one advantage of such methodology is to provide us with a clear understanding of the 
phenomena to be studied as well as to prevent us from making certain mistakes. For Austin, 
the starting point of philosophical theorising should be a thorough analysis of how the 
concepts relevant to our enquiry are ordinarily used. This should lead at the very least to a 
clear understanding of our ordinary ways of describing the phenomena we are attempting to 
explain philosophically. A beneficial by-product of knowing well the different ways in which 
certain concepts are commonly used is that we will be prepared to deal with the “traps” set 
by language. Austin is not explicit in what he means here by language setting traps. But one 
way of understanding this claim would be the following. A careful study of the common use 
of expressions will provide us with an understanding of the main ways in which these 
expressions are used. But such a study will reveal not only the regularities underlying our 
use of those expressions; it will also reveal the ways in which certain uses deviate from the 
norm (see Urmson, 1965). Being aware of divergence as well as the norm will prevent us 
from taking divergent uses as the norm and vice versa. For instance, in “Other Minds” (1946: 
106, fn. 1), Austin notes a divergent use of “signs”, namely that we talk of signs of inflation 
are of the same nature of inflation itself. This diverges from the general rule that according 
to which we talk of signs (as in “signs of a storm”) in the absence of the item the signs are 
signs of. 
More importantly for our present purposes, another claim made in this passage 
(“Thirdly…”) is that distinctions made in ordinary language should be treated with respect 
by the philosopher, for they are the result of a long history of evolution and adaptation in the 
description of a wide variety of phenomena. One way of cashing out this remark (a way 
supported by Austin’s philosophy) would be to claim that the ordinary use of language should 
have initial credibility, and a prima facie authority which should guide philosophical 
theorising. This remark provides us, then, with an avenue to respond to the worry that 
Austin’s linguistic observations fails to reveal anything about the underlying epistemology. 
The response would be that distinctions which are made in ordinary talk are distinctions to 
be taken seriously, for they have stood the test of time. It is the job of the philosopher to 
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identify such distinctions, and, recognizing their importance, she must make sense of them 
in her theory. She can do so either by incorporating the distinction into their view, or by 
rejecting the distinction. But in the latter case an adequate explanation of such rejection has 
to be given. On Austin’s view, a revisionary approach to the ordinary use of language requires 
a special reason for the revision, for instance, the failure to accommodate a given 
phenomenon without the introduction of new expressions. This shows that for Austin, when 
there is good reason for it, philosophers may defy ordinary linguistic practices.53 After all, as 
robust as ordinary language might be, it is bound to have expressive limitations: 
It is worth bearing in mind, too, the general rule that we must not expect to find 
simple labels for complicated cases. Here the natural economy of language 
operates: if the words already available for simple cases suffice in combination to 
describe a complicated case, there will be need for special reasons before a special 
word is invented for the complication. Besides, however well-equipped our 
language, it can never be forearmed against all possible cases that may arise and 
call for description: fact is richer than diction (Austin, 1957: 195). 
 
On the Austinian approach, then, everyday linguistic practice is to be analysed carefully as a 
preliminary to philosophical theorising. This analysis should lead to a comprehensive 
understanding of the way the expressions involved are ordinarily used, and the results should 
be taken seriously by philosophers. But this attitude of respect does not amount to a complete 
impossibility of revision. Revisions to ordinary language are justified only insofar as the 
ordinary language is somehow lacking when it comes to describing the relevant 
phenomena.54  
 If this is a correct way of understanding the Austinian method, it is hard to see how 
there could be anything contentious or fundamentally misguided in it. For, on this reading, 
the role of linguistic analysis in Austin’s methodology is quite sensible, as it merely urges us 
to understand and accommodate the language that is ordinarily used to describe the relevant 
phenomena we are interested in before embarking ourselves in philosophical theorising. 
Perhaps the initial worry – that Austin’s linguistic remarks lack philosophical significance – 
                                                 
53 For instance, there are reasons independent of the use of terms such as “witch” to think that they do not 
track a real entity in the world. 
54 This way of understanding Austinian methodology is advanced by Longworth (2013: §2). 
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rests on the idea that Austin only makes linguistic observations and accepts them at face 
value unreflectively. But our analysis of Austin’s linguistic methodology shows that this 
accusation rests on a simplification. For Austin, linguistic analysis is only the first step in 
philosophical theorising. The attitude of respect towards ordinary language is based on its 
long history (on its having stood the test of time), and does not amount to a complete 
incapacity to revising it. The attitude of respect advocated by Austin merely requires from 
philosophers that a good reason is advanced for the rejection of an ordinary way of talking 
or for the introduction of new, technical, terminology. Austin’s insight, then, is advanced as 
a substantive piece of philosophical theorising. A principle which finds part of its motivation 
in a well-established linguistic practice. But this does not mean that the principle finds its 
justification merely in the ordinary linguistic practice. Austin’s insight is a piece of 
philosophical theorising advanced to make sense an established linguistic phenomenon. Its 
theoretical success will depend on its capacity to play a particular theoretical role in 
epistemology. Its capacity to accommodate the ordinary linguistic practice is merely one 
reason to think that the insight is adequate.   
 Austin’s insight, then, is to be treated as a substantial philosophical principle which 
finds its motivation in the linguistic practice analysed by Austin. Moreover, that Austin’s 
view can accommodate the linguistic practice without revision is a reason that speaks in 
favour of the view. Nevertheless, in order to assess the view in terms of its theoretical merits, 
we have to subject the view to philosophical testing. Austin’s insight, nevertheless, is a very 
general and abstract principle. It merely states that non-evidential warrant is different in kind 
to evidential warrant, and that it is akin to proof. It is now our task to flesh out the insight in 
a more determinate manner. In the following section, we will provide one such substantiation 
making use of the Radical Anti-psychologism advanced recently by Mark Kalderon (2011). 
We will also contrast this substantiation with two possible alternatives.  
 
3.2 Articulating Austin’s Insight 
The Radical Anti-psychologist proposal that will be advanced here as the preferred way of 
fleshing out Austin’s insight could seem theoretically costly. For it makes a number of 
commitments which are far from uncontroversial. For example, the view makes very specific 
commitments about the nature of reasons, as well as the nature (and existence) of truthmaking 
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entities and their availability through perception. These commitments will be defended in 
due course. But given the theoretical baggage of Radical Anti-psychologism it would be 
reasonable to explore whether there is a more economical way of doing justice to Austin’s 
insight. To this effect I will briefly analyse the prospects of accommodating this insight by 
appealing to Timothy Williamson’s views on evidence. 
 
i) Williamson’s E=K and Austin’s Insight 
In traditional mainstream epistemology the notion of justification has been thought to be 
important as a way of partially elucidating the notion of knowledge. Williamson reverses this 
order of explanation by proposing that the notion of knowledge can be used to partially 
elucidate the notion of justification. On the assumption that evidence justifies belief, the 
proposal that equates a subject’s evidence with the propositions known by that subject 
amounts to the claim that knowledge justifies belief. Williamson’s case for equating S’s 
evidence with the propositions known by S (E=K) rests on the claims that all evidence is 
propositional, that all propositional evidence is knowledge, and that all knowledge is 
evidence.55  
For present purposes I am going to assume that Williamson’s case for E=K is 
plausible, for the aim here is not to assess Williamson’s E=K thesis, but rather to explore 
whether we could capture Austin’s insight by appealing to E=K. It is important to note, in 
favour of this way of interpreting Austin, that the notion of evidence which Williamson 
intends to capture seems to be congenial with Austin’s. Williamson advances his case in 
favour of E=K by appealing to established ways in which the notion of evidence is commonly 
used. Even though Williamson places a strong emphasis in the technical use of the notion of 
evidence in science and philosophy of science, he also appeals to the way in which the term 
is used in medical practice, in courts of law, as well as in ordinary contexts.56 Moreover, 
given that Williamson’s E=K thesis is explicitly about evidence, the application of his view 
to Austin’s insight should be straightforward. We shall now consider whether it appropriately 
captures everything involved in the insight. 
                                                 
55 See Williamson (2000: 193-208) for a defence of these claims. 
56 These are precisely the contexts that Austin attends to in establishing the ways we commonly use the 
notions of “evidence”, “signs”, and “symptoms”; see Austin (1946: 106-110).  
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How could we flesh out Austin’s insight by appealing to the E=K claim? Let us start 
by considering what this approach would say about evidential ways of knowing, e.g. the case 
in which we come to know that there is a pig in the office on the basis of seeing its hoofmarks 
on the carpet. One way of making sense of this case would be to say that the hoofmarks 
themselves constitute the evidence on the basis of which we form the judgement that there is 
a pig in the office. On Williamson’s view, strictly speaking, this would be incorrect. 
Williamson would concede that in this case we have evidence for thinking that there is a pig 
in the office and, moreover, he would concede that the hoofmarks are the source of our 
evidence. Nevertheless, he would construe the relation that holds between the hoofmarks and 
the evidence for that proposition in a different manner. For Williamson, the hoofmarks do 
not constitute our evidence for that proposition; instead, they provide us with evidence in 
favour of it. For Williamson the evidence would be a proposition that we know, e.g. the 
proposition that there are hoof-shaped marks in the office’s carpet.57  
Given Austin’s insight, things should be different for non-evidential knowing, e.g. 
the case in which we see the pig itself and thereby come to know that there is a pig before us. 
On the Radical Anti-psychologist position, for instance, the pig itself constitutes the warrant 
for making the relevant judgement. But things would be different in the Williamsonian 
approach. All that follows from the E=K thesis is a negative characterisation of non-
evidential instances of perceptual knowledge. On the Williamsonian picture, non-
evidentially knowing that p is not to be explained in virtue of us knowing something else 
which constitutes our evidence for thinking that p. To clarify, this does not mean that the 
Williamsonian approach should be committed to the idea that we could acquire knowledge 
of the external world in complete absence of any background knowledge whatsoever. 
Presumably, in order for us to be knowledgeable about the pig, there is a multitude of 
propositions that we should know. The claim is merely that non-evidential knowledge is not 
based on other things that we know. This is consistent with the claim that we can only acquire 
such knowledge if we already possess a complex system of background knowledge.  
But does this account of the distinction between evidential and non-evidential 
knowledge do justice to Austin’s insight? It seems not, for it fails to capture an essential 
                                                 
57 The treatment of this case under the Williamsonian view follows his treatment of the case in which a knife 
provides evidence for thinking someone committed a crime, see Williamson (2000: 195).  
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feature of the Austinian picture. I argue that the E=K approach can easily accommodate the 
negative claim associated to Austin’s insight – i.e. that non-evidential warrant is different in 
kind from evidential warrant – but that it cannot accommodate the positive claim – i.e. that 
non-evidential warrant is conclusive – without supplementation. The negative claim would 
be secured by the fact that under the E=K approach evidential knowledge necessarily requires 
that S’s knowledge be based on a proposition known by S, whereas non-evidential knowing 
require S’s knowledge not to be based on a further proposition that S knows. This much 
would suffice to guarantee that non-evidential warrant is different in kind from evidential 
warrant. Nevertheless, the E=K approach fails to accommodate the positive claim because it 
is silent about the nature of the grounds on which non-evidential knowledge rests.58 Thus, 
the E=K approach leaves open the issue of whether non-evidential warrant has the capacity 
to settle an issue, for it does not say anything about the nature of it. Something has to be 
added to the E=K approach in order to capture the positive claim of Austin’s insight. Here I 
do not want to argue that it is impossible to supplement the view in such a way that it would 
do justice to the positive claim of Austin’s insight. The point made here is simply that the 
E=K approach, on its own, would not suffice to accommodate Austin’s insight.  
The suggestion that the Williamsonian approach does not do justice to Austin’s 
insight relies on the fact that an appeal to the E=K thesis only tells us that non-evidential 
warrant must be constituted by something other than propositional knowledge, but it is silent 
on what exactly does constitute it. Admittedly, Austin himself does not spell out what 
constitutes our warrant in non-evidential cases. This is precisely the reason why fleshing out 
Austin’s insight is a task that goes beyond what Austin explicitly said. We looked at 
Williamson’s E=K approach in an attempt to do this, but now we have realized that with 
respect to the positive claim of the insight, Williamson’s approach is silent. The moral is that 
we are only going to succeed if we provide a positive account of what constitutes non-
evidential warrant in the perceptual cases at the centre of Austin’s epistemology. Only then 
will we find ourselves in a position to assess whether this kind of warrant is distinctively 
                                                 
58 It is important to note that the E=K approach would be consistent with the view that non-evidential 
knowing is groundless. It is consistent, for example, with the claim that non-evidential knowledge is self-
evident, or with the claim that non-evidential knowledge is warranted by default. Importantly, it is also 
consistent with the claim that this type of knowledge is grounded on warrant which is not independent of 
one’s knowledge. 
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good, from an epistemic viewpoint. This is precisely the reason why the Radical Anti-
psychologist approach is better suited to fleshing out Austin’s insight, for it straightforwardly 
provides us with a positive account of non-evidential perceptual warrant. 
 
ii) Radical Anti-psychologism and Austin’s Insight 
One of the main tenets of Radical Anti-psychologism is that in central cases of perceptual 
knowledge, which include the cases that Austin would classify as non-evidential instances of 
perceptual knowledge, the very items of perception constitute our warrant for judging. On 
our application of Radical Anti-psychologism to Austin’s epistemology, perceivable objects 
such as pigs, tomatoes, rainbows, shadows, shootings, etc. can constitute our non-evidential 
warrant for judging. On Radical Anti-psychologism, these worldly items are themselves 
reasons for judging.59 The suggestion is that our non-evidential warrant for, say, p derives 
from our being appraised of the reasons there are for thinking that p. For example, on this 
view, the pig itself is a reason for thinking that there is a pig in front of me, and my being 
aware of it makes me aware of a reason for so thinking. Provided I also have the capacities 
to recognize the beast as the animal it is, and that the conditions are appropriate for exercising 
this capacity, in seeing the pig itself, I might find myself in a position to know that a pig is 
before me.  
 In an important sense this view is better positioned than the E=K approach to do 
justice to Austin’s insight. Unlike the Williamsonian approach, Radical Anti-psychologism 
could provide us with a positive characterisation of the nature of non-evidential warrant. Let 
us elaborate now just how a Radical Anti-psychologist could do justice to the insight. Let us 
start by considering the negative claim associated to Austin’s insight (that non-evidential 
warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant). According to Radical Anti-
psychologism, as it has been presented, non-evidential perceptual warrant is constituted by 
the perceived items themselves. Now, it is clear that this is consistent with saying something 
similar about evidential warrant. That is, it is consistent with saying that in cases of evidential 
perceptual knowledge, the warrant possessed by the subject is constituted by the worldly 
                                                 
59 Notice that, here, the Radical Anti-psychologist position is characterised in terms of reasons for judging. 
The Radical Anti-psychologist position is a view in which (at least some) perceptual knowledge is based on 
reasons possessed by the subject. On this view, then, this type of non-evidential warrant depends on the 
reasons there are for thinking something is the case. We will discuss this commitment below in chapter 5.  
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items of perception.60 For example, we could say that the evidential warrant possessed by a 
subject who comes to know that there is a pig in the farm is constituted by the pig’s hoofprints 
on the ground. On this view, just as the pig itself is a reason for thinking that there is a pig in 
front of us, the pig’s hoofprints are evidence for thinking that there is a pig somewhere in the 
farm. But given our aim of articulating Austin’s insight, one potential worry with this account 
of evidential warrant is that it endangers the capacity of the Radical Anti-psychologist to 
accommodate the negative claim of Austin’s insight. For it is not clear why, on this view, 
non-evidential warrant would be different in kind from evidential warrant, given that in both 
cases the warrant is constituted by the same kind of entity – the worldly items of perception, 
such as the pig or the hoofprints.  
 One way in which we could address this potential problem is by rejecting the 
proposed account of evidential warrant. We could say that evidential perceptual warrant is 
not constituted by the objects of perception. We could say, for example, with Williamson, 
that evidential warrant is constituted by propositions known by the subject.  If we were to 
follow this line, we could accommodate in a straightforward fashion the claim that non-
evidential warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant – for according to this line, 
while evidential warrant would be constituted by propositions known by the subject, non-
evidential warrant would be constituted by items perceived by the subject. This is an open, 
and attractive, alternative for the Radical Anti-psychologist. And I do not want to suggest 
that we should avoid the Williamsonian approach to evidential warrant. As a matter of fact, 
Williamson himself has provided good reasons to endorse this account of perceptual 
evidence.61 But in the following I am going to argue that the Radical Anti-psychologist has 
the elements to accommodate the two claims associated to Austin’s insight without endorsing 
the E=K approach.  
 Let us assume that, for the Radical Anti-psychologist, non-evidential and evidential 
perceptual warrant is constituted by the relevant objects of perception. If we want to 
accommodate Austin’s insight within this form of Radical Anti-psychologism we need to 
provide an answer to the following two questions: If evidential and non-evidential warrant 
are constituted by the same kind of object, then in what sense can we say that they are 
                                                 
60 See Kalderon (2011: 227) for a suggestion along these lines. 
61 See Williamson (2000: 196-200). 
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different kinds of epistemic warrant? And, why is non-evidential warrant epistemically 
capable of settling an issue, e.g. that there is a pig before me?  
In order to see how we could answer these questions we have to look closely at the 
Radical Anti-psychologist thesis that perceivable objects such as pigs, tomatoes, or rainbows 
can be reasons for judgement. The Radical Anti-psychologist’s case for thinking that these 
objects can be reasons focuses not only on the objects themselves, but on the relation that 
holds between the objects and the relevant propositions. In other words, the Radical Anti-
psychologist argues that the presence of an object – be it a pig or a pig’s hoofmarks – can be 
a reason for thinking that so-and-so is the case because there is a favouring relation that 
obtains between the object and the relevant proposition. Here, by a “favouring relation” we 
understand something along the following lines: a favouring relation F obtains between an 
item x and a non-analytic proposition p only if the obtaining or existence of x increases the 
likelihood of the obtaining of the state of affairs described by p. The pig is a reason for 
thinking that there is a pig before me because its existence (and its being where it is) increases 
the probability of the relevant proposition. Similarly, the pig’s hoofmarks in the carpet are a 
reason for thinking that there is a pig in the office because their existence increases the 
probability of the relevant proposition.  
But, importantly, on this version of Radical Anti-psychologism, the kinds of 
favouring relation that hold between perceived objects and propositions in evidential and 
non-evidential cases are two different kinds of favouring relation. Consider the following 
example. Let us assume that the relevant proposition in both variants of the case is (P): “there 
is a pig in the office”. The way in which the presence of the pig favours P is different from 
the way in which the presence of hoofmarks favours P. In evidential cases, the warranting 
items can be things such as the hoofprints in the carpet or the pig food lying on the floor. 
Now, the favouring relation that holds between these items and P is that of indication. In 
good circumstances the hoofprints are a reliable indication of the presence of a pig – hence 
they are evidence of P. Importantly, that the footmarks reliably indicate that P is consistent 
with P being false – perhaps the pig is now gone, or perhaps a new carpet (hoofmarks 
included) has been installed in the office in my absence. Note that this is consistent with the 
pig’s hoofmarks standing in a different kind of favouring relation to a different proposition. 
For example, with respect to the proposition that “there are hoofmarks in the carpet” (R).  
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But things are very different in non-evidential cases. In this scenario, according to 
Radical Anti-psychologism, the warranting item is the pig itself, which is plainly in view. 
What is important to note about this case is that a different kind of favouring relation holds 
between the pig and P – a kind of relation that does not hold between the hoofprints and P. 
Namely, the truthmaking relation: the pig itself makes true the proposition that P. 
Truthmaking is a different kind of relation to that of indication. While the indication relation 
is consistent with the falsity of the relevant proposition, truthmaking is not. Moreover, we 
can say that P is true in virtue of the pig being there, but not in virtue of the hoofprints being 
there. In this sense, we can appeal to the pig itself to explain the truth of P.62 Thus, on the 
Radical Anti-psychologist view the pig is a reason for P because it stands in the truthmaking 
relation with respect to P.  
This provides us with the elements to accommodate Austin’s insight within Radical 
Anti-psychologism. Let us start with the negative claim, i.e. the claim that non-evidential 
warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant. We can accommodate this claim by 
pointing out that the kind of favouring relation that holds between non-evidential warrants 
and the propositions they warrant is different in kind to the favouring relation that holds 
between evidential warrants and the propositions they warrant. The reason why, on this view, 
the warrant involved in non-evidential cases is distinctive (i.e. different in kind to that of 
evidential cases) lies on the fact that there is a distinctive kind of relation which holds between 
a proposition P and a certain object of perception o, which only holds in non-evidential cases, 
i.e. the relation of truthmaking.  
But how are we to accommodate the positive claim, i.e. the claim that non-evidential 
warrant is distinctively good? In other words, why is it that my seeing the pig can settle the 
issue of whether a pig is in the office? The key to answering these questions lies in the kind 
of favouring relation that holds in non-evidential cases between objects of perception and 
warranted proposition. As we saw, the obtaining of the truthmaking relation between the pig 
                                                 
62 Perhaps this claim should be qualified, for clearly, on one reading, this would be an inappropriate 
explanation of the truth of P. The kind of case I have in mind, in which this would be an inappropriate 
explanation, is one in which seeing, to my surprise, a pig in my colleague’s office I ask her to explain why on 
earth is there a pig in her office. In this context, it would be entirely unsatisfactory if my colleague were to say 
that the answer to my question is the pig itself, for that is what makes true the proposition I want to 
understand. The kind of explanation I have in mind here in saying that truthmakers (such as the pig) can 
explain the truth of the relevant propositions is that of explaining in virtue of what is a proposition true. 
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being in the office and P is inconsistent with the falsity of P. We can say, then, that a subject 
who possesses non-evidential warrant is in possession of warrant which is inconsistent with 
the falsity of the warranted proposition. Following John McDowell’s usage, we can call this 
kind of warrant conclusive (McDowell, 2013). We have, then, a straightforward explanation 
of why seeing the pig has the capacity to settle the issue of whether there is a pig in the office: 
the non-evidential warrant afforded to the subject in that perceptual state is conclusive. This 
type of warrant can settle the issue because it excludes the possibility of the relevant 
proposition being false. 
It is important to clarify that the positive claim associated to Austin’s insight 
maintains only that the non-evidential warrant found in the central cases is conclusive. There 
is no suggestion that evidential warrant could not be conclusive. Consider a case in which a 
nomological relation holds between exhibiting the symptoms s1,…,sn – the presence of all of 
which can be established by perception – and having a disease X. Suppose that the 
nomological relation is such that if and only if the subject has disease X then they exhibit all 
the symptoms s1,…,sn. If this were the case, it would be plausible to say that being aware of 
the symptoms s1,…,sn amounts to having conclusive evidence for thinking that a subject has 
disease X. After all, the obtaining of the evidence would be incompatible with the falsity of 
the relevant proposition.63 Moreover, ex hypothesi, this is the sort of evidence that can be 
acquired through perception.  
 
iii) John McDowell and Austin’s insight 
I argued that an E=K approach to the insight does not accommodate it – as it stands – for 
Williamson was silent on the nature of non-evidential warrant. This assessment suggested 
that a positive account of non-evidential warrant was needed to accommodate the insight. 
The Radical Anti-psychologist picture is one view which advances a proposal on those lines. 
And, as it has been argued, it is capable of accommodating Austin’s insight. Nevertheless, I 
would like to point out that this is not to say that only a Radical Anti-psychologist 
epistemology could accommodate the insight. As a matter of fact, I would like to argue that 
the epistemology of perception advanced by John McDowell can also make sense of the two 
                                                 
63 Others have defended the possibility of conclusive evidence, see Travis’s notion of factive meaning (2004) 
and (2005), and Dretske’s treatment of conclusive reasons (1971). 
  
92 
claims associated to Austin’s insight. This will show that the Radical Anti-psychologist view 
is not the only epistemology which can be seen as voicing these ideas from Austin. There 
might be independent reasons to think that McDowell’s epistemology of perception would 
be incompatible with other parts of the Austinian epistemology. But doing justice to Austin’s 
insight is no such ground.  
 Some aspects of McDowell’s epistemology of perception have been explained before 
in chapter 2, but it is worth going through some of the details again here. In his epistemology 
of perception McDowell makes space for a special kind of perceptual episode which plays a 
central role in explaining how rational subjects acquire perceptual knowledge. McDowell 
characterises such episodes as ones in which the subject’s perceptual state makes a fact 
manifest to the subject (good cases). On the McDowellian picture, these are to be contrasted 
with cases in which it merely seems to the subject as if a fact were made manifest to them 
(bad cases). Good cases not only put subjects in a position to know the fact which is made 
manifest to them, but the epistemic warrant possessed by the subject in virtue of being in a 
good case is conclusive. On the other hand, for subjects who find themselves in a bad case, a 
fact is not made manifest to them in that perceptual episode. How could we exploit 
McDowell’s view – that in good cases a fact is made manifest to the perceiver – in order to 
accommodate Austin’s insight? 
 Let us start with accommodating the positive claim of the insight within a 
McDowellian approach. This is the claim that perceptual non-evidential warrant has the 
capacity to settle issues. For McDowell, good cases provide perceivers with conclusive 
warrant for thinking that the fact which is made manifest to them actually obtains. For 
instance, consider the following good case: someone sees that there is a red sphere before 
her, the circumstances of observation are optimal, and everything is right perceptually with 
the subject. In this scenario, the subject would find herself in possession of conclusive 
warrant in favour of the proposition that there is a red sphere in front of her. On McDowell’s 
picture, part of the reason why the warrant is conclusive has to do with the fact that it is 
impossible for the relevant proposition to be false, whilst the subject is in that perceptual 
state, i.e. one of seeing that the red sphere is there. This account could be used to explain 
Austin’s non-evidential cases of perceptual knowledge. A good case in which we see a pig 
in front of us is a case in which the fact that there is a pig before us is made manifest to us in 
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perception. As such, we would find ourselves in possession of conclusive warrant for 
thinking that there is a pig in front of us. Part of the explanation of why this is so, analogously, 
has to do with the fact that is not possible for us to be in that perceptual state and for the 
proposition that there is a pig in front of us to be false. The warrant provided by good cases 
has the capacity so settle an issue because being in that state is incompatible with the falsity 
of the relevant proposition. Thus, when I see that a pig is before me I have conclusive warrant 
for so thinking. Thus, it seems the McDowellian approach can accommodate the positive 
claim of Austin’s insight. 
 Here, it is important to note that a salient difference between Radical Anti-
psychologism and McDowell’s approach has been uncovered. McDowell’s approach can 
make sense of (the positive claim of) Austin’s insight by construing non-evidential perceptual 
cases as cases in which we see that something is the case – that is as cases of propositional 
seeing. As we saw above, the Radical Anti-psychologist position construes these cases as 
cases in which we see the pig – that is as cases of object perception. For the Radical Anti-
psychologist object perception is epistemologically significant by providing us with reasons 
for judging. McDowell thinks that such an account of the epistemological significance of 
perception falls prey to the Myth of the Given – in McDowell’s eyes, a charge powerful 
enough to expose the whole project as inadequate. This is a fundamental locus of 
disagreement between both views, and we will explore with detail in chapter 6 whether there 
are sufficient grounds to be convinced by McDowell’s case. But for the moment let us 
continue with the question of whether McDowell’s approach can make sense of Austin’s 
insight.  
We have argued that McDowell can accommodate the positive claim, but what about 
the negative claim associated to Austin’s insight, i.e. that non-evidential warrant is different 
in kind from evidential warrant? Let us start with the evidential case, i.e. the one in which 
the subject comes to know that there is a pig on the basis of seeing its hoofmarks. Using the 
McDowellian approach we could say that in such a scenario the subject possesses, at best, 
inconclusive warrant in favour of the propositions that there is a pig in the office (P). After 
all, being in this perceptual state is compatible, for instance, with the pig having left the 
office. The fact (provided it is a fact) that there is a pig in the office is not made manifest to 
the subject. As we saw before, in the non-evidential case, the subject would have conclusive 
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warrant in favour of P. In this case, the fact that there is a pig in the office is perceptually 
made manifest to the subject. This difference might provide us with the elements to 
accommodate the negative claim within McDowell’s approach. In non-evidential cases the 
fact described by the warranted proposition is made manifest to the perceiver. Whereas in 
evidential cases, the fact described by the proposition warranted is not made manifest to the 
perceiver. In evidential cases, then, the warrant depends on something external to the 
perceptual state the subject is in. For instance, the warrant had in virtue of seeing that there 
are hoofmarks in the office depends on them being a reliable indicator of porcine presence – 
something independent of the subject seeing that there are hoofmarks in the carpet. On the 
other hand, in non-evidential cases, the warrant does not depend on such an external element. 
If the subject is in a state in which she sees that there is a pig in the office, then that by itself 
determines that she has the relevant warrant. This gives us grounds, then, to say that in the 
McDowellian approach evidential warrant is different in kind from non-evidential warrant: 
evidential warrant depends on an element external to the perceptual state, whereas this is not 
the case for non-evidential warrant.  
 
Conclusion 
Here, I do not want to scrutinize the merits of McDowell’s epistemological picture of 
perception, apart from the way in which it can make sense of Austin’s insight. If in 
developing an epistemology of perception we have to decide between Radical Anti-
psychologism or the McDowellian picture, their capacity for accommodating Austin’s 
insight would not be a decisive criterion, for both views can accommodate it. This shows that 
Radical Anti-psychologism is not the only way of fleshing out Austin’s insight. For all we 
know there might be many other ways of doing so, different from the views surveyed here. 
The conclusion of this section should be, then, that Radical Anti-psychologism is not the only 
correct way of capturing Austin’s insight, but merely that it is one way of doing it. If the 
Radical Anti-psychologist view is going to stand out as a plausible epistemology of 
perception, then it is not enough to show that it can make sense of Austin’s suggestion, we 
also have to show that the view is tenable in the contemporary epistemological landscape. 
This task will be undertaken in the remainder of the thesis. The Radical Anti-psychologist 
alternative will be defended from challenges, and some positive argument will be advanced 
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in favour of its most distinctive claims. In so doing we will advance a partial case for thinking 
that this view provides us with a plausible and original account of perceptual knowledge. 
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Chapter 4 – Radical Anti-psychologism and Perception of Concreta 
So far I have presented some of the main tenets of the Radical Anti-psychologist picture, but 
I haven’t explained systematically how they fit together into a coherent epistemology of 
perception. This task will be undertaken in the first part of this chapter, making emphasis on 
the way the view is advanced by Mark Kalderon (2011). This will allow us to identify the 
central claims of Radical Anti-psychologism. As it will become clear, some of these core 
claims are controversial. In the remainder of this thesis we will carry out a detailed defence 
of these claims. This will place us in a good position to provide a plausible way of fleshing 
out the passive element in Austin’s epistemological picture. Thus, a defence of Radical Anti-
psychologism will get us closer to an epistemology of perception along Austinian lines. This 
defence will begin in the second part of this chapter, where we will look more closely at one 
of the main commitments of the view, i.e. the claim that in perception we are aware of 
concrete entities. But first, let us present the Radical Anti-psychologist view in a more 
systematic fashion. 
 
4.1 Spelling out Radical Anti-psychologism 
In general terms, the Radical Anti-psychologistic view can be characterised as an 
epistemology of reasons at the service of perceptual knowledge – or at least at the service of 
some central cases of perceptual knowledge. In a nutshell, the view holds that some of the 
items we are aware of in perceptual experience constitute valid reasons in favour of making 
certain judgements. On this view, the epistemological significance of perception consists in 
making the subject aware of reasons for judging. According to Kalderon, in central cases, 
perception affords perceivers with reasons which can ground knowledge of their 
environment: “Sensory awareness makes the subject knowledgeable of its object in the sense 
that it makes knowledge about its object available to the perceiving subject” (Kalderon, 2011, 
225). This formulation raises the issue of how to understand the idea that perception makes 
knowledge “available” for the perceiver, vis-à-vis McDowell’s claim that perception puts us 
in ‘a position to know’. In chapter 2 we distinguished two ways in which the notion of “being 
in a position to know” could be interpreted and concluded that McDowell means by this that 
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perception provides subjects with conclusive warrant for judgement.64 We will argue below 
that Kalderon’s use of the notion is congenial with McDowell’s. We will see that, for 
Kalderon, perception makes knowledge available to the perceiver by providing the subject 
with conclusive reasons for the relevant judgements. Below we will explore further the 
relation between this aspect of Kalderon’s view and Austin’s thesis that perception is only 
one out of two elements which contribute to placing the subject in the best possible position 
for judging. For Austin, let us remember, perceptual knowledge requires successful 
perception, on the one hand, and the subject’s active involvement in exploiting the warrant 
afforded by perception, on the other. But first, let us explore the several aspects which make 
up the Radical Anti-psychologist position.  
The Radical Anti-psychologist view maintains that the epistemological significance 
of perception consists in making perceivers aware of reasons for judging. Now, among the 
things that we are aware of in perception we find concrete entities such as cats or blackberries 
(i.e. physical objects); a cat eating a blackberry (i.e. events); and the cat’s softness (i.e. 
property instances). As Kalderon points out, in an Austinian spirit, these entities do not 
constitute a unified ontological category. For instance, a reason for thinking that events are 
different from material objects lies in the fact that they seem to “fill time” differently: on the 
endurantist picture, for example, material objects do not unfold through time and are wholly 
present at any time interval over which they endure, whereas events unfold through time and 
are not wholly present at any of the time intervals over which the event unfolds.65 That the 
objects of perception do not fall into a unified ontological category is exacerbated when we 
note that there are many other concrete entities which are also suitable objects of perceptual 
awareness but do not straightforwardly fall into any of the previous categories – for example 
rainbows, shadows, and flashes, among others.66 This position echoes Austin’s claim that 
material objects are not a good paradigm of the type of things that we perceive: “pens are in 
many ways though not in all ways unlike rainbows, which are in many ways though not in 
                                                 
64 See p. 60 
65 See, for example, Mourelatos (1978), Vendler (1957), for the view I sketch here. Of course, this picture has 
been contested – perdurantists, for instance, would argue that we should think of material objects as filling 
time in a way similar to events. For the perdurantist picture see Lewis (1976). For recent contributions to the 
debate see Steward (2015), Brewer (2015), and Hofweber and Velleman (2011) 
66 See Kalderon (2011): 222 for a discussion about the ontological differences between the different objects of 
(visual) perception. See also Austin (1962) on the topic of the variety of the potential objects of perception.  
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all ways unlike after-images, which in turn are in many ways but not in all ways unlike 
pictures on the cinema-screen – and so on, without assignable limit” (Austin, 1962: 4). Here 
Austin seems to be making the claim that any attempt to provide an ontological criterion 
which groups all (and only) potential objects of perception in a unified ontological category 
will encounter counterexamples. To be clear, there are certain respects in which, for instance, 
rainbows are similar to material objects, such as cats or blackberries – for instance they are 
alike in that they do not unfold through time in the way events do. Yet there are important 
dissimilarities which discourage considering them the same kind of thing – rainbows do not 
occupy space in the same way cats do: arguably, whereas it is possible to touch a cat, it is not 
possible to touch a rainbow. 
For Austin, as well as for Kalderon, there is not just one kind of thing that we perceive. 
As far as it goes, this much can be considered common ground among many philosophers of 
perception. For instance, even sense-data theorists might maintain that in perception we are 
aware of many different types of thing – events, physical objects and property instances. 
What is distinctive to the sense-data view is that, for some of its defenders, we only perceive 
these concrete things by virtue of perceiving sense-data. So strictly speaking, for them, we 
only “immediately” (or “directly”) perceive one kind of thing, i.e. sense-data, although we 
do perceive indirectly many other things.67 Critics of sense-data theories might challenge this 
way of accommodating the idea that we perceive many different sorts of thing. Naïve realists, 
for instance, would argue that we can perceive all the familiar things we encounter in the 
environment without the involvement of sense-data. Nevertheless, regardless of the potential 
disagreements among philosophers of perception, the claim that we perceive many kinds of 
thing could be endorsed by most of them. At this point we have not reached yet a 
controversial claim, nor the most distinctive aspects of Radical Anti-psychologism.  
Now, among the many things that we perceive, on the Radical Anti-psychologist 
position, we find the concrete entities listed above; moreover, on this view, at least some of 
these entities are reasons for judging. In other words, perceptual experience provides us with 
reasons for judging insofar as it makes us aware of concreta, for concreta can be reasons for 
judging. Note, nevertheless, that this is consistent with the claim that not all reasons are 
                                                 
67 See Snowdon (1992), and Foster (2000), for a discussion of direct and indirectness in perception.  
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concreta, and also with the claim the claim that perception might play a fundamental role in 
making the subject aware of those reasons. For instance, the view is consistent with the claim 
that non-concrete entities – e.g. propositions – might also be reasons for judging.  
The notion of concreta is central in the characterisation of Radical Anti-
psychologism. As a first approach to a delineation of this category we can say that we are 
thinking of concreta as particulars which are spatiotemporally located (Kalderon 2011). 
Although, as it will be noted, the matter of giving a precise way of distinguishing the concrete 
from the abstract is not a straightforward issue. Moreover, there are many concrete entities 
which are not plausible objects of perception, such as very small objects of very quick events. 
More importantly, this characterisation of concreta (i.e. as spatiotemporally located entities), 
might obscure a feature which is crucial for concreta to play the role that Radical Anti-
psychologists wants them to. Namely, that concreta do not exhibit the kind of generality that, 
for instance, concepts do. All these are issues which will be addressed in detail in the second 
part of this chapter. 
Radical Anti-psychologism, thus, is a distinctive way of articulating the view that 
perception affords the subject with reasons for belief – its distinctiveness lies in the claim 
that some of those reasons are concreta. As such, the view should be contrasted with views 
which favour the idea that the reasons afforded to the subject by perception are facts (where 
these are understood as non-concrete entities, see Dodd 2009), propositions, or the subject’s 
experiential state. According to Radical Anti-psychologism, for instance, in seeing the white 
cat in front of me I am in possession of a reason for judging that there is a white cat in front 
of me because the cat itself is a reason for making that judgement. This view is a form of 
Anti-psychologism because it rejects that reasons need to be psychological states of the 
subject – on this conception, reasons can be worldly entities (see Dancy 2000). And it is a 
radical form of anti-psychologism because it maintains that the external reasons can be 
concreta. Therefore, on the Radical Anti-psychologist view when we see a cat in front of us 
our reason to think there is a cat in front of us is the cat itself, not the experiential state of 
seeing a cat, not a belief caused by the experiential state, not any form of representational 
content that might accompany the perceptual state, nor the proposition that there is a white 
cat in front of me.  
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It is important to note that the commitment to concrete entities, as opposed to facts or 
propositions, as the reasons afforded to us by perception is not inconsistent with endorsing 
an intentional theory about the nature of perceptual experience. Thus, adoption of Radical 
Anti-psychologism does not beg the question against intentionalist accounts of perception. 
Very broadly, according to intentionalism, the phenomenological character of perceptual 
experience is explained entirely in virtue of the intentional content associated to the relevant 
experiential state.68 The Radical Anti-psychologist claim that some of the reasons we are 
aware of in perception are concreta need not be inconsistent with that fundamental tenet of 
intentionalism. For it is possible to hold both that the concreta we are aware of in perception 
are reasons for making certain judgements, and that the phenomenal character of the relevant 
perceptual states is to be explained entirely by virtue of the intentional content of those states. 
For instance, it would be possible to maintain that being aware of a concretum requires being 
in a state with intentional content with veridicality conditions; moreover, it could be claimed 
that this intentional content suffices to explain the phenomenal character of that experiential 
state. Yet, consistent with this, it could be claimed that the concretum itself constitutes the 
reason that is provided to us by virtue of being in that perceptual state, and not the intentional 
content associated to that state, nor the fact or the proposition individuated by that intentional 
content. On this view, the role of the intentional content associated to that state is to make 
the subject aware of the reason (i.e. the concretum) there is for judging that p.  
So far, we have identified the following claims in the Radical Anti-psychologist 
picture: a) among the things that we perceive we find concreta, and b) concreta can be reasons 
for judging. This provides the view with the elements for advancing the following claim 
about the epistemological significance of perceptual experience: c) perceptual experience is 
epistemologically significant partly because, at least in some cases, it makes us aware of 
reasons (i.e. concreta) for judging. As it stands, this set of claims (a)-(c) constitute the bare 
essentials that characterise the Radical Anti-psychologist view as an epistemology of 
perception. Yet, Kalderon advances a further significant claim in support of claim (b), that 
concreta can be reasons for judging, namely the claim that d) concreta are truthmakers. In 
Kalderon’s view, if we are going to conceive of concreta as reasons for judging, then we have 
                                                 
68 See Robinson (1994), Siegel (2010), Schellenberg (2011), and Fish (2010) for characterisations of 
intentional theories of the nature of perception along these lines. 
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to account for their normative force – that is we have to explain why the existence of the 
relevant reasons make it appropriate for the subject to make the relevant judgements. And it 
is precisely by introducing (d) that he attempts to undertake this explanatory task. In the 
remainder of this theses we are going to be looking closely into these claims which make up 
the core elements of the Radical Anti-psychologist view.  
It should not be thought, nevertheless, that the Radical Anti-psychologist 
epistemology, as presented by Kalderon is exhausted by (a)-(d). It is true that, for Kalderon, 
we can appeal to claims (a)-(d) to explain, at least partly, why perceptual experience is 
epistemologically significant. But this is not to say that a complete account of how our 
perceptual knowledge is warranted can be given merely by appealing to (a)-(d). This is in 
line with the Austinian idea presented before, according to which a complete account of 
perceptual knowledge has to appeal both to the fact that the subject perceives her 
environment as well as to the fact that the subject has done enough to be in a position to 
exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception. Let us remember that Kalderon 
characterises the epistemic position of a perceiving subject as one in which the subject has a 
potential for knowledge which can be actualized (Kalderon 2011: 225). In perceiving her 
environment, a subject is in a position to gain knowledge about that environment, although 
the experiential state itself does not constitute knowledge. In Kalderon’s view, the subject 
can actualize that potential by successfully exercising the appropriate conceptual and 
recognitional capacities. Importantly, lacking the relevant capacities does not mean that the 
subject’s experiences are epistemically insignificant. If the subject were to eventually acquire 
the required capacities, then nothing would prevent her, in principle, from actualizing the 
knowledge potential provided by her previous experiences. In Kalderon’s words: 
If visual awareness takes particulars as objects, it is not a form of propositional 
knowledge. But that does not mean that vision, so conceived, lacks epistemic 
significance. Vision can be a source of knowledge insofar as the perceiver can 
recognize the object of perception for what it is. When I look at the ripening 
tomato, the tomato is present in my awareness of it. Moreover, if I possess the 
appropriate recognitional capacities, in being so aware of the ripening tomato, I 
can come to know various things about it—that it is yellowish red, say (Kalderon, 
2011: 225, my emphasis). 
It is clear that in Kalderon’s Radical Anti-psychologism, there is room for agential 
elements in an account of how a subject acquires perceptual knowledge. For instance, on his 
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view, for us to know that there is a tomato before us it is not enough to be perceptually aware 
of a tomato, minimally we also have to recognize it as the object it is. As such, then, although 
the view is not necessarily committed to other agential elements playing a role in the subject’s 
acquisition of knowledge, nothing prevents the inclusion of such elements in a Radical Anti-
psychologist position. For the time being, the point I want to highlight is that Radical Anti-
psychologism, and in particular Kalderon’s version of the view, is consistent with the general 
Austinian project in which agential elements have an important place in explaining how 
perceptual knowledge is acquired.  
It is time now to begin our defence of the main tenets of Radical Anti-psychologism 
identified before. In the remaining chapter of this thesis we will discuss these claims, 
motivate their adoption and defend them from extant objections. We begin in this chapter by 
discussing claim (a) of the view, i.e. the claim that concreta are objects of perception. The 
remaining claims which make up the Radical Anti-psychologist view will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. In Chapter 5 we will discuss claim (c), that the epistemological 
significance of perception is to be explained partly by virtue of the fact that it makes us aware 
of reasons (i.e. concreta). We will then discuss extensively claim (b), that concreta can be 
reasons for judging, in Chapter 6. Our defence of this claim will deserve an extended 
treatment given that it is the most distinctive claim of Radical Anti-psychologism. Finally, 
we will discuss claim (d), that concreta are truthmakers – a claim which is meant to provide 
support for (b) – in Chapter 7.  
 
4.2 Perceptual awareness of concreta 
Perhaps the least controversial claim of the Radical Anti-psychologist position is that among 
the things that we perceive we can find concrete entities. It is important to note that its 
plausibility derives precisely from its being a rather weak claim; note that the claim is not 
that there is only one kind of entity which is always the object of perceptual awareness, nor 
that concreta constitute a unified ontological category. The claim is merely that among the 
things that we perceive we find concrete entities. Moreover, the claim is not that it is not 
possible to perceive things other than concreta. Thus, the position does not beg the question 
against approaches in which not only do we perceive concreta, such as the sun and the 
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horizon, but also the fact that the sun is setting.69 But if the claims is this minimal, what is its 
significance within Radical Anti-psychologism? It is still important to explore the 
connections of this claim with the rest of the view.  
 
i) The Scope of Radical Anti-psychologism  
In order to get a clearer understanding of the scope of the claims made by Radical Anti-
psychologism we need an account of what concreta are. That is, we could provide a principled 
way of characterising the entities that we talk about when we talk about concreta. But as it 
will become obvious, despite the plausibility of the claim that among the objects of 
perception we find concrete entities, it is rather difficult to provide a straightforward way of 
picking out the entities we are interested in. As a cautionary note I want to emphasize that in 
the following I do not attempt here to advance a watertight definition of concreta. The 
definition I advance will provide us with a working notion strong enough for our purposes 
here. It will be more important to explain the sense in which concreta are entities which lack 
the kind of generality that, paradigmatically, concepts have. For this feature of concreta is 
crucial if they are going to play the theoretical role that the Radical Anti-psychologist wants 
them to play. 
Let us start by having a look at certain remarks made by Gottlob Frege regarding 
some of the differences between seeing the sun rising and seeing that the sun is rising. On 
Frege’s view, strictly speaking, we can only see the sun itself – a concretum. The sense in 
which we see that the sun is rising is bound to be, on Frege’s view, very different from the 
sense in which we see the sun. As mentioned before, here we will not follow Frege on the 
impossibility of perceiving non-concrete entities, such as that the sun is rising. Yet in 
advancing his view, Frege provides us with useful elements to make sense of the differences 
between the sun rising, and that the sun is rising. As part of his broader project, Frege 
attempts to introduce the idea that, apart from mind-independent physical entities such as 
trees and windows, and mind-dependent entities such as my perception of the tree and my 
headache, we should include in our ontology a third kind of entity, thoughts, which are taken 
to be, in a first approach, mind-independent, but non-physical entities. These thoughts, 
                                                 
69 That is, the view allows for an understanding of facts where these are non-concrete entities. See Frege 
(1956), Dodd (2002). Arguably McDowell endorses a version of this view in his (1996). 
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although immaterial and abstract, can be expressed in material forms, e.g. by writing down 
or uttering a sentence which expresses the thought in question.70 According to Frege, we can 
perceive the material expressions of thoughts, but we cannot perceive the thoughts 
themselves. In the course of this discussion Frege makes the following remarks, where he 
advances potential criteria to mark a distinction between abstract and concrete entities: 
A thought is something immaterial and everything material and perceptible is 
excluded from this sphere of that for which the question of truth arises... But do 
we not see that the sun has risen and do we not then also see that this is true? That 
the sun has risen is not an object which emits rays that reach my eyes, it is not a 
visible thing like the sun itself. That the sun has risen is seen to be true on the 
basis of sense-impressions. But being true is not a material, perceptible property 
(Frege, 1956: 292). 
Significantly, in this passage Frege points to not just one, but several different features which 
are distinctive of thoughts, features which are not shared by concrete entities. We have the 
suggestion that unlike the sun, that the sun has risen is “immaterial”. We also have the 
suggestion that the sun has certain causal powers – it emits rays which can reach someone’s 
retinas – which the relevant thought lacks. Related to these points is the claim that the thought 
that the sun has risen, unlike the sun itself, is something for which the question of truth arises, 
i.e. it is something which is susceptible of being true or false. Are these remarks useful to 
delimit the class of concreta which is relevant to the Radical Anti-psychologist’s claims? I 
will argue that the materiality and causal efficacy remarks made here can be used in a working 
definition of the relevant class. I will argue that this conception of concreta will allow us to 
explain why they can play the theoretical role that is assigned to them in Radical Anti-
psychologism.  
 Now, providing a way to distinguish the concrete from the abstract is not a 
straightforward matter. The criterion we will endorse here is not intended to provide us with 
a watertight definition of concrete and abstract entities. The difficulties in providing such 
criterion have many sources and this is not the place to address all of them. For instance, it 
                                                 
70 See Frege (1956), especially: "The thought, in itself immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a 
sentence and thereby becomes apprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thought" (Frege, 1956: 
292). 
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is generally accepted that an appropriate definition should be extensionally adequate. There 
is great deal of agreement on whether many paradigmatic entities are abstract or concrete: 
material objects, such as rocks or trees are generally agreed to be concrete, whereas 
mathematical objects (if they exist) are often considered abstract (Rosen, 2014). But some 
cases are especially controversial, such as universals. For Platonists universals are 
paradigmatic abstract entities (Armstrong, 1989), whereas for an Aristotelian they might be 
considered concrete – according to MacBride (1988) the Aristotelian should think of them as 
spatiotemporally located. On the other hand, the distinction between concreta and abstracta 
has been carved in many different ways.71 This variation might be explained by the fact that 
the distinction is relevant for many different philosophical debates, and is informed by 
different philosophical commitments. Some suggest that there might be more than one way 
of providing an extensionally adequate classification, thus leaving ample room for 
independent commitments to decide which definition should be endorsed (Rosen, 2014; 
MacBride, 1988). These issues might make it impossible to provide a single criterion which 
will satisfy all philosophers interested in the distinctions. But fortunately, that is not the aim 
our definition will seek to accomplish. Our aim here will be to provide a definition which 
can make sense of the list of perceivable concreta advanced by the Radical Anti-psychologist. 
Let us remember that in this list we found things such as cats and blackberries (i.e. physical 
objects), a cat eating a blackberry (i.e. events), the cat’s softness (i.e. property instances), as 
well as things such as rainbows, shadows, and flashes of light. As we will see, the definition 
we will favour is not free of problems. We will briefly consider these and provide potential 
responses. Nevertheless, it will be more important, given our purposes, to highlight the 
features of concreta which allows them to play the theoretical role assigned to them by the 
Radical Anti-psychologist, namely why can they be reasons for judging. 
 Here we will look into two of the main ways in which philosophers have tried to 
characterise the distinction between the abstract and the concrete – namely the spatiotemporal 
location and the causal efficacy criteria (Hale 1988). A version of these approaches can be 
found in the Frege passage previously quoted, where he characterises the sun as something 
that we can see, but that the sun has risen as something we cannot see. Let us remember, 
firstly, that for Frege the sun is material, whereas that the sun has risen is immaterial – this 
                                                 
71 For instance, Hale (1988) compiles a list of twelve ways in which the distinction has been attempted.  
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remark might suggest a criterion of “materiality” to define the concrete. Second, for Frege, 
the sun has certain causal powers, which the thought that the sun has risen lacks, in particular 
it emits rays which can reach someone’s retinas – this remark might suggest a “causality” 
criterion to define the concrete. There is, nevertheless, a good reason to not use the criterion 
of materiality (as it stands) to help us define concreta. As Austin correctly pointed out, the 
notion of “material object”, as it is commonly used in philosophy, does not track a common 
use of the notion (Austin, 1962a). For instance, we might want to classify shadows and 
rainbows as concrete entities, but it is not so clear that the common man would regard 
rainbows or shadows as “material objects”. To avoid these difficulties, we can flesh out the 
materiality criterion as appealing to the notion of being spatio-temporally located. We would 
have, then, two ways in which we could attempt to mark the difference between the concrete 
and the abstract: by appeal to spatio-temporal location, and by appeal to causal efficacy. After 
all, an important aspect of thoughts – the entities that Frege wishes to use as contrast to the 
non-conceptual – is that they have no location and are atemporal.72  
Let us begin by considering the causality criterion and its potential shortcomings. One 
way of carving the distinction by appeal to causality could go as follows: concreta can be 
involved in causal interactions, whereas abstracta cannot (Hale, 1988). But one reason to 
doubt this criterion is that it might yield incorrect results for objects widely considered to be 
abstract, e.g. games, languages, and fictional characters. Consider the game of chess, which 
has endured several changes throughout its history – for instance it seems that castling was 
introduced at some point in the 15th century and adopted its modern form around the 17th 
century. If such rule changes are to be construed as changes in the game caused by players 
or legislators, then the game of chess should be considered a concrete entity by the causality 
criterion. We can address these worries by refining the criterion to focus on causal efficacy: 
concreta are causally efficacious, whereas abstracta are causally inefficacious. By adopting 
this criterion, we could accommodate the fact that chess has endured some changes 
throughout its history without the unfortunate consequence that it should, therefore, be 
considered a concretum. So long as we can maintain that the game of chess itself makes 
nothing happen, we will be able to maintain that it is an abstract entity (Rosen, 2014: 12-13).  
                                                 
72 This is echoed by Travis when he points out that “that the sun has set (in Rostock) may be, in some sense, 
about a location. But it has none. The sun, perhaps, is in the sky” (Travis, 2007: 231).  
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This way of carving the distinction attracts two immediate responses. The first one is 
that there might be many entities which are causally inefficacious but which we would not 
take to be, therefore, abstract. For instance, in a particular understanding of certain conscious 
episodes, their phenomenal character is considered an epiphenomenon (Jackson, 1982). But 
it is not so clear that this would give any weight to the idea that the phenomenal characters 
of those conscious episodes are abstract. This puts pressure in the revised causal criterion. It 
could be objected that, strictly speaking, this view merely maintains that mental 
epiphenomena do not make a causal contribution to our behaviour, which does not imply that 
they are causally inefficacious altogether (Robinson 2006, 2015). According to this response, 
mental epiphenomena would not be straightforwardly characterised as abstract by the 
criterion analysed here. But more importantly, the second response to the causal efficacy 
criterion is that problems arise when we consider the issue of which are the relata of the 
causal relation. Worryingly, it seems that many of the options would yield inappropriate 
results when used as a tool to identify the abstract. Take as an example a common conception 
in which the relata of causal relations are events (Davidson, 1967). It is not so clear that, on 
this approach to causality, we could maintain that physical objects (such as the sun or a cat) 
are concrete entities. For they are not events, and strictly speaking, on this interpretation of 
causality, only events are causally efficacious. In order to avoid this difficulty, it could be 
argued that if an entity constitutes or is part of a causally efficacious event, then that thing 
counts as being itself causally efficacious. For instance, insofar as a cat can be a constituent 
of a causally efficacious events (such as the cat jumping over the table), then the cat itself is 
to be considered a causally efficacious entity. This would allow us to classify the cat as 
concrete, not abstract. Yet, this response invites criticisms. Consider, for instance, the event 
of judging that the sun has risen. Let us assume that this type of event could be causally 
efficacious (with Davidson, 1963: 694). This would mean, under the operative suggestion, 
that its constituents are to be considered concrete. A constituent of this event is the 
proposition that the sun has risen. Thus, we arrive to the unfortunate consequence that this 
proposition is concrete. I will not pursue this discussion further, for the issue cannot be settled 
here. What I want to highlight with this discussion is the difficulty in appealing to causal 
criteria to identify the abstract. The underpinning claims about causation bring with them 
many delicate issues in metaphysics which cannot be settled in this investigation.  
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Perhaps the spatiotemporal criterion will fare better in providing us with a distinction 
of concrete and abstract entities. We can formulate this criterion as follows: concrete entities 
are spatiotemporally located, whereas abstract entities are not (Hale, 1988). Some 
paradigmatic abstract objects, such as numbers and propositions, surely lack a spatial and 
temporal location; arguably it would be absurd to wonder where can we find these entities or 
question when will they cease to be. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that this criterion 
too will yield inappropriate results for many entities widely considered to be abstract (Hale, 
1987). Again, games, languages, and fictional characters give rise to problems. It seems 
correct that these entities lack a spatial location, but is it correct to say that they are also 
atemporal? Consider the game of chess. It would be right to say – despite the uncertainty as 
to origin – that chess originated, in its modern form, in a certain place and at a certain time – 
perhaps in Southern Europe in the 15th century. It would also be true to say that the game 
has endured some changes throughout its history. It is therefore not obvious that abstract 
entities should be characterised in terms of existing altogether “outside” space-time (Hale, 
1987). Of course, this does not mean that we cannot attempt a solution to this problem. For 
instance, we could suggest that it is wrong to think about the “invention” of chess in those 
terms. It could be argued, for instance, that the game of chess, being and abstract object as it 
is, is atemporal and has no location. What has been characterised here as the invention of 
chess should rather be described as its discovery, something which can be traced back to a 
particular moment in time. Alternatively, we could construe chess’ “invention” as the 
invention of a practice that uniquely selects chess as its abstract analogue. Arguably, 
something similar could be said about fictional characters and languages, with varying 
degrees of plausibility. Bob Hale (1987) considers a similar response and argues that such a 
solution does not fit neatly with the way we talk and think about the history of chess or the 
English language. He argues that this proposal would describe the historical changes of 
English as “really a record of a succession of replacements of one language by another” 
(Hale, 1987: 49).  
Now, although this way of talking would be at odds with ordinary language, it is 
worth asking if the current proposal makes a claim which would be inconsistent with ordinary 
talk. How shall we explain, from the perspective of ordinary language, the historical changes 
in the English language or the game of chess? Surely the reason why chess today is different 
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from its 15th century version is down to a difference in the rules which constitute the game 
now with respect to the rules which constituted the game then. That the set of rules has 
changed is not inconsistent with ordinary talk. But really this is all that was implied by the 
current proposal. We can decide, for good reason, to call those different sets of rules “chess” 
or “English”. But this linguistic convention is consistent with explaining the changes merely 
as successions of one set of rules by another. I will not pursue further the discussion, for the 
issue cannot be settled here. I merely want to sketch a possible way in which we can define 
concreta and abstracta, noting the kind of difficulties that the criterion faces. 
The proposed definition of concreta as spatio-temporally located particulars advanced 
here provides some clarity to the notion of concreta which is crucial for the Radical Anti-
psychologist’s purposes – it provides us with a criterion that classifies as concrete the list of 
paradigmatic objects of perception. Nevertheless, the features discussed so far – i.e. causal 
efficacy and spatiotemporal location – obscure a feature of concreta which is crucial for the 
purposes of the Radical Anti-psychologist, namely their lack of generality. We will shortly 
explore this feature more closely. But before doing so it will be helpful to examine, very 
briefly, some reasons why not all concreta might be suitable objects of perception on a 
Radical Anti-psychologistic position.  
The Radical Anti-psychologist claim is that some concreta are suitable objects of 
perception, which suggests that some concreta might not be suitable objects of perception for 
creatures like us. One criterion which can help us delimit, within the class of concreta, which 
of these entities are suitable objects of perception, for creatures like us, lies completely 
outside the purview of philosophy. Once we have appealed to spatiotemporal location to 
define the concrete, we are left with many concrete entities which need not be objects of 
perceptual awareness from a Radical Anti-psychologist perspective. Many of these entities 
are not perceivable due to the natural limitations of our perceptual capacities; for instance, 
we cannot be perceptually aware of very small objects (say molecules) or very fast events 
(say the cinema screen going black in between frames). The issue of precisely which concrete 
entities lie beyond the grasp of our perceptual capacities is something that could only be 
settled empirically, not from an armchair. But an adequate understanding of these limitations 
will play an important part in determining which concrete entities can be perceived by 
creature like us.  
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ii) Lack of Generality as the Mark of the “Non-conceptual” 
We have characterised concreta as spatiotemporally located entities. On Radical Anti-
psychologism, perception of concreta is epistemologically significant because they can be 
reasons for judging. An account of why concreta can play this theoretical role – that of being 
reasons – at all will be advanced in chapter 6. Our case there will depend on the claim that 
concreta can be truthmakers – a claim which will be defended in chapter 7. Now, on Radical 
Anti-psychologism, concreta have to play the dual role of being reasons and objects of 
perceptual awareness. I will suggest that lack of generality (in a sense to be explained in what 
follows), together with our proposed criterion for a concrete/abstract distinction, will allow 
us to sketch an explanation of why concreta can play this dual role in Radical Anti-
psychologism.  
Let us remember that, for Frege, thoughts, unlike concrete entities, are susceptible to 
be regarded as true or false. Part of the idea here is that thoughts are truth-evaluable partly 
because they possess some kind of generality that concrete entities – such as the sun – lack 
altogether. Note, nevertheless, that this does not mean that everything which possesses this 
kind of generality will be, therefore, truth-evaluable – e.g., concepts, which exhibit this kind 
of generality. Following Charles Travis (2007) we can use the label of “the conceptual” to 
designate everything that exhibits the sort of generality that will be characterised in the 
following. According to this conception, an item x belongs to the class of the conceptual if 
there is, as a matter of necessity, a range of possible circumstances which would qualify as 
falling under that conceptual item, i.e. a range of circumstances which would “satisfy” x. 
Take the concept of being a pig as an example. There are indefinitely many objects which 
could qualify as falling under that concept. That is, there are many ways in which an animal 
could be such that it would be considered a pig. Importantly, this kind of generality is not 
only exhibited by concepts such as being a pig; it is also exhibited by items such as that the 
pig is on the sofa. These are precisely the “thoughts” identified by Frege. In a similar way to 
concepts, there is a range of circumstances which would qualify as circumstances in which 
the pig is on the sofa – i.e. there are indefinitely many ways in which that animal and that 
piece of furniture could be, such that their being in one of those ways would count as a case 
of the pig being on the sofa. For instance, the pig could be black or pink, the sofa could be a 
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chesterfield or a cabriole, and yet all these variations would count as instances of the pig 
being on the sofa.  When a particular circumstance qualifies as one in which the pig is on the 
sofa we say that the thought or proposition that the pig is on the sofa is true. This is how the 
question of truth comes to bear on some of these conceptual entities, namely thoughts (in 
Fregean jargon). If the circumstance that obtains is one which falls under the range of 
circumstances specified by a thought, we say that the thought is true; otherwise it is false. 
Now, it seems that “the conceptual” contains not only items which are truth-evaluable, for, 
as noted before, apart from thoughts we also have concepts. Concepts are not in the business 
of being true or false. Rather, they are satisfied or unsatisfied by the obtaining of particular 
circumstances or the existence of particular objects.  
Before continuing we should point out, following Travis, that there is an additional 
kind of generality that items which belong to the conceptual need not exhibit. For instance, 
a concept, or a thought, could be “particular” in the sense that they could necessarily be about 
a specific item. For example, the concept of being Aristotle is necessarily only satisfied by 
Aristotle. But the fact that this concept can only be satisfied by a particular man, does not 
mean that it lacks the generality which has been identified as the mark of the conceptual. For 
there is still an indefinitely large range of possible ways in which the man picked out by 
“Aristotle” could be, which would satisfy the concept, i.e. there are indefinitely many ways 
in which Aristotle could have been different to the way he actually was and still be Aristotle. 
Travis calls this feature “specificity”, and is a feature of concepts, not particulars. On his 
view, then, a conceptual item is general by necessity, yet it can be specific – i.e. it can be 
about a specific circumstance or object. Moreover, their being specific in no way implies that 
they are not general in the sense which is distinctive of “the conceptual” (Travis, 2007: 123-
127). 
This characterisation allows us to trace a distinction between “the conceptual” and 
“the non-conceptual”. On the one hand, we have elements which exhibit the kind of 
generality described in previous paragraphs, and on the other hand, we have the non-
conceptual – which is characterised precisely by the fact that it does not exhibit the kind of 
generality that the conceptual exhibits. We have, then, a conception in which the non-
conceptual is not susceptible of being true or false, or having instances. Travis exploits in 
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this connection the metaphor of “Frege’s line”, i.e. a distinction which places the conceptual 
on one side of the line and the non-conceptual on the other: 
To the right of Frege’s line is the conceptual. What is there to the left? What 
instances (first-order) conceptual generalities. Such as that piece of meat. A piece 
of meat is not in the business of being instanced. So treating it would be bad 
grammar. Of course, of any given piece of meat, there is a concept of being it… 
That for which there is thus no range of cases I will call the non-conceptual 
(Travis, 2007: 232). 
 
According to Travis, there is no associated range of circumstances which instantiate the non-
conceptual. Paradigmatic cases of concreta, such as material objects, events, and property 
instances belong on this side of Frege’s line. Particular material objects – such as a pig – or 
particular events – such as the pig walking in the field – have no instances. Rather, they are 
the instances of first-order generalities such as the concept of being a pig, and the proposition 
that a pig walks in the field. These remarks seem to capture a natural way of thinking and 
talking about concepts and objects – hence Travis’ remark that treating a piece of meat as 
something which has instances is “bad grammar”.  
Yet, this distinction could be challenged by a suggestion that even concrete entities 
exhibit the generality described by Travis. Such a challenge could be mounted by appealing 
to the fact that material objects can change through time while maintaining their identity. Let 
us consider this possible challenge. The criticism could start by noting, for instance, that a 
particular pig can differ in many ways while remaining the same pig. For instance, a pig can 
be arranged or constituted at time t1 in a particular way w1, say lying down on the floor. But 
at time t2 it could be arranged or constituted in a different way w2, say standing up and having 
lost half of its left ear. There are in principle indefinitely many ways the pig could be w1…wn. 
That there is a range of ways in which the same entity can be, the challenge goes, shows that 
concreta do have, after all, the kind of generality which is distinctive of “the conceptual”. 
This challenge would, then, seem to construe these ways of being, w1…wn, as instances of 
the pig.  
A straightforward way of responding to this challenge would be to deny that the 
different ways a material object can be are instances of that material object. More positively, 
we can construe these ways of being of the pig, w1…wn, as all being on a par with each other, 
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in the sense that none of them is an instance of any other, i.e. the pig being in way w1 is not 
an instance of the pig being in way w2. Think of the difficulty in selecting one of these ways 
wx as the one which is instanced by all other ways of being – could we make sense of the idea 
that the pig lying down on the floor is an instance of the pig standing up having lost half of 
its left ear, or vice-versa? Naturally, we need not deny that the many ways in which a 
particular object can be are all instances of something. But that something need not be the 
particular object itself, nor a way of being of that object; after all it would be natural to say 
that each way of being, w1…wn, seems to be an instance of indefinitely many conceptual 
generalities. E.g. the conceptual generalities “being that pig” or “being a pig” could be 
instanced by the different ways – w1…wn – in which the pig could be. In other words, the 
idea that different ways of being are instances of something does not force the conclusion 
that they are instances of non-conceptual entities. It is possible, thus, to account for the fact 
that there are many ways a pig can be, without thereby maintaining that a given way in which 
the pig is possesses the kind of generality which is a mark of the conceptual.  
Let us bring this discussion back to our central issue here, namely perception of 
concreta. It seems clear that perceivable concreta fall on the “non-conceptual” side of Frege’s 
line. Events, property instances, and physical objects are things which have no generality. 
Their relationship to the conceptual is that they are the instances which can satisfy or fall 
under one or another generality. The same goes for less straightforward entities such as 
rainbows, flashes, shadows, etc. But, importantly, not everything on this side of the line is a 
concretum. Presumably, for instance, some of the abstract entities considered in the previous 
section might fall on the non-conceptual side. Arguably, numbers, and fictional characters, 
despite being abstract, lack generality.  
I suggested at the outset of this section that focusing on the lack of generality of 
concreta would help us explain their theoretical role in Radical Anti-psychologism. Now, 
part of the explanation why concreta are suitable objects of perception might appeal to their 
spatiotemporal location. For instance, their spatiotemporal location might feature in an 
explanation of their capacity to impinge our sense organs. On the other hand, and following 
Frege’s suggestion, the question of truth arises only for some elements in the conceptual, i.e. 
thoughts or propositions. On the other side of Frege’s line, among other things, we find the 
concrete. These entities can instantiate conceptual generalities, and in so doing they make 
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them true or false. For a thought or position to be true is nothing more than having an instance 
in the historical world. On the Radical Anti-psychologistic position concreta are reasons for 
judging in virtue of being truthmakers for the potential propositions judged. Frege and 
Travis’ conception makes space for this Radical Anti-psychologistic approach. Nevertheless, 
it should be made clear that this does not constitute yet an argument in favour of the Radical 
Anti-psychologistic position. This is merely a systematic presentation of the different parts 
of the view, how they fit together and how some parts support others. Arguments in favour 
of the view will be advanced in the following chapters.  
 
Conclusion 
Let us take stock. In the first part of this chapter we identified some of the main claims of 
Radical Anti-psychologism and explained how they fit together into a coherent epistemology 
of perception, which can help us flesh out the passive element in Austin’s epistemological 
outlook. In the second part of this chapter we looked closely into one of these main claims, 
namely, the claim that among the items we are perceptually aware of we find concreta. The 
main task, then, was to bring some clarity to the notion of concreta. To that end, we advanced 
a definition based on the spatiotemporal criterion, which, if not watertight, nevertheless 
proves useful for our purposes here. Then, inspired by Frege and Travis, we approached the 
notion of concreta from a different (non-definitional) angle, focusing on the idea that lack of 
generality is the mark of “the conceptual”. We argued that this is a crucial feature of concreta 
vis-à-vis the theoretical role assigned to them in Radical Anti-psychologism. What has been 
achieved with this discussion is to get a more precise idea of what concreta are and why they 
are important in the Radical Anti-psychologistic position. 
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Chapter 5 - Perceptual Knowledge is Based on Reasons 
In the previous chapter we began the task of exploring and defending some of the main claims 
of the Radical Anti-psychologistic picture. Such a task will be continued in the present 
chapter. The exposition and defence of this view is being carried out with the aim of fleshing 
out the epistemology of perception we found in Austin. In the previous chapter, we had a 
close look at the claim that in perception we are aware of concreta, and discussed its limits 
and some of its implications. We noted there that such a claim is not distinctive of the Radical 
Anti-psychologistic position, for many other views would accept that the concrete entities 
that populate the world can be objects of perceptual awareness. Similarly, in this chapter we 
will scrutinize a claim which is not exclusive to the Radical Anti-psychologist position – it 
is, as a matter of fact, one of the central claims in many forms of internalist epistemologies. 
This is the claim (c) in our reconstruction of Radical Anti-psychologism, namely that at least 
some central instances of human perceptual knowledge constitute an epistemic achievement 
which is based on reasons possessed by the subject. Although (c) is not a claim distinctive of 
the Radical Anti-psychologistic position, given other core background commitments of the 
view, we have a reading of (c) which does make it a distinctively Radical Anti-psychologist 
claim. Let us remember that claim (a) is the claim that in perception we are aware of, among 
other things, concreta. Whereas claim (b), which has not been discussed in detail yet, is the 
claim that concreta can be reasons in favour of making certain judgements. With these claims 
in place the Radical Anti-psychologist can advance a reading of (c), according to which at 
least in some cases the reasons on which our perceptual knowledge is based are constituted 
by concreta. We can use the label (c*) to refer to claim (c) when it is read under the guise 
that perceptual knowledge is, at least sometimes, based on concreta. It is important to note 
that the move from (a) and (b) to either (c*) or (c) is not strict (i.e. there is not a deductive 
inference which could take us to (c*) or (c), from (a) and (b)). The role of (a) and (b) in the 
Radical Anti-psychologistic picture is not, thus, to figure as the premises of an argument 
which could lead us to conclude (c*). Rather, their role is to clear the ground, and provide 
the elements, for advancing claim (c*). 
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 Given that there is no strict implication from (a) and (b) to either (c) or (c*), an 
opponent of Radical Anti-psychologism could challenge (c) while conceding (a) and (b) – 
she could concede that concreta can be both reasons for judging and potential objects of 
perception. Yet she could maintain that this is irrelevant in an account of perceptual 
knowledge, for perceptual knowledge has nothing to do with reasons. Given that (c*) is a 
stronger claim – and implies – (c), it is also possible to challenge (c*) while conceding (a) 
and (b). In this chapter I want to focus our discussion on claim (c), for I want to look into the 
motivations for adopting an epistemology of reasons with respect to perceptual knowledge. 
I also want to look into the standard objections against such a view of perceptual knowledge. 
Although claim (c*) is not a logical consequence of (a) and (b), its plausibility does depend 
on the plausibility of the case in favour of these claims (especially (b)) as well as the 
plausibility of the case in favour of (c). A defence of (a) has been carried out in the previous 
chapter, and a more detailed scrutiny of claim (b), that concreta can be reasons for judgement, 
will be undertaken in the following chapter.  
In the first part of this chapter we will contrast the view that perceptual knowledge is 
based on reasons with some externalist theories of perceptual knowledge, a prominent way 
of understanding how perceptual knowledge is warranted, which do not appeal to reasons 
possessed by the subject. First, we will advance some simple remarks to motivate the view 
that perceptual knowledge is based on reasons possessed by the subject. Then, we will discuss 
some of the standard challenges launched by externalist epistemologies to argue that such an 
account is untenable. In particular we will look into the regress problem argument and the 
hyper-intellectualism accusation. The former argues that a reasons epistemology leads to a 
vicious infinite regress of reasons. The later maintains that a reasons account of perceptual 
knowledge places requirements for perceptual knowledge which are too demanding – so 
demanding that that the majority of the perceptual knowledge we take ourselves ordinarily 
to possess is not really knowledge. We will argue that reasons epistemologies – and Radical 
Anti-psychologism in particular – have the resources to respond to both challenges. In the 
second part of this chapter, we will look into a potential tension between endorsing an 
Austinian epistemology of perception and adopting (c), a claim which is at the centre of the 
Radical Anti-psychologist view. The tension arises from Austin’s apparent rejection of the 
claim that knowledge is grounded on reasons. We argue that the tension is only apparent, for 
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it takes its foothold by exploiting a merely terminological discrepancy between Austin and 
the Radical Anti-psychologistic position. Usefully enough, this discussion will lead us to 
consider the role that recognitional capacities have in perceptual knowledge acquisition, and 
its implications with respect to possible requirements of warrant articulation for perceptual 
knowledge. In turn, this discussion will help us advance a more robust response to the 
externalist challenges addressed in the first part of the chapter and will provide a spring board 
for the discussion in the following chapter.  
 
5.1 Radical Anti-psychologism and Externalist Epistemologies 
I will begin by suggesting that reflection on particular cases provides some of the more 
compelling reasons there are for thinking that the perceptual knowledge enjoyed by adult 
humans is sometimes based on reasons.73 Suppose that an expert birdwatcher spots a 
goldfinch on a tree and comes to know, thereby, that there is a goldfinch in the garden. 
Suppose further that she possesses abundant reasons for making that judgement – something 
which is made evident by her articulation of those reasons (let us suppose that our 
birdwatcher is quite an eloquent individual). I want to suggest that there is absolutely nothing 
extraordinary about this case. And a natural way of explaining why the subject in our example 
possesses knowledge would be to appeal to her possession of those reasons. Further 
considerations about this case provide additional reasons to think that a reasons account is 
appropriate. If, contrary to the hypothesis, the subject’s standing was not based on reasons, 
then it would be feebler than it seems reasonable. For instance, it seems reasonable to think 
that the expert birdwatcher’s judgement is securely grounded, in the sense that she is in a 
position to neutralize many possible counter-considerations. If someone were to suggest to 
her that the bird might not be a goldfinch, but a different red-headed bird such as a 
woodpecker – the expert birdwatcher might be able to neutralize this challenge by pointing 
out that the bird’s peak is not pointy enough for a woodpecker. Similarly, a natural 
explanation of why the expert birdwatcher can defend her claim to know in this way is that 
her epistemic standing is grounded on reasons possessed by her. We should clarify that 
eloquent articulation of the possessed reasons need not be a requirement in a reasons 
                                                 
73 See Conee and Feldman (2001) for this type of defence of an internalist epistemology, in general, not just 
about perceptual knowledge. 
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epistemology. This aspect is exploited in the present example merely to bring out the intuition 
that in these cases the goodness of the subject’s epistemic standing depends on her possessing 
those reasons.  
 Even though the reasons account seems to be able to provide a natural account of this 
type of cases, opponents of the view have argued against it by finding problems with the 
view. Here we will look closely at two of these challenges and provide a response to them. 
For instance, opponents of the view might argue that a reasons epistemology is not tenable 
on the basis that it exhibits an internal flaw which makes it inadequate to account for the 
phenomenon of knowledge. This is the path followed by the infinite regress argument. Other 
type of criticism suggests that a reasons account is inadequate because it cannot give an 
adequate account of many of the cases we want to explain. This is the path followed by the 
hyper-intellectualism argument.74 Before presenting and assessing these arguments let me 
briefly say something about the epistemological outlook from which many of these criticisms 
are advanced, i.e. epistemological externalism.  
In its most general form, externalist epistemologies maintain that a subject can know, 
or warrantedly believe, that p, even in cases in which the subject would be unaware of reasons 
that there might be in favour of p. Sometimes the view is supplemented with the claim that 
subjects can know that p even if they are incapable of citing any reasons in favour of p.75 For 
instance, according to reliabilist theories of knowledge, a subject’s knowledge that p does 
not depend on the subject possessing the reasons there might be in favour p.76 On this view, 
as long as the relevant belief – i.e. the belief that p – is the result of a belief-forming 
mechanism that is reliable in the circumstances in which it is deployed, the subject might 
know that p. Of course, depending on the particular view, further conditions might have to 
be satisfied if the subject is to count as knowing that p. A belief-forming mechanism is 
reliable when it produces an appropriately high proportion of true beliefs. Thus, on such a 
                                                 
74 See Goldman (1999), Alston (1986), and Plantinga (1996) for arguments against internalism which differ 
from the ones we will analyse here. See Conee and Feldman (2001) for a response to these criticisms.  
75 For this characterisation of externalism see Armstrong (1973), as well as BonJour (1980) for a critical 
assessment of Armstrong’s position. See also Brandom (2000) for a critical assessment of the main thesis of 
externalism and reliabilist. 
76 For instance, Goldman’s (partial) analysis of the notion of justified belief (1979): 102. According to his 
analysis, if a subject’s belief that p at t is the product of a reliable belief-forming process, and there is no 
alternative or additional reliable belief forming-process available to the subject which would have had as a 
result the subject not believing p at t, then the belief is justified (Goldman, 1979: 102) 
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conception of knowledge, subjects might acquire propositional knowledge despite being 
unaware of (and despite being incapable of articulating) the reasons there are in favour of 
their beliefs. Since there is no immediate requirement for being reliable that one possesses 
reasons, nor that one is able to articulate them, one can meet the reliability condition without 
meeting those other conditions. 
It is important to note that it is possible to uphold an externalist epistemology without 
accounting for perceptual knowledge along externalist lines. For the way we characterised 
externalist epistemologies does not imply a commitment to the general claim that all types 
of knowledge should be accounted for along externalist lines. As long as some types of 
knowledge follow the externalist paradigm a form of externalism can be upheld. To be an 
externalist it might suffice, for instance, to maintain that testimonial knowledge is to be 
accounted along externalist lines. This would be compatible with claiming that perceptual 
knowledge is based on reasons that the subject possesses. Therefore, our characterisation 
leaves open the possibility for an externalist position in which perceptual knowledge, 
nevertheless, is based on reasons that the subject possesses. It goes without saying, 
nevertheless, that many externalist epistemologists think that a correct account of perceptual 
knowledge should follow the externalist paradigm. We will discuss a view of this kind below, 
when we look into Tyler Burge’s account of perceptual knowledge.  
In a similar fashion, the Radical Anti-psychologist position (a type of reasons 
epistemology) is not committed to the position that an externalist account of knowledge 
cannot be right about some cases of knowledge or belief. As a matter of fact, there are good 
reasons to think that true beliefs produced by a capacity to, by and large, truly represent the 
world, should be regarded positively from an epistemic point of view – they would be the 
product of a truth conducive procedure after all – even if the subject lacked reasons for the 
resulting beliefs. As is often pointed out by externalist epistemologists, these notions might 
be useful to characterise what is epistemically right in the reliably-produced true beliefs of 
creatures incapable of articulating the reasons for their beliefs, such as small children and 
higher animals.77 Radical Anti-psychologism is not inconsistent with this minimal point. 
                                                 
77 For instance Burge (2003: 515). 
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Nevertheless, a conflict between some versions of externalism and the kind of reasons 
epistemology advanced by Radical Anti-psychologism might arise when we consider the 
specific question of under what paradigm should we place adult human’s perceptual 
knowledge. Sometimes externalist epistemologists insist on the more specific point that this 
sort of perceptual knowledge should be understood along externalist lines. When this further 
step is taken, then, there is an obvious conflict between Radical Anti-psychologism and this 
sort of externalist epistemology. In favour of a reasons epistemology we have the 
straightforward account of cases such as the expert birdwatcher’s knowledge that there is a 
goldfinch on the tree. In order to undermine the plausibility of a reasons account of perceptual 
knowledge, externalist epistemologists tend to advance arguments such as the infinite regress 
argument and the hyper-intellectualism argument. We will explain how these arguments are 
supposed to work shortly.  
I will argue that a correct understanding of the claim that perceptual knowledge is, at 
least sometimes, based on reasons possessed by the subject shows that these worries are 
unfounded. In particular, I will be suggesting that claim (c) should be read in a rather minimal 
way, such that the alleged problems raised by the standard externalist challenges do not 
represent significant problems for the version of Radical Anti-psychologism defended here. 
It should be noted here that I do not intend this discussion to be an exhaustive rejection of 
the arguments which have been advanced to favour an externalist epistemology, nor is it an 
attempt to refute externalist epistemology. In responding to these standard objections I 
merely want to highlight one way in which the particular view defended here could deal with 
the problems raised by common objections. This will also help delineate more precisely what 
kind of view Radical Anti-psychologism is, and place it within a broader philosophical 
debate.   
 
i) The Regress Problem 
The regress problem in epistemology is commonly characterised as the problem which arises 
when epistemological views allow for a potential infinite regress of the grounds on which 
particular pieces of propositional knowledge are warranted. Consider, for instance, an 
account of knowledge according to which in order for S to know that p, S has to know that 
the reasons which warrant her adoption of p actually obtain. Suppose that all knowledge 
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needs to be grounded on reasons possessed by the subject. Suppose, moreover, that the 
obtaining of those reasons is described by q. This means that S’s knowledge that p is based 
on S’s knowledge that q. If we apply the same reasoning to S’s knowledge that q, and to all 
new pieces of knowledge which arise in the warranting chain, we are faced with an infinite, 
and seemingly vicious, regress.  
There are several ways in which this problem can be dealt with in epistemology, and 
not all epistemological approaches advance a solution to the problem. For instance, infinitist 
approaches endorse the strategy of claiming that there is nothing problematic with an infinite 
regress of warrants, a hard sell for many epistemologists.78 But a straightforward way of 
dealing with the problem is to attempt to solve it. For instance, coherentist approaches have 
attempted to solve the problem by arguing that there is not an infinite number of warrants 
which ground our knowledge. Instead, coherentists claim that there is a warranting chain 
which eventually comes back in a circle.79 Unlike the potential infinite regress, the warranting 
circle is not vicious, or so they argue. Alternatively, foundationalist approaches attempt to 
solve the problem by introducing ending points to the warranting chains. The terminating 
points of the warranting chains are constituted by so-called “basic beliefs”. Different brands 
of foundationalism have characterised basic beliefs in different ways. There are three 
prominent alternatives. The first is that basic beliefs do not need reasons to constitute 
knowledge – on this view not all knowledge ought to be grounded on reasons. Second, that 
basic beliefs are self-warranted in virtue of being self-evident. On this position all knowledge 
should be grounded on reasons, but not all reasons need to be independent of the knowledge 
they ground. Finally, the claim that basic beliefs are warranted by something other than a 
belief, which is not itself in need of warrant. On this position, all knowledge need to be 
grounded on reasons, but not all reasons are afforded by a state of knowing (nor by a state 
which requires reasons to be grounded).80 Here a clarificatory point is in order. Classic 
foundationalist theories of knowledge traditionally advance the additional claim that every 
non-basic piece of knowledge ought to be grounded, ultimately, on the basis of a basic belief. 
                                                 
78 See Klein (2000, 2003) for a defence of “infinitism”. See BonJour (2009), and Ginet (2013) for criticisms.  
79 See BonJour (1985) and Lehrer (1990, 2005). 
80 See Pryor (2013), Alston (1989), BonJour & Sosa (2003), and Fumerton (2000) for explicit defences of 
basic beliefs and foundationalism, and Zalabardo (2006) for a characterisation of the Regress Problem and the 
available responses to it.  
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This aspect of the foundationalist picture will be left out in the present work, for we are 
interested here only in the foundationalist account of basic beliefs as regress stoppers. Now, 
how do externalist epistemologies respond to the regress problem? And how could they 
exploit their response to it in an argument against reasons epistemologies? In the following, 
we will look at these questions in turn. 
Externalist epistemologies usually appeal to a stopping point in the warranting chain 
and are, in this sense, a form of foundationalism. They argue that there is a special kind of 
knowledge – basic knowledge – which is non-inferentially warranted. A common way of 
defining non-inferential knowledge is as follows: a piece of knowledge is non-inferentially 
warranted when its warrant need not be constituted by further beliefs of the subject.81 On the 
externalist conception it is usually claimed that the obtaining of a relevant fact, of which the 
subject need not be aware in any way, ensures the warranted status of the relevant piece of 
knowledge. Take, for instance, Goldman’s reliabilist approach. On a view like that, a 
subject’s knowledge that p can be warranted simply by virtue of the fact that it is the product 
of a reliable belief-forming process, where one need not in addition be knowledgeable about 
the reliability of this process.82 This type of view could stop the regress, the reasoning goes, 
because a fact (such as the fact that the belief is the upshot of a reliable mechanism) is not 
the kind of thing that stands in need of warranting support. This type of warrant is non-
inferential precisely because other beliefs that the subject possesses need not constitute the 
warrant for the relevant piece of knowledge.  
Very schematically, this is a standard externalist response to the regress problem. But 
how could an externalist use her response to the regress problem in order to advance an 
argument against a conception of perceptual knowledge along a reasons epistemology? Often 
epistemological arguments which appeal to the regress problem take the form of an inference 
to the best explanation, which in turn rests on discrediting alternative explanations.83 In other 
words, arguments tend to take the form of finding problems in competing theories, in order 
to argue that a given position is the only way in which we can deal with the regress problem. 
We can restrict the scope of possible positions by assuming that the appropriate way of 
                                                 
81 See Alston (1989: 21), and BonJour (1985: 18), for a definition of non-inferential warrant along these lines. 
82 As well as by virtue of the fact that there are no alternative reliable belief-forming processes available to the 
subject which could have had as a result the subject not endorsing that belief. See Goldman (1979).  
83 See BonJour (1999) for this description of the dialectic which turns on the regress problem. 
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dealing with the regress problem is by introducing regress stoppers. The argument would, 
then, look as follows: 
 
i) Any viable account of basic knowledge must be able to deal with the regress. 
ii) Any view which deals with the regress must be either reasons based or 
externalist. 
iii) Reasons accounts of basic knowledge cannot stop the regress.  
iv) Therefore, the correct account of basic knowledge is an externalist account. 
On the further assumption that perceptual knowledge is basic, we have the conclusion that 
the correct account of perceptual knowledge is an externalist account. Faced with this 
argument it would be natural for a reasons epistemologist to question the credentials behind 
premise (iii) of the above argument. The following line of reasoning might be used by the 
externalist to sponsor claim (iii). An essential aspect of a reasons epistemology is that 
knowledge is grounded on reasons possessed by the subject. On a reasons epistemology, 
basic knowledge that, say, p should be grounded on reasons possessed by the subject. But 
how are we to understand the notion that a subject “possesses” a reason? A flat-footed 
suggestion would be that the subject possesses a reason insofar as she knows that the reason 
obtains. But this approach to basic knowledge would fall to the regress problem sketched in 
the outset of this section. Suppose the subject’s reasons for knowing that p (where this is a 
basic piece of knowledge) are described by q. Then her possessing those reasons would 
amount to her knowledge that q. But if she knows that q she must have reasons for it. A 
vicious regress looms. Here, it is important to note that the regress arises as the result of the 
adoption of the following two claims: first, the claim that all knowledge should be grounded 
on reasons possessed by the subject, and, second, the claim that possession of reasons 
amounts to knowing that the relevant reasons obtain.  
 One way to respond to this line of reasoning is to point out that some versions of the 
reasons epistemology do not hold these principles, nor principles similar to the ones which 
give rise to the regress problem. In particular, we can point out that the version of Radical 
Anti-psychologism advanced here does not endorse the claim that possession of reasons 
amounts to knowledge that the relevant reasons obtain. Arguably, this would result in the 
Radical Anti-psychologist conception of basic perceptual knowledge avoiding the regress 
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problem. To see why, first, it should be clear that the way in which perceptual knowledge is 
warranted on the Radical Anti-psychologist conception should be considered non-inferential. 
On the Radical Anti-psychologist conception, the reasons that constitute the warrant which 
grounds a piece of basic knowledge are the very objects of perception which make true the 
warranted proposition. S’s knowledge that there is a pig in front of her can be warranted by 
the pig itself, for, on this conception, concreta can be reasons. Moreover, for the subject to 
possess that reason (i.e. the pig), she does not need to be in a state of belief (nor knowledge) 
with respect to any proposition involving the pig. In other words, the possession of the 
relevant reason is afforded to the subject not by her being in a state of belief about the pig, 
but by a state of perception of the pig (Cfr. Kalderon, 2011: 227).  
The Radical Anti-psychologist, thus, can reject the claim that possession of reasons 
requires knowledge of those reasons. Against this position, it could be argued that for a 
subject to form the relevant judgement, for instance that there is a pig before her, there are 
certain beliefs she must possess – for instance the belief that pigs are animals. This remark, 
nevertheless, can be endorsed without challenging the non-inferential status of the warrant 
proposed by the Radical Anti-psychologist. For any beliefs subjects should have for them to 
be in a position to judge that p, need not constitute the warrant for their knowledge that p. 
Non-inferential warrant only requires that no beliefs constitute the warrant on which a piece 
of knowledge rests. That is, we can allow for certain beliefs to function as enabling conditions 
for making the relevant judgements. In the example above, that is just the role that we can 
assign to the beliefs about pigs. Thus, the kind of warrant advanced by the Radical Anti-
psychologist should be considered non-inferential. That pieces of knowledge warranted in 
this way can serve as regress stoppers could be shown by pointing out that the items which 
constitute the warrant are not the kind of thing which stands in need of warranting support. 
For a pig is not the kind of thing which could be warranted or unwarranted. Nevertheless, 
against this attempt to stop the regress, it could be argued that even though the reasons which 
ground our perceptual knowledge are not the kind of thing that needs warrant, the way in 
which the subject is aware of those reasons might be something that stands itself in need of 
warrant. But, it could be replied, in a similar fashion, that a perceptual state (unlike a state of 
believing or knowing) is not the kind of thing which stands in need of warrant. My seeing 
the pig is not the kind of thing which can be warranted or unwarranted. 
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Granted, perhaps the last claim is not so straightforward within the framework of a 
belief account of perception, according to which being in a perceptual state is to be identified 
with the acquisition of a belief. For these views, a subject perceives, for instance, a property 
P if and only if she acquires the belief that something is P.84 On such a conception of 
perception, given its intimate connection to belief acquisition, talk of a perceptual state being 
warranted might make sense insofar as talk of beliefs being warranted makes sense. For 
instance, a suggestion would be that a perceptual state is warranted or unwarranted insofar 
as the concomitant beliefs are warranted or unwarranted. Here, I am going to set aside these 
views on the nature of perception. In the current debate, such views are widely regarded as 
untenable on the basis of considerations such as the following: someone who knows (and 
therefore believes) that the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are of equal length, would 
nevertheless see them as unequal – as a matter of fact she could not help but seeing them as 
unequal. Endorsing the belief theory of perception would leave the subject, in cases like this, 
with inconsistent sets of beliefs.  
 
ii) Hyper Intellectualism 
The argument that appeals to the regress problem is one major objection which could be 
advanced from an externalist epistemology against an epistemology of reasons. But it seems 
that the Radical Anti-psychologistic position has the elements to avoid this alleged problem. 
What about the second standard objection identified before – the one that claims that a 
reasons account of perceptual knowledge is bound to advance a hyper-intellectualized 
conception of this sort of knowledge? For instance, Tyler Burge has advanced a form of this 
reasoning to argue in favour of his own externalist account of perceptual knowledge – and 
against a reasons account. Burge’s account attempts to occupy a middle ground between a 
reasons account of perceptual knowledge and a reliabilist approach such as the one advanced 
by Goldman. For Burge considerations about the reliability of certain belief-forming 
mechanisms are relevant for his account, but that is not the central feature in his epistemology 
of perception. Very briefly, for Burge a subject is entitled to hold a perceptual belief when 
the non-conceptual representational content afforded by a perceptual episode is appropriately 
                                                 
84 See Fish (2010: 53) and Armstrong (1968). 
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transformed into a conceptual or propositional content which preserves crucial elements of 
the truth conditions of the original representational content. Burge calls this process 
conceptualization, and the process only leads to warrant if it is a reliable process (Burge, 
2003: 522-526). For Burge, the process of conceptualization leads to warrant partly by virtue 
of being a reliable process of belief formation. But his account does not stop as soon as we 
reach reliability; for him, the process of conceptualization provides the subject with warrant 
only when reliability is achieved in the appropriate manner. What is crucial for the proper 
functioning of conceptualization is the preservation of the verticality of the perceptual 
representations, and preservation of reference to the singular elements in perceptual 
representations (Burge, 2003: 540-542). 
Now, even when Burge’s view is not an instance of classical reliabilism, it is still a 
form of externalism insofar as it holds that even adult human perceptual knowledge is such 
that it does not require the knower to be aware of the reasons there might be in favour of her 
perceptually based knowledge. For Burge, the special kind of epistemic warrant he labels 
“perceptual entitlement”, which is the result of the process of conceptualization, exhibits the 
following characteristic: “[it] need not be fully conceptually accessible, even on reflection, 
to the warranted individual. The individual need not have the concepts necessary to think the 
propositional content that formulates the warrant” (Burge, 2003: 504). So, in a similar way 
to Goldman’s reliabilist approach, a perceptual knower can be entirely unaware of the 
grounds there might be, which would warrant their adoption of the relevant belief. Moreover, 
the subject might be unable to articulate that warrant. What is essential, on Burge’s view, for 
the warrant of a perceptual belief is whether or not it was formed in an appropriate way.  
But what is Burge’s argument to dismiss a reasons account of perceptual knowledge? 
Burge thinks that his externalist account of perceptual knowledge is partially warranted by 
the fact that any account of perceptual knowledge more demanding than his would provide 
us with an inadequate, hyper-intellectualized, elucidation of perceptual knowledge.85 In 
particular, on Burge’s view, reasons epistemologies would fall prey to this problem. Let us 
have, then, a closer look into his case for the accusation of hyper-intellectualism advanced 
against reasons epistemologies of perception.  
                                                 
85 This kind of objection against reasons epistemologies is very common in externalist approaches. See, for 
example, Alston (1980, 1986: 144), Vogel (2000), Goldman (1999).  
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Not all versions of reasons epistemology would impose the requirement that for a 
subject to possess perceptual knowledge she must be able to articulate the reasons which 
ground her knowledge. Some views might maintain that it suffices if the judgement is 
grounded on reasons of which the subject is aware, independently of her capacity to articulate 
those reasons. Here, nevertheless, I will assess the more demanding version of the view, 
according to which the subject must be able to articulate her warrant. We will see that this 
more demanding version can deal adequately with the hyper-intellectualism worry. Let us 
call knowledge understood in conformity with the demanding epistemology of reasons 
“reflexive knowledge”. Having reflexive knowledge, in this sense, simply means that the 
subject must have the capacity to give some appropriate expression to the reasons which 
ground their relevant belief if they are required to do so. It has been argued that a construal 
of perceptual knowledge as reflexive, in this sense, would have the consequence that many 
adult humans, all pre-conceptual children, and “higher animals” would be prevented from 
having said knowledge. This line of attack exploits the commitment that subjects must be 
capable of articulating the reasons on which the relevant piece of knowledge is grounded. 
For example, McDowell, explains Sellars’ conception of perceptual knowledge as reflexive 
– a conception McDowell himself endorses – as follows: 
If someone has a bit of knowledge of the sort Sellars is concerned with [i.e. 
knowledge that is distinctive of rational animals], she can state not only what she 
knowledgeably believes, but also how her believing it is rationally grounded in a 
way that shows the belief to be knowledgeable (McDowell, 2011: 10). 
So, on this account of reflexive knowledge, the knower must be in a position in which she 
can make explicit the grounds on which her knowledge is based. Once this much has been 
endorsed by the reasons epistemologist, the externalist can launch the following attack. Many 
subjects who surely have perceptual knowledge, such as pre-rational children and non-
linguistic higher animals, will be incapable of giving expression to the grounds on which 
their knowledge is warranted – for they simply lack the conceptual capacities to entertain 
such grounds and, furthermore, lack the linguistic capacities to articulate them. Moreover, 
the attack usually argues that a reasons account of perceptual knowledge is too demanding 
not only with respect to such knowers, but also with respect to many rational adult humans. 
But surely we want to concede that perceptual knowledge is an epistemic achievement which 
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is within reach of these creatures, pre-linguistic children, and most adult humans. 
Nevertheless, according to this criticism, lacking the conceptual and linguistic capacities 
required to give expression to their perceptual warrant would prevent many of these creatures 
– adult humans included – from having perceptual knowledge. Therefore, the argument 
concludes, the account of perceptual knowledge as reflexive is inadequate insofar as it would 
prevent, if it were true, too many subjects from having perceptual knowledge at all. 
I want to start by noting that we can identify two related but independent objections 
being raised here against a reasons account of perceptual knowledge. The first is that it would 
prevent many pre-linguistic children and higher animals from having perceptual knowledge. 
The second is that it would prevent even many adult humans from enjoying this kind of 
knowledge. As we will see, we will treat these objections as independent since they rest on 
different grounds. The former rests on the assumption that a uniform account of perceptual 
knowledge should be advanced for rational and non-rational animals. The latter rests on the 
idea that the requisites imposed by a reasons epistemology are overly demanding even for 
rational adult humans. I think both criticisms are objectionable insofar as their plausibility 
depends on an inadequate – i.e. non-obligatory – construal of the sort of requirement put 
forward by a reasons epistemology regarding the capacity of the knower to articulate the 
warrant that grounds her knowledge. We will take these criticisms in turn.  
Let us start by noting that the first criticism only works on the assumption that we 
should give a uniform account of perceptual knowledge across rational and non-rational 
animals. This is an assumption which might be challenged by a reasons epistemologist. The 
conclusion that a reasons account is inadequate when applied to higher animals and pre-
linguistic children, on the basis that they lack the linguistic and conceptual capacities to 
articulate their warrant, can only be reached under the assumption that the scope of the 
reasons account of perceptual knowledge ranges over all instances of perceptual knowledge. 
Tyler Burge acknowledges explicitly that this assumption is in play in his own case against 
reasons epistemologies. Thus, he thinks that the following is a requirement which should be 
met by any plausible epistemology of perception: 
A viable conception of warrant and knowledge must include both primitive and 
sophisticated types. A condition of viability is that such a conception apply to 
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animal and child perceptual belief, and knowledge, as well as to mature instances 
of belief and knowledge (Burge, 2003: 505). 
Of course, if we think that the same account we advance for the perceptual knowledge 
enjoyed by rational adult humans is to be extended to the perceptual knowledge enjoyed by 
young children and higher animals, then reasons epistemology will certainly face a problem 
of hyper-intellectualization – for lacking the required linguistic and conceptual capacities 
would prevent them from qualifying as knowers. But it is not obvious at all that we should 
advance the same account of perceptual knowledge across rational and non-rational animals.  
As a matter of fact, there seems to be an unwarranted move in Burge’s passage. The 
two sentences that compose the passage seem to be treated by Burge as equivalent, but they 
clearly are not – we will explain why shortly. Alternatively, it could be thought that the 
passage is to be read as if the first claim implied the second; but similarly, the implication 
clearly fails. We could concede that an adequate conception of perceptual knowledge should 
account for both “primitive” and “sophisticated” types – that much seems to be an innocuous 
requirement for a comprehensive epistemology. But conceding this much does not commit 
us to the claim which is advanced immediately after by Burge, namely that the same 
epistemological account should be given for both instances of knowledge. In principle, there 
is no reason to think that an adequate epistemology should not advance different treatments 
for the primitive and the sophisticated cases. After all, differences in the rational capacities 
of the knowers are reasons to advance different accounts to the ensuing knowledge. It is, 
thus, open to the reasons epistemologist to claim that the account of perceptual knowledge 
as reflexive is to be understood as an account which applies exclusively to rational agents, 
such as adult humans, and that a different account – perhaps an account modelled along 
externalist lines – should be advanced for the “primitive” cases. If this is so, then, the mere 
fact that pre-linguistic children and higher animals are incapable of articulating the reasons 
that ground their perceptual knowledge should not be considered a reason to think the account 
is inadequate.86 
 Burge does not provide very much in the way of argument for thinking that an 
adequate account of perceptual knowledge should advance the same treatment for 
                                                 
86 Here I am following one line of defence advanced by John McDowell (2010, 2013) against Burge’s charge 
of hyper-intellectualization. 
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sophisticated and primitive cases. He rightly points out that a philosophical outlook in which 
higher animals and pre-linguistic children are denied certain perceptual and cognitive 
capacities – examples of which are knowledge, belief, and perception, among others – should 
be regarded as inadequate. He also sensibly suggests that an adequate account of perceptual 
knowledge should not divorce human perception and cognition from its animal roots (Burge, 
2003: 503-503). What is not clear is that a reasons account of perceptual knowledge would 
necessarily be guilty of these sins. For instance, it is not inconsistent with Radical Anti-
psychologism to concede that higher animals have perceptual knowledge nor that pre-
linguistic children are perceptually aware of the world around them. Moreover, it is open to 
the Radical Anti-psychologist to regard the reflexive knowledge had by adult humans as a 
species of a genus which does include the non-reflexive knowledge enjoyed by other 
creatures. A move which has been defended by McDowell: “giving a special account of the 
perceptual knowledge of rational animals is consistent with regarding perceptual knowledge 
in rational animals as a sophisticated species of a genus that is also instantiated more 
primitively in non-rational animals and pre-rational human children” (McDowell, 2010: 20). 
It is not clear that an account like this could be seen as divorcing human perception and 
cognition from its animal roots. A view like this could claim, for instance, that both types of 
knowledge (sophisticated and primitive) depend on the successful operation of perceptual 
capacities – capacities which are shared by rational and non-rational beings. This might give 
us one reason to think that such a view does not divorce human cognition from its animal 
roots.  
Moreover, and more importantly, there are good reasons for advancing an account of 
perceptual knowledge in which there are important differences between primitive and 
sophisticated types. Consider, for instance, the following line of reasoning. It seems 
reasonable to grant that in the presence of a predator, certain animals and young children 
could acquire knowledge about the presence of danger, knowledge which would be based on 
their perception of the predator. Similarly, adult humans could get to know the same thing – 
that the present situation is dangerous – on the basis of their perception of a predator. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to find important differences in those ways of knowing. Saliently, 
the adult human’s knowledge will typically be sensitive, in a way that other creatures could 
not be, to the presentation of counter-considerations that would speak against her putative 
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piece of knowledge. If someone points out that the tiger is actually behind a reinforced glass 
wall, her judgement regarding the presence of danger can be adjusted in light of this 
information, provided she understands the remark. Perhaps they will abandon the initial 
belief and form the new belief that there is no danger after all, or no significant danger for 
them after all. It is not so clear that the knowledge (or warranted belief) had by young children 
and higher animals could exhibit this kind of sensitivity to counter-considerations. One way 
of explaining this difference, due to McDowell, consists in conceiving young children and 
higher animals as being merely aware of reasons, and the beliefs they hold as a response to 
those reasons. But, on this view, importantly, their beliefs are not based on those reasons, 
they are merely a response to them. In order for a belief to be based on a reason, the subject 
must exhibit the desired sensitivity to counter-considerations described before. On the other 
hand, adult humans should be regarded as being aware of reasons as such, and forming their 
beliefs not only in response to those reasons, but formed on the basis of those reasons. Being 
aware of reasons as such implies that a subject understands their role in grounding her beliefs. 
Thus, when counter-considerations are advanced the subject can appreciate the impact they 
have in their reasons, or in the way the reasons support relevant beliefs (McDowell, 2006: 
128-129). Considerations like these do speak in favour of an account of perceptual 
knowledge in which there are important differences between sophisticated and primitive 
types.  
 But the second way of reading the hyper-intellectualization charge does not rely on 
the assumption that the same account should be given for sophisticated and primitive types 
of perceptual knowledge. Let us remember that the second way of presenting the charge 
maintains that the requirement to articulate one’s warrant is too demanding even for adult 
humans. The argument is simply that even in sophisticated cases a reasons account would 
give rise to a hyper-intellectualized conception of that kind of perceptual knowledge. The 
charge rests on the assumption that the capacity to cite the reasons on which the relevant 
perceptual knowledge rests requires the possession of far too sophisticated concepts; 
concepts which many rational adult humans might lack. For instance, Burge seems to suggest 
that a reasons account would be committed to the idea that for a subject to have perceptual 
knowledge she should be in possession of the following concepts: “reliable, normal 
condition, perceptual state, individuation, defeating condition” (Burge, 2003: 528). Sure, if 
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an account requires possession by subjects of these technical terms as a requisite for them to 
qualify as knowers, indeed that would be a hyper-intellectualized conception of perceptual 
knowledge. But it is simply a mistake to think that a reasons account of perceptual knowledge 
necessarily requires that the subject be capable of articulating her reasons using such 
sophisticated concepts. Consider the following formulation of the relevant requirement, 
advanced by McDowell: 
Spelled out in connection with the capacity to know the colours of things by 
looking at them, the requirement is that someone who gives expression to such 
knowledge by saying, for instance, “That’s green” must be able to vindicate the 
authority with which she speaks by saying something like “I can tell a green thing 
when I see one” (McDowell, 2011: 12).  
It should be clear that a capacity to say something along these lines when we are asked to 
provide our grounds for thinking that something is green hardly requires the possession of 
sophisticated concepts on the part of the subject.  If we understand the requirement of being 
able to articulate the reasons we have for our perceptual knowledge along these lines, then it 
seems that the charge of hyper-intellectualization advanced by the externalist epistemologists 
is groundless. Being able to say, at least, something along those lines when our perceptual 
knowledge is questioned does not require from us to possess any of the sophisticated concepts 
in Burge’s list.  
 This construal of the requirement to articulate one’s warrant might attract a criticism 
in the opposite direction. It could be argued that in many cases an incapacity to go beyond 
this minimal articulation could signal a lack of knowledge. The view which requires merely 
a minimal articulation of one’s warrant might be sufficient for many everyday cases. 
Moreover, a reason to favour this position is the observation that someone’s 
knowledgeability might not be necessarily accompanied by a high degree of eloquence. But 
although this might be true, what do we make of other cases in which, it seems, a deeper 
articulation is required if we are to consider the subject knowledgeable? Consider, for 
instance, the case of the expert ornithologist who claims to know that, in her latest field 
research, she was able to establish the presence of goldfinches in a location further north to 
what was considered their natural habitat. Arguably for such a subject to count as knowing 
this proposition she must be able to articulate her reasons for so thinking, with a considerable 
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degree of detail and exhibiting a considerable degree of conceptual sophistication. The 
articulation requirement, for a reasons epistemologist, might differ from context to context. 
But, then, an interesting question will be why in ordinary cases of perceptual knowledge, the 
minimal articulation suffices? It would be good to have a positive, and specific, explanation 
of why the bar is not put higher for these cases. McDowell does not provide such an 
explanation. But we will see in the second part of this chapter, that some remarks by Austin 
might help us do just that. We will see that, for Austin, the role of recognitional capacities in 
perceptual knowledge acquisition allows us to explain why a minimal requirement of 
articulation is appropriate for many ordinary cases of perceptual knowledge.  
 In summary, in responding to these objections commonly raised from an externalist 
perspective against a reasons epistemology we have done two things. First, we provided a 
defence of the Radical Anti-psychologist view from standard attacks, and, secondly, we 
delineated the view with more precision. On the one hand, we have explained how the 
Radical Anti-psychologist can deal with the regress problem by advancing a non-inferential 
account of perceptual warrant. On the other hand, we have explained how the view can deal 
with the accusation that the resulting account hyper-intellectualizes perceptual knowledge. 
But apart from challenges against the plausibility of a reasons account of perceptual 
knowledge, we also face potential worries, internal to the project we aim to defend here. In 
the following section we will discuss a worry to the effect that endorsing a reasons 
epistemology would be inconsistent with certain aspects of Austin’s epistemology. This 
discussion will also allow us to provide a more robust response to the charge of hyper-
intellectualization considered in this section.  
 
5.2 Reasons Epistemology and Austin 
Let us now consider whether there is a potential inconsistency between endorsing both an 
Austinian epistemology and a reasons epistemology such as Radical Anti-psychologism. In 
explaining how there is no such inconsistency we will also look into some interesting 
suggestions made by Austin regarding the way in which we should understand the 
requirement that a rational subject who possesses perceptual knowledge should be able to 
articulate the warrant that grounds it. 
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 One salient remark made by Austin in “Other Minds” is that, in ordinary talk, the 
question used to enquire for the grounds on the basis of which a belief is held is very different 
from a similar question which enquires for the grounds of a piece of knowledge: 
There is a singular difference between the two forms of challenge: ‘How do you 
know?’ and ‘Why do you believe?’ We seem never to ask ‘Why do you know?’ or 
‘How do you believe?’ (Austin, 1946: 78). 
As we have seen before, a distinctive trait of Austin’s philosophy is that of taking very 
seriously ordinary ways of speaking. He thinks that this difference in the relevant challenges 
reveals something deep about the nature of knowledge and its difference from belief. One 
suggestion advanced by Austin is that in saying “I know” we are doing something more than 
merely describing our mental state – as we seemingly do when we say “I believe”. For Austin, 
when we say “I know” we are also putting ourselves on the line in a distinctive way – at least 
in a way that we do not when our claim is merely to believe. For Austin, a claim to know (if 
indeed correct) has the capacity to transmit our knowledge to another subject, and, moreover, 
the hearer is entitled to endorse the relevant proposition as knowledge. Or, alternatively, the 
hearer would be entitled to complain with her source if it turns out that it was not knowledge 
after all (Austin, 1946: 97-103). Nevertheless, I do not want to focus here on this aspect of 
Austin’s discussion. Instead I want to focus on what Austin thinks these challenges teach us 
about the different ways in which knowledge and belief are epistemically grounded.  
 In summary, following Austin’s terminology, he wants to suggest that, strictly 
speaking, believing is based on reasons whereas knowledge is not. This idea is advanced as 
a response to the observation that we enquire for the reasons in favour of something by asking 
“why”, and that something entirely different is asked when we use “how”. Nevertheless, 
Austin’s view on the matter is not so straightforward, for he notes that we sometimes do talk 
of “reasons for knowing”: 
Some of the answers to the question ‘How do you know?’ are oddly enough, 
described as ‘reasons for knowing’ or ‘reasons to know’… despite the fact that 
we do not ask ‘Why do you know?’ But now surely, according to the Dictionary, 
‘reasons’ should be given in answer to the question ‘Why?’ Just as we do in fact 
give reasons for believing in answer to the question ‘Why do you believe?’ 
However there is a distinction to be drawn here. ‘How do you know that IG Farben 
worked for the war?’ ‘I have every reason to know: I served on the investigating 
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commission’: here, giving my reasons for knowing is stating how I come to be in 
a position to know (Austin, 1946: 81).  
In this passage Austin highlights a linguistic phenomenon, according to which the way in 
which we cite reasons for our beliefs is different to the way in which we cite reasons for our 
knowledge. It is tempting to read Austin as concluding that talk of “reasons for knowing” is 
a mere façon de parler. After all, he suggests that when we articulate our “reasons” for 
knowing, instead of listing our reasons (as we do when we spell out our reasons for believing) 
we explain how is it that we came to be in a position to know. There is indeed one way in 
which this reading of Austin can be justified. Such a reading, though, depends on the peculiar 
use of the notion of “reasons” adopted by Austin. I will be suggesting that it is this use which 
gives an appearance of conflict with the Radical Anti-psychologist position. Moreover, I will 
argue that it takes nothing but some ironing out of the terminology to dispel the appearance 
of conflict. But doing so should not distract us from the fact that Austin is making an 
interesting suggestion with respect to the way in which we usually articulate our “reasons” 
for knowing.  
 Let us start by explaining Austin’s idiosyncratic use of the notion of “reason” and 
how it gives rise to an apparent conflict with Radical Anti-psychologism. On Austin’s view, 
the notion of a “reason” should be understood along the lines of evidential warrant, a notion 
discussed above. There, we construed the notion of evidential warrant as warrant that favours 
adoption of a belief in virtue of indicating that the relevant proposition might be true, i.e. 
something that points to the obtaining of the relevant fact, but does not necessarily establish 
it. As we just saw, Austin thinks that we respond to a how-do-you-know-challenge at least 
partly by explaining how we came to be in a position to know. But the case of belief is rather 
different, on his view: “Reasons for believing on the other hand are normally quite a different 
affair (a recital of symptoms, arguments in support, and so forth)” (Austin, 1946: 81). For 
Austin, “reasons” are assimilated with evidence, i.e. something that speaks in favour of p, 
but that might fall short of settling the issue. On the other hand, certain central cases of 
perceptual knowledge (such as the pig case) involve warrant which does not fall short of 
settling the issue.  
In “Other Minds” Austin tentatively advances the stronger idea that knowledge in 
general, and not only some central cases of perceptual knowledge, ought to be grounded in 
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conclusive warrant. For instance, he remarks that someone could say the following if a 
subject who claims to know something provides an inadequate response: “his next riposte 
will be… something such as ‘Then you don’t know any such thing’, or ‘But that doesn’t 
prove it: in that case you don’t really know it at all’” (Austin, 1946: 78; my emphasis). Here 
Austin is suggesting that we come to know on the basis of proof, but we come to believe on 
the basis of “reasons” (i.e. considerations that fall short of proving the truth of a proposition). 
On this understanding of “reasons”, then it becomes clear why perceptual knowledge (and 
perhaps even knowledge in general) cannot be based on reasons. When I know that there is 
a pig in front of me by virtue of seeing it, I do not have reasons to think that there is a pig 
before me – I have proof of it.  
 Now, it should be obvious that even though on Austin’s view, strictly speaking, 
perceptual knowledge cannot be based on “reasons”, there is no real inconsistency between 
his view and a Radical Anti-psychologistic approach. The Radical Anti-psychologistic claim 
that perceptual knowledge is based on reasons does not amount to the claim that the grounds 
on which knowledge is based fall short of proving the relevant proposition. Far from it, the 
reasons which ground perceptual knowledge, on this approach, are as strong as proof. Let us 
remember that, on the Radical Anti-psychologist view, concreta can be reasons for making a 
judgement in virtue of them being truthmakers for the relevant proposition. The relation of 
support between the concretum and the proposition suffices for proving the relevant 
judgement, for it is a matter of metaphysical necessity that the proposition be true if the 
relevant concretum exists. I want to suggest, then, that there is a merely apparent conflict 
between Radical Anti-psychologism and an Austinian epistemology. For it only takes some 
ironing out of the terminology to dispel the illusion of conflict. The Radical Anti-
psychologistic position could endorse Austin’s terminology and claim that perception is 
epistemically significant because it makes us aware of non-evidential warrant for making 
world-directed judgements. Having made this clarification, we will carry on talking of the 
warrant afforded by perception in central cases as “reasons” for the sake of consistency. 
 
i) Articulation of Reasons and Recognitional Capacities 
Now, in the course of making this clarification we have encountered an aspect of Austin’s 
thought which might be relevant for the discussion in the first part of this chapter. Namely, 
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the extent to which a subject should be able to articulate her warrant if she is going to qualify 
as a knower.  
Austin argues that a relevant feature of the way in which we justify our claims of 
knowledge is that we normally do so partly by explaining how it is that we came to be in a 
position to know such a thing. This feature seems to have special ramifications for the case 
of perceptual knowledge. Austin suggests that in explaining how it is that we came to know 
something on the basis of perception, say that the bird on the tree is a guacamaya, there are 
at least a couple of things which are relevant in an explanation of how we came to know such 
a thing: firstly, an explanation of how is it that we came to be in a position, in general, to 
recognize guacamayas visually, and, secondly, an explanation of how is it that we can 
recognize that bird in the present circumstance as a guacamaya (Austin, 1946: 79-80). Austin 
thinks that these two requirements arise for the case of perceptual knowledge because 
acquisition of perceptual knowledge depends on the appropriate exercise of our perceptual 
recognitional capacities.  
Perceptual knowledge differs in this way from other forms of knowledge, such as 
mathematical knowledge or testimonial knowledge. For instance, in the case of mathematical 
knowledge acquired by grasping a proof in favour of the relevant theorem, an explanation of 
how we came to know that, say, there are infinitely many primes, will not involve the 
subject’s deployment of any perceptual recognitional capacities. One natural explanation of 
how we know this theorem would be to say something along the lines of “I did A-level 
Maths”. This would convey the idea that in school we learned to understand mathematical 
proofs to a degree which allows us to know the truth of the relevant theorem. If someone 
challenging our claim to know, nevertheless, wants to push the challenge further, perhaps we 
could respond by sketching or by developing in detail (depending on our interlocutor’s 
patience) a proof for the relevant theorem.  
In the framework of a reasons epistemology, we have to specify the different ways in 
which a subject should be able to articulate their warrant to count as a knower. Nevertheless, 
such an articulation might take different forms for different types of knowledge, or for 
different contexts. On Austin’s view, everyday perceptual knowledge is based on having 
developed the relevant recognitional capacities and exercising them successfully in a 
particular circumstance. In the Austinian framework, this peculiarity of perceptual 
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knowledge seems to follow from the general idea that perceptual experiences are “silent” or 
“dumb”:87 
Uncritical use of the direct object after know seems to be one thing that leads to 
the view that… sensa, that is things, colours, noises, and the rest, speak or are 
labelled by nature, so that I can literally say what (that which) I see… It is as if 
sensa were literally to ‘announce themselves’… But surely this is only a manner 
of speaking…: sensa are dumb, and only previous experience enables us to 
identify them. If we choose to say that they ‘identify themselves’…, then it must 
be admitted that they share the birthright of all speakers, that of speaking 
unclearly and untruly (Austin, 1946: 97).  
According to Austin, perception presents us with something that, by itself, does not speak to 
us. Something that cannot simply be taken in as it is presented. Sensa, on Austin’s view, do 
not identify themselves. It is us who have to identify them as the things they are, and our 
capacity to identify them depends on our previous experience and our upbringing, i.e. on our 
previous encounters with similar things and our having learned properly to identify them as 
the things they are. That this type of perceptual knowledge is acquired on the back of 
recognition explains why in meeting the challenge “how do you know?” the subject’s 
response might involves an explanation of how they can recognize the things they perceive 
as the things they are. We need not agree with Austin that perceptual knowledge is based on 
recognition because perceptual experience is “silent” or “dumb”. But, similarly, we do not 
need to accept that explanation to agree that recognitional capacities have an important role 
in an account of how perceptual knowledge is warranted.  
 We will assume here, with Austin, that recognitional capacities are crucial in an 
account of how perceptual knowledge is acquired. What are the implications of this position 
with respect to the ways in which a how-do-you-know-challenge could be met? According 
to Austin, two types of response are common: the first one is a specification of how we 
learned to recognize, say, guacamayas by sight (“I used to work in my home city’s zoo”, “I 
studied zoology”, “they are a common bird back home”). The second one, is a specification 
of how I can recognize that particular bird, in the present circumstance, as a guacamaya 
(“from its colourful plumage”, “from the shape of its beak”). It should be clear that the two 
                                                 
87 This idea appears at least both in Sense and Sensibilia (1962: 11) and in “Other Minds” (1946). See Travis 
(2004) for an original development based on this view, and Schellenberg (2011) for a criticism of Travis. 
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responses are not competing responses – instead they can be complementary in the sense that 
we can advance both in responding to a how-do-you-know-challenge. With respect to the 
second type of response Austin says the following: 
If you have asked “How do you know it’s a goldfinch?” then I may reply “From 
its behavior”, “By its markings”, or, in more detail, “By its red head”, “From its 
eating thistles”. That is, I indicate, or to some extent set out with some degree of 
precision, those features of the situation which enable me to recognize it as one 
to be described in the way I did describe it. (Austin, 1946: 83). 
When we respond to a how-do-you-know-question not only do we say how we came to be in 
a position to know the relevant sort of thing. When we are asked “how do you know that bird 
is a guacamaya?” we could indeed say something along the lines of “because I studied 
zoology”. But at least some times we would be required to say more about the specific 
situation – not something about how we acquired the capacity to recognize guacamayas, but 
something about what is so special about that particular bird that allows me to recognize it 
as a guacamaya. Perhaps our interlocutor wants to learn to tell guacamayas by sight. In such 
a circumstance the remark that we studied zoology will be utterly unhelpful. Rather we 
should point out to some of the characteristics that we pick up on to recognize it as a 
guacamaya. The colourful plumage of the bird might be the feature that allows me to 
recognize it as a guacamaya, or perhaps its song allows me to do so. And if our linguistic 
capacities allow it, we could convey this by saying something along the lines of “I can 
recognize it as a guacamaya by its plumage ”. It will depend on each subject’s capacities how 
detailed such a response can be. But it is crucial for Austin that the response need not be 
eloquent or detailed at all. In other words, we can very well have the relevant recognitional 
capacities for telling certain objects without being capable of explaining with great degree of 
detail what is it about the objects that allow us to recognize them as such: 
Our claim in saying we know (i.e. that we can tell) is to recognize: and 
recognizing, at least in this sort of case, consists in seeing, or otherwise sensing, 
a feature or features which we are sure are similar to something noted (and usually 
named) before, on some earlier occasion in our experience. But, this that we see, 
or otherwise sense, is not necessarily describable in words, still less describable 
in detail, and in non-committal words, and by anybody you please… So, when I 
say I can tell the bird “from its red head”, or that I know a friend “by his nose”, I 
imply that there is something peculiar about the red head or the nose, something 
peculiar to goldfinches or to him, by which you can always tell them or him… 
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often we know things quite well, while scarcely able at all to say “from” what we 
know them, let alone what there is so very special about them (Austin, 1946: 84-
5).  
This suggestion by Austin is in line with the remarks made earlier regarding knowers’ 
capacities to articulate their warrant. For Austin, it is a consequence of the fact that perceptual 
knowledge is based on recognitional capacities that the subject need not be able to be highly 
articulate when she justifies her claim to know. Having a recognitional capacity, and 
exercising it appropriately on a given occasion, is consistent with the subject being incapable 
of explaining in detail the way in which his recognition occurred.  
 When we discussed McDowell’s own interpretation of a reasons epistemology 
requirement with respect to the knower’s capacity to articulate their warrant we found a 
similar position. For McDowell, subjects should be able to articulate their warrant rather 
minimally if they are to count as having reflexive perceptual knowledge. For McDowell, a 
response along the lines of “I can tell a green thing when I see one” is a good enough 
articulation of the knower’s warrant. This general suggestion is in line with the Austinian 
approach. But Austin’s understanding of reflexive perceptual knowledge provides us with 
something that is absent in the McDowellian approach. It provides us with an explanation of 
why in the central cases of perceptual knowledge such a minimal response is enough to justify 
the relevant knowledge claim. For Austin, the fact that perceptual knowledge is acquired 
through the exercise of recognitional capacities explains why the knower’s capacity to 
articulate their warrant is rather undemanding. Possession and successful exercise of 
recognitional capacities do not necessarily come in hand with the capacity to articulate in 
detail the grounds on which a particular piece of perceptual knowledge is based. A 
recognitional capacity can be successfully acquired and exercised even while lacking the 
capacity to articulate with detail the way the recognitional capacity works.  
 This appeal to recognitional capacities in perceptual knowledge makes manifest the 
importance they have in an Austinian epistemology of perception. The appeal will naturally 
suggest to the reader questions regarding the nature and the conditions of success of these 
capacities. I have also claimed that recognitional capacities belong to the active element in 
the optimal position advanced by Austin to account for incorrigible perceptual knowledge. 
Unfortunately, as noted before, a detailed analysis of this element will be left for another 
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occasion. We will be unable to explore how recognitional capacities fit into a developed 
framework of the active element in the optimal position. Nevertheless, the issue regarding 
the nature of recognition and the extent to which it is to be considered an active capacity will 
emerge again in the following chapter, when we discuss how can the Radical Anti-
psychologist respond to the charge of falling prey to the Myth of the Given. There we will 
provide a start on how to think about recognitional capacities, but we will fall short of 
providing a complete account of the active element in the optimal position.  
 
Conclusion 
In summary, at the outset of this chapter we advanced some reasons in support of the claim 
perceptual knowledge is based on reasons. We argued that this position provides a natural 
explanation of the expert birdwatcher’s example. Then, we defended the position from two 
standard objections advanced from an externalist epistemology perspective. The first one 
regarding the regress problem, and the second regarding the hyper-intellectualization 
problem. There we argued that a reasons epistemology, and Radical Anti-psychologism in 
particular, have the elements to respond to the challenges satisfactorily. In the second part of 
the chapter, we looked into a potential tension between Radical Anti-psychologism and 
Austinian approach to perceptual knowledge. We argued that the tension is only apparent for 
it rests merely on a terminological disagreement. This discussion opened the way for a closer 
look into the role that recognitional capacities have in perceptual knowledge acquisition for 
Austin. Moreover, some of his remarks, we argued, can be used to provide a more robust 
response to the hyper-intellectualization problem discussed in the first part of the chapter.  
In the following chapter we will defend the most distinctive claim of the Radical Anti-
psychologist picture, namely the claim that concreta can be reasons for knowledge. We will 
explain how we can make sense of concreta as reasons within the contemporary philosophical 
discussion of reasons. Also, we will argue that the view can avoid the charge of falling prey 
to the Myth of the Given, as it is advanced by McDowell. In this latter part of the chapter our 
discussion regarding recognitional capacities will become relevant again.   
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Chapter 6 - Concreta are reasons for judging 
In the previous two chapters we have defended some key commitments of the Radical Anti-
psychologistic picture; namely, the claim that among the objects of perceptual awareness we 
find concreta, as well as the claim that, in some central cases, perceptual knowledge is based 
on reasons that the subject possesses. These commitments, as we noted before, are not 
exclusive to Radical Anti-psychologism. But in this section we will have a close look at the 
most distinctive claim advanced by Radical Anti-psychologism: that concreta can be reasons 
for making certain judgements about the perceived environment. In this chapter I will assume 
that concreta can be truthmakers in the course of my argument in favour of the claim that 
concreta can be reasons for judging. We will leave a critical discussion of this assumption, 
and the way if figures in a Radical Anti-psychologistic picture, for the following chapter. 
This chapter will be divided into two parts. In the first part I will argue in favour of the claim 
that concreta can be reasons. I will do so by making a case for thinking that concreta can play 
the theoretical roles typically ascribed to reasons – i.e. that reasons have normative force and 
that they can play a motivational role. In the second part I will address a potential worry that 
arises for Radical Anti-psychologism insofar as it embraces the claim that concreta can be 
reasons. Namely, the worry that the view falls prey to the Myth of the Given. Here I will 
focus on the version of the challenge advanced by John McDowell. I will defend the view 
from multiple arguments by McDowell based on that accusation. I will conclude by 
suggesting that the Austinian approach defended here (supplemented by Radical Anti-
psychologism) can be used to develop an original account of the role the agent has in 
perceptual knowledge acquisition.  
 
6.1 The Normative Force and Motivational Role of Concreta 
We can frame the discussion to be undertaken in this part of the chapter in the following 
terms: assuming that concreta are truthmakers, can perceived concreta be reasons for the 
perceiver – reasons that the subject can exploit in making a judgement about her perceived 
environment? On Radical Anti-psychologism, the answer is positive, and it appeals precisely 
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to the fact that concreta are truthmakers in support of such a response. I would like to start 
this section by advancing a line of reasoning in favour of such a positive answer.  
Let us start with the notion of a judgement or a belief being well-founded. In Alan 
Millar’s sense this is for it to rest on a “firm foundation”.88 On this view, there are at least 
two elements which contribute for a judgement being well-founded: in the first place there 
has to be a good reason in favour of the relevant proposition, say p, of which the subject is 
aware – i.e. an item, the existence of which “favours” the truth of p; and, secondly, the 
subject’s judgement has to rest on that good reason. The contribution of each element might 
become clear if we pay attention to cases in which these elements are absent. A judgement 
might be defective because it is based on a “bad reason” – i.e. an item whose existence fails 
to favour the truth of the relevant proposition (Millar, 2014: 3). Consider a case in which I 
see a tapir, but I mistake it for a pig and judge accordingly. My judgement, in this case, would 
fail to be well-founded because it rests on a bad reason – something that does not favour the 
truth of the judged proposition. Moreover, in this case, I do have access to good reasons for 
thinking that a tapir is before me, on which I could have based my judgement. But for the 
judgement that there is a pig before me to be well-founded, it does not suffice that I have 
access to the appropriate reason. In addition, I have to base my judgement on that (good) 
reason. Consider a case in which I see the pig in front of me, but I base my judgement that a 
pig is before me on the ill-founded belief that an evil demon has ensured that an invisible pig 
will follow me everywhere I go. Here, my possession of a good reason for thinking that there 
is a pig before me does not suffice to render my judgement well-founded. In addition to 
possession of a good reason, I must base my judgement on that reason.  
These two elements are closely connected to two central notions in the contemporary 
philosophical discussions about reasons – i.e. that reasons have normative force and that they 
play a motivating role in action and thought. The idea is that the notion of a reason is relevant, 
at least, in the context of justifying an action or a judgement, as well as in the context of 
explaining why an agent performed a given action or made a particular judgement. The 
former context is meant to be the one in which the notion of the normative force of a reason 
                                                 
88 See Millar (2014) for the conception of well-founded belief I will be using here: “to be justified in believing 
something in this sense amounts to having an adequate reason to believe it and believing it for that reason” 
(Millar, 2014: 1).  
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is in play, whereas the latter is the context in which the motivational role of a reason in a 
subject’s practical and cognitive life is in play. For instance, the gin and tonic in the glass in 
front of me (or, alternatively, that there is gin and tonic in the glass in front of me) can make 
it appropriate for me to drink it (under the right circumstances) and can justify my judgement 
or belief that there is a glass of gin and tonic in front of me. This is what we mean by saying 
that reasons have normative force – that in certain circumstances they favour acting in a given 
way or making a certain judgement.  
But we also appeal to reasons in contexts in which the invoked reason does not make 
the relevant action or judgement appropriate – i.e. cases where the invoked reasons do not 
favour doing or thinking as we did. In these contexts, the cited “reasons” might help us 
understand what the subject did or thought. Think, for instance, of a case in which, being 
under the false impression that there is gin and tonic in the glass, I take a sip only to discover 
that it is instead filled with gasoline.89 In this case, the gasoline in the glass (or, alternatively, 
that there is gasoline in the glass) does not make it appropriate for me to drink it nor does it 
justify my judgement that there is a glass of gin and tonic in front of me. Nevertheless, in 
explaining – i.e. making intelligible or rendering rational – my action or my judgement we 
could appeal to a “reason”. We could say that my reason for drinking the gasoline is that I 
(mistakenly) took it to be gin and tonic. Notice that this formulation of the reason which 
explains the subject’s action is ambiguous between two readings: on one reading the subject’s 
reason is her (mistakenly) taking the gasoline to be gin, whereas on the second reading the 
subject’s reason is the gin-looking gasoline in the glass (or alternatively, that the gasoline in 
the glass looks like gin). This disambiguation will be relevant in the following discussion. 
For the time being note that in this scenario we could say that my false impression renders 
my action reasonable (in the sense that it explains it) even if it does not make it an appropriate 
action. It is important to note that the kind of explanation we are considering here is a 
rationalizing explanation, i.e. one which (if successful) renders the target explanandum (the 
subject’s actions or judgement) reasonable (Davidson 1963). Contrast this type of 
explanation with other kinds of explanation, which do not render the explanandum 
reasonable. Consider a subject who is hit on her head by a rock, which causes her to believe 
that there is an infinite number of primes. This type of explanation does not render the 
                                                 
89 This example is due to Bernard Williams (1979). 
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subject’s belief reasonable – for citing the relevant causal process fails to exhibit a rational 
standing of the subject, i.e. a standing grounded on reasons. In the remainder of this section, 
for the sake of brevity, I will use “explanation” to refer to rationalizing explanation. 
 
i) Difficulties for Unified Accounts of Reasons 
Much of the recent literature on reasons stems from this dual role of reasons, and many of 
the problems that particular theories of reasons face arise from the difficulty of 
accommodating the normative and motivating roles that reasons seem to have in the lives of 
rational agents (Dancy, 2000; Hornsby, 2008; McDowell, 2013; Roessler, 2014; Wallace, 
2009). To illustrate, we can consider the difficulties faced by views which attempt to provide 
a unified account of the normative force and motivational role of reasons. A unified account 
of reasons would be an account in which the entities that constitute reasons have normative 
force and play a motivational role. Such a unified account might be desirable merely on the 
basis of theoretical economy. In addition, it could be pointed that such a unified account 
might be desirable for it could provide us with a straightforward explanation of cases in which 
the items which favour my doing or thinking Φ are also the reasons which motivate (or 
explain) my so doing or thinking.  
How might such an account look, and what potential difficulties might it face? On the 
one hand, we have the case in which the subject drinking from the glass can be explained by 
appeal to the true consideration that it contains gin and tonic (let us call this case, following 
current philosophical jargon, the “good case”). On the other hand, in the “bad case”, we can 
explain the subject drinking from the glass by appeal to the fact that the subject is under the 
false impression that the glass contains gin and tonic. How to provide a unified account of 
reasons, capable of accommodating good and bad cases? Let us consider, in turn, anti-
psychologistic and psychologistic accounts of reasons.  
We might start by paying attention to the good case. In that scenario, it is easy to 
identify something that favours (and, thus makes appropriate) the drinking of the content of 
the glass, i.e. a normative reason. Namely the gin and tonic in the glass (or, alternatively, that 
the content of the glass is gin and tonic). On this view, it is a mind-independent aspect of 
reality what renders the action appropriate. Following Jonathan Dancy’s (2000) terminology, 
let us call this approach a form of anti-psychologism about reasons. Sticking to the good case, 
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what about the motivating reason? The anti-psychologistic approach could suggest that the 
motivating reason for drinking the gin is also the mind-independent aspect of reality 
characterised before – i.e. the gin and tonic in the glass. Of course, this should be 
accompanied by the claim that this mind-independent aspect of reality can motivate the 
subject’s action only insofar as the subject is aware of it. For instance, when the subject knows 
that there is gin and tonic in the glass we can say that this mind independent aspect of reality 
not only renders the relevant action – i.e. the drinking of the glass – appropriate, but also that 
it motivates it (McDowell, 2013b; Roessler, 2014). Nevertheless, problems might arise for 
the anti-psychologistic approach when to it comes to accommodating the bad case. It might 
be suggested that in such a case, it is not clear that there is a normative reason which would 
favour the action (i.e. the drinking of the gasoline). But still, as noted before, we want to say 
that, in some sense, the action is reasonable. And one way of making sense of this intuition 
is to suggest that there is a motivating reason in play in this scenario, even if there is not a 
normative one. An immediate candidate to be the operative motivating reason is the false 
belief that the glass is filled with gin and tonic. This would indeed make the action 
intelligible, even if it does not justify it.90 But making this move would mean that this version 
of the anti-psychologist approach has failed to give a unified account of reasons. For in the 
good case, the operative reason was constituted by a mind-independent aspect of reality (the 
gin and tonic in the glass). But in the bad case the operative reason was constituted by the 
subject’s (false) belief, a mind-dependent aspect of reality. The point of this discussion is not 
to raise an unsurmountable objection against anti-psychologism. I only want to illustrate the 
kind of problem that might arise for a unified account of reasons.  
 A similar problem might arise for the psychologist. Let us consider a form of 
psychologism which maintains that psychological states of the subject, such as beliefs, are 
the operative motivating reasons in bad cases. From this perspective, what should we say 
about the good cases? If she is to provide a unified account, a defender of psychologism must 
say that the motivating reasons in those cases are psychological states too. Does this imply 
that psychological states are also the normative reasons in good cases? There seems to be 
something wrong in holding that the reasons which make the relevant action – i.e. drinking 
                                                 
90 See Shope (1983:ch.3) and the introduction to Papas & Swain (1978) for a discussion of the no false 
lemmas principle in epistemic justification which might lend support to this claim. 
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the contents of the glass – appropriate is, say, the belief that the glass contains gin and tonic. 
That belief itself is not something which could make the relevant action appropriate, for 
having that belief is consistent with there not being gin and tonic in the glass. The presence 
of gasoline in the glass, independently of whether or not the agent believed that it contained 
gin and tonic, would make it inappropriate to drink from it. Facing this problem, the 
psychologist might respond that the claim that psychological states are reasons should be 
understood as being limited to motivating reasons. Roessler characterises versions of 
psychologism which endorse this amendment as “two-concept views”.91  
By making this move psychologism would give up the aim of providing a unified 
account of reasons. Moreover, endorsing the amendment (i.e. that only motivating reasons 
are psychological states of the subject) seems to give rise to additional problems for the 
defender of this version of psychologism. It might seem initially plausible to maintain that in 
the good case the motivating reason for drinking from the glass is the subject’s belief that 
there is gin and tonic in it, especially when we look at it from a third-person perspective. An 
explanation in these terms on behalf of someone else might seem correct: S drank from the 
glass because S believed there was gin and tonic in it. But the initial plausibility seems to 
fade when we look at the situation from a first-person perspective.92 Consider the oddity of 
the following explanation: I drank from the glass because I believed there was gin and tonic 
in it. It might be true that the subject holds the relevant belief in those circumstances, but it 
would be odd if a subject appeals (merely) to their belief in order to explain why she acted 
as she did. Being in that situation, even if I did believe that the glass contained gin and tonic, 
I surely want to appeal to the gin and tonic in the glass (or, alternatively, to the fact that there 
is gin and tonic in the glass) as the reason for which I drank from it, not merely my believing 
it.93 In good cases, when I tried and succeeded in drinking my gin and tonic, I would 
                                                 
91 One of the characterizing features of the two-concept view is that, on this view, “‘Motivating reason’ 
statements are neutral on whether the agent has a normative reason for doing what she does” (Roessler, 2014: 
3). See also McDowell (2013b: 14) for a similar explanation of how one might arrive to such a view. 
92 See Wallace (2006) for a detailed discussion of these perspectives and their importance for reason 
explanation. 
93 This line of attack against the “two-concept” view follows from certain considerations advanced by 
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Dancy advances a principle he denominates the “normative constraint” which is to be 
met by any philosophical account of reasons. According to it, “a motivating reason, that in the light of which 
one acts, must be the sort of thing that is capable of being among the reasons in favour of so acting; it must, in 
this sense, be possible to be a good reason” (2000: 103). For a thorough defence of the constraint and an 
attack on the two-concept view see Dancy (2000), especially ch. 5. 
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underplay my hand if in explaining my reasons I merely quote my belief that there was gin 
and tonic in the glass. This way of talking seems most appropriate for bad cases: –‘Why did 
you drink the gasoline?’ –‘I thought (believed) it was gin and tonic.’  But less so with good 
ones –‘Why did you drink the gin and tonic?’ – ‘Because I though (believed) it was gin and 
tonic?’. Again, the point of the discussion in these paragraphs is not to raise an 
unsurmountable objection against psychologism. I merely want to illustrate the kind of 
problem that might arise for such a unified account of reasons.  
In this section, I have explained how some problems might arise for psychologistic 
and anti-psychologistic accounts of reasons. The upshot of the discussion is that good and 
bad cases seem to give rise to tensions when we try to provide a unified account of reasons 
(normative and motivating) across good and bad cases. It seems that the psychologistic 
approach gives the most natural account of bad cases, whereas anti-psychologism gives the 
most natural account of good cases. Here I will not try to articulate a unified account of 
reasons in the face of these worries. In the following I will advance an anti-psychologistic 
account of well-founded judgements. I will place the resulting view within the dialectic 
described in this section and will defend it from objections.  
 
ii) An Anti-psychologistic Account of Well-founded Judgements 
Where does this leave the notion of a well-founded judgement which is under discussion? 
Let us remember that a judgement is well founded when the (motivating) reason on which 
the judgement is based is a good (normative) reason. It follows from this characterisation of 
well-foundedness that there are at least some cases in which normative and motivating 
reasons coincide. In the case of a well-founded judgement, the reason that justifies my 
judgement is also the reason for which I form the judgement. Here I will not advance a 
conclusive defence of this claim, my primary aim will be to place this claim in the wider 
debate about reasons to show that it is a live and attractive option. Perhaps less 
controversially, I will assume that normative reasons are constituted by non-psychological 
aspects of reality – i.e. I will endorse anti-psychologism with respect to normative reasons. 
Notice that these two claims – i.e. that normative reasons are mind-independent aspects of 
reality and that in well-founded judgements normative and motivating reasons coincide – 
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entail the result that in the case of well-founded judgement the reasons which justify and the 
reasons which motivate are non-psychological aspects of reality.  
 Before presenting an anti-psychologistic conception of good cases let me say 
something brief in favour of anti-psychologism about normative reasons in general. Perhaps 
the strongest reason to favour this position is that they provide a straightforward explanation 
of many paradigmatic cases of rational actions and judgements. Moreover, this provides us 
with a reason to prefer anti-psychologism over psychologism since on many of these cases 
psychologism would give a clearly incorrect account of normative reasons. Let us consider a 
case: let us imagine a case in which you have a normative reason to help someone because 
they are in danger. What might be the feature of the situation which grounds your normative 
reason to help them? In other words, what is it about the situation which makes your helping 
them an appropriate thing to do? It seems that the crucial aspect of the situation which makes 
your helping them appropriate is that they are in danger. Had you misjudged the situation – 
for instance if the subject was not in danger but was an actor shooting a film – then your 
helping them might not be appropriate, regardless of your beliefs about it. Your believing 
them to be in danger is not the relevant aspect of the situation which provides you with 
reasons for acting (or judging).  
Perhaps the strongest objection to an anti-psychologistic account of normative 
reasons is that, supposedly, this picture gives wrong results systematically in false beliefs or 
misguided desires scenarios. According to this objection, when your belief that someone is 
in danger is false you lack reason to help them because they are not in danger. Yet, we want 
to say that your helping them is, in some sense, reasonable. You acted “as a sensible person 
would have done” (Dancy 2000: 62). But this observation does not force the Radical Anti-
psychologist to concede that beliefs (or other psychological sates) can also be normative 
reasons. Let us remember that a normative reason is one that renders the making of certain 
action or the making of certain judgement appropriate. Even though it would be rational for 
a subject to help someone who they (falsely) believe to be in danger, merely having that 
belief would not render the action appropriate. The anti-psychologist can explain why, in 
these circumstances, it is reasonable for the subject to help without conceding that in those 
circumstances the action was appropriate, nor that the relevant belief rendered it appropriate. 
For instance, Jonathan Dancy suggest that we can explain why helping is reasonable even in 
  
150 
false belief cases by appealing to an objective reason which forbids the combination of 
certain beliefs and actions. Dancy suggests that in false belief cases there is indeed a 
normative reason grounded on a mind-independent aspect of reality to help if we believe 
someone is in danger. On Dancy’s view, what there is a reason for is not to exhibit the 
following belief/action complex: believe that S is in danger and not help them. Importantly, 
this strategy does not imply that the subject has a reason to help – that this would be an 
inappropriate action is determined by the fact that S is not in danger.94  
One question which arises for Dancy’s explanation here is what is the aspect of non-
psychological reality which gives me reason not to exhibit that belief/action complex, and 
how might I be aware of that reason in such a way that when I act I do so in the light of that 
reason? We can find a straightforward answer for good cases: the gin and tonic in the glass, 
S’s being in danger are the aspects of non-psychological reality which give me reason to 
drink or help. Those are things I can readily be aware of and they are the reasons which 
motivate me to act and which render my action appropriate. It is not clear that Dancy can 
give such a straightforward answer for the relevant cases. I will argue below that there are 
more straightforward ways of dealing with this type of case.  
 What about the assumption that in well-founded judgements normative and 
motivating reasons coincide? As we noted before, the attempt to provide a unified account 
of motivating and normative reasons across good and bad cases seemed to be the source of a 
tension which gives rise to problems for psychologistic and anti-phycologistic accounts of 
reasons. How can we square this conception of well-foundedness within a dialectic which 
makes it difficult to conceive of such coincidence? There are a number of things which could 
be said to make space for the conception of well-foundedness we are endorsing here. Let us 
start by noting that the claim is rather minimal in the sense that it merely maintains that the 
coincidence holds in good cases. As such, the view is silent on what is the correct account of 
bad cases. One way of making space for our view within the broader debate would be by 
casting aside the ambition of a unified account of normative and motivating reasons across 
good and bad cases. Let us suppose that indeed the operative motivating reasons in bad cases 
are psychological states of the subject. It is open to us to claim that this does not imply 
                                                 
94 See Dancy (2000, ch. 3) for a detailed exposition of this line of response.  
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anything about the operative motivating reasons in the good cases. Introduction of a sort of 
disjunctivism about motivating reasons could be used as a defensive move to avoid the 
attempt to generalize from what goes on in the bad cases (Hornsby, 2008; McDowell, 2013b; 
Roessler, 2014).  
But perhaps the strategy described above concedes too much by granting that the 
motivating reasons in bad cases are to be identified with psychological states of the subject. 
An alternative way of making space for the view that in well-founded judgements motivating 
and normative reasons coincide consists in rejecting that in bad cases the operative 
motivating reason is a psychological aspect of reality. This move would deprive the 
generalizing strategy described in the previous paragraph from any materials to advance the 
generalizing step. Consider, again, the bad gin and tonic scenario. What is the reason for 
maintaining that in this case a belief about the contents of the glass are the operative 
motivating reasons for the subject drinking its content? Part of it is the alleged absence of a 
normative reason, i.e. there seems to be no aspect of the mind-independent world which 
renders the action appropriate. But does this mean that, therefore, we are to look for the 
motivating reason in the subject’s psychology? There is no immediate reason to think that 
the answer to this question should be positive. We saw before Dancy’s proposal for scenarios 
similar to these. I think he is right in rejecting that false beliefs provide us with a normative 
reason to drink the gasoline. Nevertheless, I suggested that his own response faced problems 
when it came to identifying the aspect of non-psychological reality which grounds the 
normative reason not to exhibit the relevant belief/action complex. I want to propose here a 
different way of dealing with bad cases in the face of the generalizing strategy which 
threatens to infect good cases. In the gin and tonic scenario there is at least one plausible non-
psychological aspect of reality which could be appealed to in a straightforward explanation 
of why the subject acted as she did, namely the gasoline in the glass (or, alternatively, that 
there is gasoline in the glass) and the way it looks. There are facts about the gasoline and 
about the subject which explain why this mind-independent item in the world motivated the 
subject to form the relevant judgement or to perform the relevant action. They can explain it, 
despite not being a normative reason for the subject to drink it or judge that there is gin and 
tonic in the glass. In this particular case, that gasoline looks very similar to gin and tonic as 
well as the subject’s incapacity to distinguish gasoline from gin and tonic in those 
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circumstances, help us understand how the gasoline in the glass (or, alternatively, that there 
is gasoline in the glass) constitutes the operative motivating reason for the subject’s 
judgement or action.  
Now, although this strategy could be used to accommodate within an anti-
psychologistic framework many of the cases which are thought to spell trouble for the view, 
the strategy has its limitations. Notably, think about a case in which there is no glass, no gin 
and tonic, nor gasoline in the table; suppose it is all a hallucination. Yet the subject makes 
the judgement that there is a glass of gin and tonic in front of her and even tries to reach for 
it only to discover thin air. There is something unsatisfactory about maintaining that the 
operative motivating reason in these cases is a mind-independent aspect of reality, for there 
is no clear candidate which could play the role. Perhaps in these cases, the anti-psychologistic 
position will have to concede that the operative normative reasons have to be psychological 
states. Alternatively, we could maintain that, in these cases, not only there is no normative 
reason, but there is no motivating reason either. Arguably, in order to prosper, this suggestion 
would have to advance reasons to dismiss a possible ad hoc charge. Moreover, it would have 
to explain why normally we would be willing to concede that a hallucinating subject would 
act and belief rationally when she takes her hallucinations at face value and acts accordingly. 
Unfortunately, I have no space here to pursue these questions further.  
Let us summarize what has been achieved by the defensive strategy deployed in the 
previous two paragraphs. We saw that it is possible to identify the motivating reasons in some 
bad cases as mind-independent aspects of reality. Many of the bad cases which are thought 
to spell problems for anti-psychologism could be subsumed under this model, although 
perhaps not all of them – for instance some hallucinatory cases. But even if it is not possible 
to subsume all the bad cases within this framework the basis on which the generalizing step 
is made has been effectively put into question. Thus, the discussion above shouldn’t be read 
as a positive nor a conclusive defence of the view that in well-founded judgements our 
normative and motivating reason is a mind-independent aspect of reality. Rather it should be 
read as a way of establishing it as a live and interesting view within the current philosophical 
debate about reasons.  
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iii) Back to Radical Anti-psychologism 
With this understanding of a well-founded judgement in place, let us have a closer look at 
the way in which the notion could be applied within a Radical Anti-psychologist framework. 
Let us consider a case in which I form the judgement that there are oranges on the kitchen 
counter on the basis of the perceptual experience of oranges I undergo when I go to the 
kitchen. In these circumstances, the judgement would be well-founded if the reason which 
justifies the making of the judgement is also the reason which explains (at least partly) why 
the subject made that judgement – i.e. the oranges on the counter (or, alternatively, that there 
are oranges on the kitchen counter). 
 In talking about reasons having normative force we have been assuming that there is 
a dimension of evaluation associated with them. Actions and judgements can be evaluated 
along many dimensions of evaluation, and reasons have their normative power relative to 
those dimensions. The action of donating to charity, for instance, can be evaluated from a 
moral perspective as well as from financial perspective (among many others).95 An element 
of the mind-independent world might be a normative reason to do Φ when evaluated from 
the financial perspective, but not from the moral perspective. For instance, fossil fuels being 
cheap might be a good reason, from a financial point of view, to use them to generate 
electricity. But the same thing (i.e. fossil fuels being cheap) is not a good reason, from a 
moral point of view, to generate electricity.  I submit that the appropriate dimension of 
evaluation required to assess the normative force of reasons in the case of judgements and 
beliefs is that of promoting the aim of veridicality, that is promoting the aim of having a true 
worldview. That this is the appropriate dimension of evaluation for reasons for judging 
follows from a “veritistic” assumption about the fundamental aim of cognition. According to 
this, the fundamental aim of a cognitive system (such as ours) is to represent the world in a 
veridical manner. Thus, in general terms, an element of non-psychological reality E will 
constitute a reason for making a judgement that p only if the obtaining of E favours or points 
to the truth of p.  
With this very general understanding of well-founded judgements, reasons, and their 
normative and motivational role in place, we could mount a defence of the claim that 
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perceived concreta can be reasons for judgement, by explaining how concreta both can have 
normative force and can also play a motivational role in the subject’s cognitive life. Let us 
start with the normative force of concreta. I mentioned that, in the context of judgement and 
belief, a reason’s normative force has to do with the way it promotes the aim of veridicality. 
So a relevant question to ask is whether there is a relation that obtains between concreta and 
the truth of propositions which could be exploited in grounding concreta’s potential 
normative force for judging – i.e. is there a relation between concreta and the truth of certain 
propositions which could be exploited by a subject who wishes to attain the aim of 
veridicality in her worldview? And the immediate answer to this question is affirmative, for 
we have assumed that concreta can be truthmakers for propositions. This alethic relation 
between concreta and propositions provides us with a ground to construe concreta as having 
normative force in favour of judging. According to this view, the truth of certain propositions 
is necessitated by the existence of concreta. For instance, the pig is a reason with normative 
force in favour of the judgement that there is a pig before me precisely because the pig’s 
being there makes the relevant proposition true.  
Now, for a judgement to be well-founded it is not enough that there is a reason with 
normative force which justifies the making of the judgement, it is also necessary that that 
very reason explains why the subject makes the judgement they do. In practical cases, 
minimally, it would be reasonable to say that a good reason can render an action intelligible 
only if the subject is in some way aware of the reason which motivates the action. For 
instance, in the case of drinking from the glass on the ground that it contains gin and tonic, 
the action is going to be “well-founded”, minimally, only if the subject is aware of the fact 
that the glass has gin and tonic. If this is correct in the practical case, similar considerations 
could be upheld for the cognitive case. For the subject’s perceptual judgement to be well-
founded it is not enough that there is a concretum which constitutes a normative reason for 
making a judgement, in addition the subject’s judgement has to be based on the relevant 
concretum. Which means that the subject must, minimally, be aware of the relevant 
concretum. I want to suggest that the Radical Anti-psychologist picture has the elements to 
satisfy this requirement too. For on the Radical Anti-psychologist view, in central cases of 
perceptual knowledge, the subject must be perceptually aware of the concretum which 
constitutes the reason in favour of judging. On this view, it is precisely the perceptual 
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awareness of concreta which makes us aware of the reasons there are for making a 
judgement. That perception makes us aware of concreta allows us to explain how concreta, 
despite not being psychological states of the subject, could motivate the subject’s making of 
a particular judgement. We turn not to explore the plausibility of the conception defended so 
far in the face of a different type of objection. 
 
6.2 Austin Inspired Epistemology and the Myth of the Given 
The discussion in the first part of this chapter provides us with the following simple reason 
in favour of the claim that concreta can be reasons for making certain judgements: on the 
Radical Anti-psychologist approach it is possible to make sense of the idea that perceived 
concreta have normative force and can play a motivational role, two features which 
characterise reasons for judging in contemporary philosophical discussions of reasons. Being 
able to make sense of concreta as reasons for judging within the contemporary philosophical 
debate on reasons is a minimum for the viability of the Radical Anti-psychologistic option. 
The absence of major obstacles for holding such a view would put us in a position in which 
we could start making a positive case in its favour either by arguing that the view is 
compulsory in some sense, or that it brings with it advantages no other view can offer.  
 But the path is not yet clear of obstacles. There is at least one relevant approach to 
perceptual knowledge which would dismiss the position we are defending and any argument 
in its favour from the get-go – the epistemological project of John McDowell. He would 
regard our attempt to make space for the Radical Anti-psychologist conception of perceptual 
reasons as a dead-end, for the view we put forward would be classified by him as a view 
which falls prey to the Myth of the Given. For McDowell, any view which endorses the Myth 
is bound to fail not only in making intelligible the idea that we have knowledge of the 
empirical world, but also in making intelligible the idea that the empirical world has a bearing 
on our objective thought about it. In a nutshell, and in vey general terms, falling prey to the 
Myth of the Given consists in endorsing the view that the conceptual capacities that are 
necessary for mature human’s knowledge “are operative only in responses to experiences, 
not in experiences themselves” (McDowell, 2008: 258, emphasis added). On the contrary, 
McDowell’s view is that the correct way of understanding the idea that empirical judgements 
are “rationally intelligible” in the light of experience is one in which the relevant conceptual 
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capacities are “operative in experience itself, not just in judgements in which we respond to 
experience” (McDowell, ibid. emphasis added). For McDowell the capacity of perceptual 
experiences to provide the subject with reasons for judging depends on the actualization of 
these conceptual capacities in experience. But for the Radical Anti-psychologistic position 
advanced here, some of the items of perception themselves (i.e. concreta), can be the relevant 
reasons for judging, and they are so not in virtue of any conceptual capacities being exercised 
in perceptual experience. On this conception, the epistemological role of perceptual 
experience consists in making the subject aware of the mind-independent reality that 
surrounds her, for some of those items are reasons for judging. On this view, contra 
McDowell, experience can play this epistemic role without any conceptual capacities being 
exercised in it.  
 I take it that this characterisation captures the main point of disagreement between 
McDowell’s view and views which would be characterised by him as endorsing the Myth of 
the Given (Radical Anti-psychologism amongst them).96 I want to start by looking more 
closely into some of the arguments advanced by McDowell for rejecting views that fall within 
the characterisation of “falling prey to the myth of the given”. I will argue that McDowell’s 
arguments leave the Radical Anti-psychologistic proposal untouched. For his reasons for 
rejecting views which endorse the “myth of the Given” do not straightforwardly apply to the 
Radical Anti-psychologism espoused here.  
 Before addressing these issues, let me say something brief about the strategy I will 
use here to deal with the charge of falling prey to the Myth of the Given. In his defence of 
Radical Anti-psychologism Mark Kalderon also addresses this worry, but in a different 
manner. The main difference between these approaches is that Kalderon uses an “indirect” 
strategy, whereas I use a direct one. Kalderon’s strategy consists in looking closely at views 
which are tailor-made to avoid the Myth (Sellars’ and McDowell’s) and argue that they, too, 
fall prey to the charge. He considers this to be a strong reason to think that, after all, “the 
Myth of the given is no myth” (Kalderon 2011: 221). Kalderon opts for this indirect strategy 
because he considers this is the best we can do in a context where there is no agreement on 
how to understand in general terms what the Myth amounts to. A situation which cannot be 
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157 
settled by appeal to the origin of the conception, for Sellars, the originator of the notion, does 
not advance a general understanding of it. In this context, Kalderon points out, a direct 
defence of Radical Anti-psychologism from a particular understanding of the Myth could be 
challenged on the basis that the view falls prey to the Myth on a “distinct and potentially 
superior understanding of it” (Kalderon 2011: 220). I share Kalderon’s scepticism about the 
Myth of the Given being a real myth after all. The way I see it, my attempt to advance a direct 
response on behalf of the Radical Anti-psychologist against the charge of falling prey to the 
Myth (in McDowell’s understanding of it), is complimentary to his defensive strategy. 
Kalderon’s considerations provides us with good reason to doubt that, in general, showing 
that a view endorses the Myth of the Given will suffice to discredit the view. Nevertheless, 
specific arguments have been directed against views which allegedly endorse the Myth of 
the Given, some of these arguments point out to some defects exhibited by these views, 
beyond their endorsement of the Myth. Thus, in McDowell we find arguments to the effect 
that views which endorse the Myth cannot give an adequate account of the epistemic 
responsibility a subject must exhibit if her judgements are to be knowledgeable. On other 
parts, he argues that views which endorse the Myth simply cannot given an adequate account 
of how experience warrants perceptual judgements. Being able to respond to these specific 
arguments is complementary to Kalderon’s strategy, and it helps us build a positive case in 
favour of the Radical Anti-psychologist position.  
 McDowell’s general project aims to make space for a view in which perceptual 
experience has the epistemological role of grounding perceptual knowledge. In order to do 
so he aims to strike a balance between two unacceptable views: on the one hand, a 
coherentism or idealism (exemplified by Davidson’s coherence theory) in which perceptual 
experience has no justifying role at all for perceptual knowledge; and, on the other hand, a 
simple empiricism in which experiential inputs are conceptually unstructured. He thinks that 
much of the modern epistemological tradition has been swinging from one unacceptable view 
on the matter to another, where the movement from one to the other has been marked by an 
exaggerated reaction to the perceived failures of the opposite view. He recommends to break 
from this swing by rejecting some of the terms which shape the discussion. On his account, 
each view is motivated both by a correct and valuable insight as well as by an overreaction 
to the failures faced by the opposite view. Thus, the empiricist side of the dialectic is 
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motivated by the correct idea that for empirical thought (and knowledge) to be objective at 
all (i.e. about the mind independent world) perceptual experience must play a justifying role 
in the way we acquire empirical knowledge. Its mistake, according to McDowell, lies in 
conceiving perceptual experiences as exercises of mere sensibility with no involvement of 
conceptual capacities – this conception, McDowell thinks, makes it so that perceptual 
experiences cannot stand in justifying relations with judgements at all. On the other side of 
the dialectic – i.e. on the coherentist side – we find a diagnosis of what is wrong with the 
empiricist view. This diagnosis is that perceptual experiences as conceived by the empiricist, 
i.e. as states devoid of conceptual content, cannot stand in justificatory relations with beliefs 
and judgements. This diagnosis flows from the general commitment that only conceptually 
structured states (such as beliefs, in Davidsons’s view) can provide the subject with reasons 
for belief and judgement. From McDowell’s point of view, this is a correct insight by the 
coherentist. But this view comes with problems. Namely, that it renounces the empiricist’s 
insight which helps us ground empirical thought in objective, mind-independent, reality. 
How can we make sense of our beliefs being about the objective reality if our alleged avenue 
of contact with the empirical world (i.e. our perceptual experiences) cannot provide us with 
justifications for our judgements and beliefs about said world?97  
 This is the way the tension between these forms of empiricism and coherentism plays 
out in McDowell’s picture. Moreover, he maintains that the only way out of the seesaw 
consists in challenging some of the elements on which this dialectical swing depends. For 
McDowell, this can be achieved while retaining the insights each view advances. On the one 
hand, McDowell wants to hold on to the empiricist claim that perceptual experience provides 
us with some constraint for empirical thought in the form of justificatory relations with 
beliefs and judgements. On the other hand, he holds on to the claim advanced by Davidson 
(which allegedly has Sellarsian and Kantian ancestry) that only elements which find 
themselves in the “space of reasons”, i.e. elements with conceptual content, can stand in the 
relevant justificatory relations to thought. McDowell thinks that the reason why, within the 
dialectic, it seems as if we can only choose one of these insights is the assumption of a 
conception of perceptual experience in which conceptual capacities are not involved at all. A 
rejection of this assumption on which the dialectic described in the previous paragraph 
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depends on allows for the adoption of a view which, allegedly, has both the advantages of 
coherentism and empiricism with none of the problems. McDowell’s own proposal, then, is 
to advance a conception of perceptual experience inspired by Kant, according to which 
conceptual capacities are (passively) actualized in experience. This view is designed to allow 
experiences to play the double role of belonging to the space of reasons while providing the 
relevant constraints which ground empirical thought in objective reality.  
 Now, it should be clear that McDowell’s overall case for the view he endorses 
depends on rejection of the traditional alternatives within the dialectic, finding an 
insurmountable difficulty in each of them. Here, I want to focus on, and challenge, the way 
in which he rejects the empiricist side of the dialectic. I want to look more closely at 
McDowell’s stated reasons for rejecting views which maintain both that perceptual 
experience can justify our empirical judgements, and that perceptual experience does not 
involve the (passive) actualization of the perceiver’s conceptual capacities. These views are 
classified by McDowell as views which endorse the Myth of the Given. The Radical Anti-
psychologist approach advanced here would be classified by him as falling within this class, 
for it insists that we can account for the epistemological significance of perception without 
endorsing the claim that conceptual capacities are actualized in it (Kalderon, 2011: 220). In 
the following I will look closely at three arguments which have been advanced by McDowell 
against views which endorse the Myth. The first of them rests on a general characterisation 
of the Myth – which McDowell thinks shows that endorsement of the Myth is incoherent. 
The other two arguments attempt to point out specific failings that views which endorse the 
Myth will necessarily exhibit.  
 
i) McDowell’s General Characterisation of the Myth 
What does it meant to say that an epistemology of perception endorses the Myth of the Given? 
And why is endorsement of the Myth sufficient reason to reject an epistemological account 
of perception? These are not straightforward questions to answer. The very notion of the 
Myth of the Given – as well as the attack directed against views which endorse it – has its 
origin in Wilfrid Sellars’ work on the epistemology of perception.98 As it has been noted by 
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interpreters, one of the main problems about this notion, and the consequent attack mounted 
on it, is that Sellars himself does not advance a positive general characterisation of the notion 
of Givenness.99 McDowell (2008) does address this problem by characterising the notion of 
Givenness in general terms. He suggests that such a general characterisation makes it obvious 
that endorsement of the Myth is “incoherent” (2008: 256). It is not clear, however, that his 
general characterisations of the Myth are consistent with one another. For instance, after 
pointing out that we do not find a general characterisation of Givenness in Sellars, he 
advances the following suggestion: 
Givenness in the sense of the Myth would be an availability for cognition to 
subjects whose getting what is supposedly Given to them does not draw on 
capacities required for the sort of cognition in question (McDowell, 2008: 256). 
According to this formulation, the Myth consists in the view that we have a capacity c1 which 
makes some sort of knowledge k1 available to us, where having knowledge of the sort k1 
requires the actualization of capacity c2, and that successful exercises of c1 – i.e. exercises 
which do make knowledge of the sort k1 available to the subject – do not involve 
actualizations of c2. Radical Anti-psychologism seems to endorse this form of the Myth. For 
they hold that perceptual experience (c1) makes reflexive knowledge about the perceivable 
mind-independent world available to the subject (k1). They also hold that having knowledge 
of that sort does require the actualization of conceptual capacities (c2), but they deny that 
perceptual experiences involve the actualization of conceptual capacities. In other words, for 
the Radical Anti-psychologist having reflexive perceptual knowledge requires actualization 
of our conceptual capacities in judgement, but denies that these are exercised in perceptual 
experiences. However, it is not so clear that endorsing the Myth, as this characterisation has 
it, would be a deficiency of an epistemology of perception. After all, we have been 
articulating a Radical Anti-psychologist epistemology, a coherent account of the 
epistemological significance of perception, which does seem to embrace the Myth and is not 
straightforwardly false. We need a reason to think that endorsement of the Myth on this 
“weak characterisation” involves an unsurmountable flaw in an epistemology of perception. 
In the absence of a convincing reason to think that endorsing the Myth involves a 
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fundamental mistake, the argument by McDowell against views which endorse the Myth is 
inconclusive. Let us call it the “weak characterisation” of the Myth. 
 This characterisation of the Myth does apply to Radical Anti-psychologism, but 
unfortunately does not seem to establish that endorsing the Myth would lead to incoherence. 
This task is taken up explicitly in the following passage (which immediately follows the one 
previously quoted) McDowell stresses the point that the general characterisation of the Myth 
does show itself to be obviously incoherent: 
If that is what Givenness would be, it is straightforward that it must be mythical. 
Having something Given to one would be being given something for knowledge 
without needing to have capacities that would be necessary for one to be able to 
know it. And that is incoherent (McDowell, ibid). 
Now, it seems that McDowell takes this passage to be a mere elaboration of the previous one. 
But I want to argue that this characterisation of the Myth is not identical, nor is it equivalent, 
to the “weak characterisation” advanced before. More importantly, it seems the 
characterisation does not apply to the Radical Anti-psychologism espoused here. Before 
explaining why the two characterisations are not equivalent, let us explain what this new 
characterisation maintains. On this general characterisation of the Myth – let us call it the 
“strong characterisation” – the Myth indeed shows itself to be mythical. According to it, the 
Myth consists in thinking that we have a capacity c1 which makes some sort of knowledge k1 
available to us, where having knowledge of the sort k1 requires the actualization of capacity 
c2, but where the subject lacks the capacity c2 altogether. This is a straightforwardly 
incoherent idea. On this conception, a capacity makes available knowledge of one kind, while 
at the same time the subject lacks a capacity required for having that kind of knowledge. 
How, then, could this capacity make the relevant knowledge available to the subject, if the 
subject cannot have that knowledge? When applied to the perceptual case we would have the 
following picture: perception (c1) makes reflexive knowledge (k1) available to the perceiver, 
where possession of this type of knowledge requires possession of conceptual capacities (c2). 
Yet according to the operative characterisation of the Myth this type of knowledge could be 
made available to the subject by perception even if the subject lacked conceptual capacities 
altogether – i.e. capacities required to have that very knowledge which is supposedly made 
available. 
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 But I want to argue that the strong and weak characterisations of the Myth are not 
equivalent. On the strong characterisation, the subject lacks altogether the capacity c2 
required for having the knowledge supposedly made available by c1. But the weak 
characterisation is consistent with the subject having the capacity c2 – for the weak 
characterisation only requires that the capacity c2 not be actualized in exercises of capacity 
c1. No obvious incoherence arises for the weak characterisation, for on this conception of the 
Myth, the subject may possess the capacities required for having the relevant knowledge. 
Thus, McDowell’s claim that the Myth shows itself to be mythical would only be correct of 
the strong characterisation. Moreover, there seems to be plenty of space for views which do 
not instantiate the strong characterisation, but merely the weak one. For instance, on the 
Radical Anti-psychologist position we have been sketching, perceptual knowers have the 
conceptual capacities which are required for making of judgements about the perceived 
mind-independent world. This view holds that these capacities are not actualized in 
perceptual experience. But clearly, this does not force the view to the claim that the subject 
must, therefore, lack conceptual capacities altogether. The version of Radical Anti-
psychologism defended here is one in which perceptual experience makes knowledge 
available for subjects who possess the relevant conceptual capacities, which would avoid 
endorsement of the problematic, strong characterisation of the Myth. These views would be 
impervious to McDowell’s criticism, for the charge of incoherence only would apply to them 
if they endorsed the strong characterisation of the Myth. 
 
ii) Specific Problems with Endorsement of the Myth 
But this is not the only argument advanced by McDowell against positions which endorse 
the Myth of the Given. Further arguments by McDowell attempt to locate fundamental 
mistakes in views which endorse the Myth and argue that their mistakes can be attributed to 
their acceptance of the Myth. These arguments move away from the general characterisation 
of the Myth and focus on finding specific alleged defects of views which endorse the Myth. 
On this understanding of the charges, even if the general notion of the Myth is not incoherent, 
endorsement of the Myth gives rise to unsurmountable problems for the views which endorse 
it. Some of the arguments from McDowell, then, attempt to find problems for views which 
endorse the Myth in its weak characterisation. Let us have a look at a couple of such 
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arguments. The first one rests on a conception of reasons which is directly at odds with the 
Radical Anti-psychologist position: 
The idea of the Given is the idea that the space of reasons, the space of 
justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere. The 
extra extent of the space of reasons is supposed to allow it to incorporate non-
conceptual impacts from outside the realm of thought. But we cannot really 
understand the relations in virtue of which a judgement is warranted except as 
relations within the space of concepts: relations such as implication or 
probabilification, which hold between potential exercises of conceptual 
capacities. The attempt to extend the scope of justificatory relations outside the 
conceptual sphere cannot do what it is supposed to do (McDowell, 1996: 7).  
Here, McDowell is appealing to a particular way of understanding the notion of the “space 
of reasons” in order to exclude experiences as conceived by the “Given theorist” as genuinely 
belonging to said space. On McDowell’s account, only elements that belong to the “space of 
reasons” can stand in justificatory relations with judgements, or beliefs. This much may be 
conceded by the defender of Radical Anti-psychologism (and perhaps other “Given 
theorists”). She will maintain that, nevertheless, elements which lack conceptual content 
(which do not belong to the “space of concepts”), elements such as concreta, are also to be 
found in the space of reasons. And, thus, concreta also stand in justificatory relations with 
judgements, or beliefs. Thus, the Radical Anti-psychologist position is one in which “the 
space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere” 
(McDowell, ibid).  
But here we might wonder what is the basis on which McDowell circumscribes the 
space of reasons to the conceptual sphere? What is the reason for denying that elements such 
as concreta truly belong to the space of reasons? A claim implicit in the passage above, but 
made explicit elsewhere, might help us give the beginning of an answer to these questions: 
“[e]mpirical justifications depend on rational relations, relations within the space of reasons” 
(McDowell, 1996: 6). In other words, the claim is that (a) in order for an element to stand in 
a justificatory relation to a judgement, then it has to stand in a rational relation to it - that is 
the kind of relation that reasons stand to judgements. This much could be conceded by the 
defender of Radical Anti-psychologism (and other Given theorists) and should be considered 
common ground between McDowell and his opponents. He then goes on to focus on some 
paradigmatic examples of rational relations that hold between elements of the conceptual 
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sphere, namely implication and probabilification. And then he seems to make the further 
claim that (b) only elements that stand in relations similar enough to those of implication and 
probabilification can stand in rational relations to judgements. The final step in the argument 
seems to be the claim that (c) given that elements not belonging to the conceptual sphere (for 
instance, concreta) do not stand in relations of implication or probabilification (nor in 
relations similar enough to those) with respect to judgements, then these elements cannot 
stand in rational relations to judgements.  
As said before, it seems that claim (a) can easily be conceded by someone who 
endorses the Given, as long as they hold on to a conception in which perceptual knowledge 
rests on reasons as described in the previous chapter. Given our commitment here to an 
epistemology of reasons we will not challenge this aspect of McDowell’s argument. Perhaps 
it is possible to mount a challenge to McDowell’s reasoning by challenging claim (c). It could 
be argued, for example, that McDowell is wrong in claiming that elements outside the 
conceptual sphere cannot stand in relations similar enough to those of implication or 
probabilification with judgements. Here, the Given theorist could appeal to the way we 
ordinarily talk, for it seems that sometimes we make reference to concreta as a way of 
indicating that it is highly probable that something else is the case. For example, we might 
appeal to the rain as something that makes probable that the tennis match will be cancelled – 
“I think the match will be postponed, just look at the rain!”. Nevertheless, I will not be 
following this path here. Instead I want to focus on a challenge to claim (b) from our 
reconstruction of McDowell’s argument. Thus, I want to challenge the claim that only 
elements that stand in relations similar to those of implication or probabilification can stand 
in rational relations to judgements and, thus, provide justifications or warrants for those 
judgements.  
Now, in the passage quoted, unfortunately, we do not get much of an argument from 
McDowell in favour of (b). All McDowell has to say here is that “we cannot really understand 
the relations in virtue of which a judgement is warranted except as relations within the space 
of concepts” (McDowell, ibid) and he moves on to mention the paradigmatic relations of 
implication and probabilification. We can concede that these relations are indeed 
paradigmatic instances of rational relations. But this should not be confused with a claim that 
any other instance of rational relation needs to be, thus, similar to the paradigmatic examples. 
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That guitars and violins are paradigmatic examples of musical instruments is no reason to 
think that any other musical instrument is going to be similar to these. We need a further 
reason to think that only elements in the conceptual sphere, or elements which stand in 
relations similar to the paradigms, can stand in rational relations.  
A gap between “rational relation” and “conceptual relation” needs to be filled in the 
argument advanced by McDowell. One way of trying to get more from McDowell would be 
to inquire why the relations of implication and probabilification are rational relations. Why 
does the fact that a conceptual item stands in an implying relation with the proposition that p 
provides the subject with warrant for the thought that p? Why does the fact that a conceptual 
item stands in a probabilifying relation with the proposition that q provides the subject with 
warrant for the thought that q? How is that relevant for a subject who wishes to attain 
knowledge of the world? A natural response could bring into focus to the way in which the 
obtaining of those relations could be exploited by a subject who wishes to attain knowledge 
of the world. Indeed, a commonality of the relations of probabilification and implication is 
that the obtaining of elements which stand in those relations to specific propositions favour 
the truth of those very propositions. But if this feature, i.e. “favouring the truth of a thought”, 
is the relevant feature which makes a relation a rational one, then there is no good reason to 
exclude from this class the relation of truthmaking. For if an element stands in a truthmaking 
relation with a thought, that is an excellent way of favouring the truth of the relevant thought. 
In other words, that this relation obtains is something that could be exploited by a subject 
who wishes to attain knowledge of the world. This line of reasoning presents us, then, with 
an alternative to McDowell’s narrow understanding of rational relations. Once we establish 
that rational relations are such in virtue of exhibiting a connection to truth – a connection 
which can be exploited by rational beings looking to attain knowledge – we are left with no 
reason to exclude truthmaking from the class of rational relations. And, thus, we are left with 
no reason to exclude concreta from the space of reasons, for they too can stand in rational 
relations to thought, i.e. the truthmaking relation.  
It is possible that the passage discussed is not intended by McDowell as a stand-alone 
argument against the Myth of the Given. The final phrase of the passage quoted – “the attempt 
to extend the scope of justificatory relations outside the conceptual sphere cannot do what it 
is supposed to do” – might be read as a clause to be expanded in the paragraph that follows. 
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In that paragraph, McDowell goes on to argue that embracing the Myth would leave us with 
a view in which perceptual experiences are incapable of providing justifications for our 
empirical judgements – for all experience can do, in views which endorse the Myth, is to give 
us exculpations for them. McDowell points, correctly in my opinion, that in elucidating 
perceptual knowledge we are after reasons which justify our perceptual judgements, not 
merely after excuses which can be given when we fail to attain knowledge. That views which 
endorse the Myth can provide us nothing but excuses, McDowell thinks, shows that such 
views are untenable. This is the second argument that we shall examine here. But before 
doing so I will say a few words about McDowell’s way of thinking about the legitimacy of 
the use of empirical concepts in an empiricist framework. 
Following Kant’s characterisation, McDowell thinks of the faculty of understanding 
as fundamentally spontaneous or active, whereas sensibility is understood as fundamentally 
receptive or passive (Kant, 2007; McDowell, 2006:127-8). On this understanding, perception 
is passive because in experience we receive something which is there to experience 
independently of our experience of it.100  
We explained before that McDowell endorses the traditional empiricist claim that 
input from experience is necessary if we are going to account appropriately for the objectivity 
of our empirical thought. On this view, thought’s interaction with experience is required if 
we want to legitimize our use of empirical concepts as something other than “moves in a self-
contained game” (McDowell, 1996: 5) – or, in Kantian jargon, as empty thoughts. The 
external constrain which is meant to keep within bounds the freedom of the understanding 
comes from the input provided by perceptual experience. Experience is meant to provide 
empirical thoughts with content, lending legitimacy to the application of concepts. Now, in 
order to provide the required constraint for thought, experience has to be able to stand in 
rational relations to thought. On McDowell’s story this amounts to experience having to stand 
in conceptual relations to thought. This leads McDowell’s to a conception in which 
experience involves the (passive) actualization of conceptual capacities. Here it is important 
to note that McDowell’s insistence that conceptual capacities are passively exercised in 
experience follows from his commitment to the idea that sensitivity is a passive faculty. In 
                                                 
100 See Kalderon (2017) for a recent suggestion for thinking that there is an active element to perceptual 
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his view, it is fundamental that conceptual capacities are passively actualized in experience, 
for otherwise perceptual experiences could not provide the required constraint on the active 
exercise of conceptual capacities exhibited in thought: “In fact it is precisely because 
experience is passive, a case of receptivity in operation, that the conception of experience I 
am recommending can satisfy the craving for a limit to the freedom that underlies the Myth 
of the Given” (McDowell, 1996: 10).  
This detour will allow us to understand better the second argument by McDowell 
against theories which endorse the Myth. For McDowell, there is something fundamentally 
wrong in the way in which the Given theorists implement the idea that experience puts an 
external constraint to the otherwise free exercise of conceptual capacities: 
What we wanted was a reassurance that when we use our concepts in judgement, 
our freedom—our spontaneity in the exercise of our understanding—is 
constrained from outside thought, and constrained in a way that we can appeal to 
in displaying the judgements as justified. But when we make out that the space of 
reasons is more extensive than the conceptual sphere, so that it can incorporate 
extra-conceptual impingements from the world, the result is a picture in which 
constraint from outside is exerted at the outer boundary of the expanded space of 
reasons, in what we are committed to depicting as a brute impact from the exterior 
[…] What happens there is the result of an alien force, the causal impact of the 
world, operating outside the control of our spontaneity. But it is one thing to be 
exempt from blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in can be 
traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to have a justification. In 
effect, the idea of the Given offers exculpations where we wanted justifications 
(McDowell, 1996: 8).  
This is a rich and difficult passage. Perhaps the fundamental claim can be summarized as 
follows: endorsement of the Myth of the Given cannot provide us with the right kind of 
constraint on empirical thought, for the sort of relation instantiated between experience (as 
conceived by the Given theorists) and thought falls short of providing justifications for 
judgements made on the basis of experience. Let us unpack this claim further. We find in the 
passage the claim that extending the space of reasons beyond the conceptual sphere (a move 
which is tantamount to endorsing the Myth of the Given) commits us to the idea that 
experience cannot be understood as nothing but a brute causal impact from the exterior. The 
suggestion is, then, that experiences can, at most, bring about judgements about the empirical 
world; a process of which we seemingly have no control, for it is beyond our spontaneity. On 
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such a view, we cannot be blamed for having the judgements about the world we end up 
having, for their formation is beyond our control. Nevertheless, not being liable for our 
empirical judgements is not the same than being justified in holding them – this much is 
common ground. But is the argument effective against theories which endorse the Myth? 
Implicit in McDowell’s reasoning is the claim that a judgement can be justified only 
insofar as the subject is somehow responsible for its formation – just as long its formation 
can be attributed to the subject. Moreover, we have the claim that being blameless for the 
formation of a judgements does not suffice for that judgement to be justified. Let us grant 
these plausible assumptions. But why think that views which endorse the Myth are committed 
to the thought that judgements are merely caused by experience, in such a way that this 
process and the formation of the resulting judgement are beyond our control? There is not 
much of an argument from McDowell here in favour of this claim. We could, nevertheless, 
articulate an argument if we read this paragraph as a continuation of the previous one.101 In 
the passage quoted before, we found the idea that experience can stand in rational relations 
to judgements only if it can stand in relations similar enough to those of probabilification or 
implication with judgements. We can read the present paragraph as suggesting that the only 
relation that can be instantiated between experiences (when conceived as the Given theorist 
does) and judgements is that of causality. Further, the claim could be that causality is not 
similar enough to implication and probabilification, something that is made apparent by the 
fact that it gives rise to a process which is completely beyond our control. But if this is the 
correct way of reading this paragraph, then the reply provided above for the first argument 
can be deployed again in response to the present argument.  
On a Radical Anti-psychologist view, the items we are aware of in experience stand 
in truthmaking relations to potential empirical judgements. The obtaining of such a relation 
can be exploited by a subject in her judgements, provided she has the relevant conceptual 
and recognitional capacities. This provides an alternative to McDowell’s picture: the relation 
between experiences and judgements is more complex than that of mere causation. It is 
neither a relation of probabilification nor of implication. Crucially, on this view, the 
formation of judgements on the basis of experience is a process which is not beyond our 
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control. Experience does make certain aspects of the environment present to us, and it is true 
that we have no much control of this process – largely it is a passive occurrence. Although 
we might control whether or not we open our eyes, pay attention, and maintain our look 
towards the perceived environment, it is not up to us what is out there for us to see.102 I will 
be arguing, that the recognition of those items as the items they are (when we are successful) 
and the endorsement of a perceptual judgement are up to us – they are things that we do. As 
a result, on the Radical Anti-psychologist picture, we are not merely blameless for the 
formation of perceptual judgements. Their formation is not a brute effect of the world’s 
impingement in our sensibility – it is the result of the active exercise of our conceptual and 
recognitional capacities. McDowell’s claim that endorsing the Myth can merely provide 
exculpations when we are looking for justification is simply not true of the Radical Anti-
psychologist alternative.  
 
iii) Recognition as an Activity, a Proposal 
I would like to use these considerations as a springboard to develop further, from an 
Austinian perspective, the role that recognitional capacities might have in perceptual 
knowledge acquisition. In particular, I will present a tentative proposal on how to understand 
the agential control a subject might have in the process which leads to perceptual recognition, 
and in what sense the achievement of recognizing can be attributed to a subject. Although 
McDowell’s position is not straightforwardly incompatible with the suggestion I will be 
advancing, his position is not very developed in this direction. If the position I advance turns 
ot to be perfectly consistent with McDowell’s, then the proposal can also be read as a 
suggestion on how McDowell might develop this aspect of his position. Independently of 
what McDowell might say, I want to suggest that the proposal to be advanced here shows the 
potential that the Austinian epistemology defended here has in the contemporary 
philosophical landscape.  
As we saw before, McDowell’s commitment to a conception of experience in which 
conceptual capacities are drawn into operation in experience itself leads him to the idea that 
these capacities must be passively exercised in experience:  
                                                 
102 See Kalderon (2017) for a discussion of the extent to which perception is also an active occurrence, despite 
the subject not being in control of what is out there to be perceived. See also Noë (2005). 
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I said […] that when we enjoy experience conceptual capacities are drawn on in 
receptivity, not exercised on some supposedly prior deliverances of receptivity 
[…] In experience one finds oneself saddled with content. One’s conceptual 
capacities have already been brought into play, in the content’s being available to 
one, before one has any choice in the matter (McDowell, 1996: 10, emphasis 
added).  
 
On this view, when a rational subject has an experience, some conceptual capacities have 
already been passively exercised, without the subject’s involvement. If it is not up to the 
subject which is the appropriate concept to actualize in a given experience, what then is the 
role of the subject in the acquisition of perceptual knowledge? On McDowell’s view, this 
role seems to be rather diminished:  
Minimally, it must be possible to decide whether or not to judge that things are as 
one’s experience represents them to be. How one’s experience represents things 
to be is not under one’s control, but it is up to one whether one accepts the 
appearance or rejects it (McDowell, 1996: 11). 
 
In fairness to McDowell, he is cautious enough to preface this claim by pointing out that this 
is a minimal role that subjects could have in the formation of empirical judgements. This is 
consistent with the role of the subject being much more robust than it is depicted in this 
passage from McDowell. For instance, a suggestion made by McDowell is that it is part of 
the subject’s responsibility to “reshape” our conceptual scheme in response to potential 
inconsistencies which might arise from unexpected experience (McDowell, 1996: 13). 
Consider a case in which something novel is presented in experience, say a type of bird we 
did not encounter before – something which cannot be adequately characterised by our 
conceptual scheme. In this situation it might be up to the subject to reshape her conceptual 
scheme to accommodate the novel reality – perhaps by introducing a new concept. In a 
similar fashion, previously acquired concepts might be found in need of revision on the light 
of new information. For instance, I might find that my concept of coriander turned out to be 
ineffective for it also applies to parsley. This type of case might involve updating a concept 
I previously had. There are many ways in which our conceptual scheme might be in continual 
need of updating, and in McDowell’s view it is up to the subject to keep the scheme in good 
form to deal best with our environment. 
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But the proposal I want to advance here reflects on a different way in which the 
subject might affect the way conceptual capacities are exercised on experience. Here I want 
to look at the way in which the subject might be able to enhance the effectiveness of one’s 
ability to successfully apply some of the concepts that she possesses. Consider the following 
familiar scenario. You are walking through the park when you see a familiar-looking woman 
sitting on a bench. Suppose you stop and look at her in an attempt to recognize her. Suppose 
that at first you mistakenly take the woman to be Maru, only to realize shortly thereafter that 
it cannot be Maru for you know that she is in Switzerland at the moment. Finally, after closer 
inspection, you come to the realization that it is not Maru, but her sister Sofía who looks a 
lot like her. Now, a natural way to describe this case would involve saying that, at first, you 
made a mistake in thinking it was Maru, but that then you corrected it by recognizing the 
woman as Sofía. I take it that this is a neutral description of the situation and, furthermore, 
that McDowell would have no problems in accommodating it within his view. McDowell 
can say that you made a mistake in endorsing the judgement that it was Maru, and that you 
corrected the mistake by rejecting that first mistaken judgement and by subsequently 
endorsing the judgement that it was Sofía. On this interpretation of the scenario advanced on 
behalf of McDowell the error incurred by the subject occurs at the level of the acceptance of 
a judgement which turns out to be incorrect. But it is not so straightforward that, on 
McDowell’s position, the subject is to be held responsible for the unsuccessful exercise of 
her conceptual capacities in this scenario – for these are exercised passively on his view. In 
other words, for McDowell, the subject is not to be held responsible for the error that occurs 
when the incorrect concept is applied to our experience.  
But one natural way of describing the situation would be to say that first you 
misrecognized the woman as Maru, but that then you corrected your mistake by recognizing 
her as Sofía. As McDowell’s view stands he lacks the resources to take this description at 
face value, for the actualization of conceptual capacities in experience, in his view, are not 
under the control of the perceiver. But let us remember that McDowell’s remark regarding 
the role of the subject in making perceptual judgements maintains that acceptance or rejection 
of a judgement is a “minimal” role the subject might have. Thus, perhaps the suggestions to 
be made in the following could supplement McDowell’s position. 
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I want to suggest that the Radical Anti-psychologist position that I wish to defend 
here does have the elements to accommodate this description at face value. Here, the 
Austinian influence on my version of Radical Anti-psychologism has the opportunity to come 
to the foreground. In chapter 1, I advanced an interpretation of Austin’s epistemology of 
perception in which being in a position to attain perceptual knowledge requires the active 
involvement of the perceiver (as well as being the subject of a successful perceptual 
experience). Throughout this thesis, I have suggested that among the capacities actively 
exercised in perceptual cases by the subject to put herself in said position we find 
recognitional capacities. I also pointed out that it is not straightforward in what sense the 
exercise of these capacities is an activity attributable to the subject. In the remainder of this 
chapter I will sketch a view on which recognition is conceived as an activity attributable to 
the subject. On the one hand, this suggestion will contribute to the development of the active 
element in our Austinian approach to perceptual knowledge – an element for which, 
unfortunately, there has not been space to explore in this thesis. On the other hand, this 
development will provide us with a ground for thinking that our Radical Anti-psychologism 
can contribute with original positions to the contemporary epistemological debate. For we 
can see this contribution as a way to accommodate some aspects of perceptual knowledge 
acquisition for which McDowell does not have a developed treatment – in particular, our 
position advances one way of explaining the phenomenon of recognizing as something done 
by the subject and failing to recognize as something for which the subject might be held 
responsible.  
First, let us characterise our perceptual recognitional capacities as capacities to apply 
concepts to the different elements presented to us by perception in our environment. This 
characterisation of our recognitional capacities is such that all applications of concepts 
(successful and unsuccessful) are to be considered exercises of the capacity. On our view, 
then, capacities to recognize can be either successful or unsuccessful. Successful exercises 
of the capacity are constituted by correct applications of the concept. We are thinking of 
recognizing as an achievement in Zeno Vendler’s sense of the term (1957). Compare this 
conception with Alan Millar’s conception, in which the exercises of recognitional capacities 
are always successful. Millar conceives of cases in which we fail to perceptually recognize 
the items perceived as cases in which the capacity, contrary to appearances, was not exercised 
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(Millar 2008, 2011). Here I lack the space to develop a reason to favour our referred 
conception over Millar’s. Note, nevertheless, that on the face of it, these conceptions would 
advance different explanations of the phenomenon of misrecognition or failing to recognize. 
On our conception misrecognition might include cases where subjects exercised their 
recognitional capacities in a defective manner, whereas for Millar they might be exhausted 
by cases where subjects failed to exercise those capacities.  
Perhaps the main obstacle in the path of developing a view in which particular 
exercises of recognitional capacities are attributable to the subject has to do with the fact that, 
in most cases, we do not seem to be in control of the process of trying to achieve recognition. 
I suggest that there are two main sources of resistance as to why it might seem that in many 
cases achieving recognition is beyond our control. First, in many cases, the process of trying 
to achieve recognition occurs without our intending to recognize the items perceived by us – 
i.e. recognition can occur automatically. Secondly, in many cases, the process of trying to 
recognize occurs instantaneously, leaving us with no time to exercise active control over the 
process. Even so, is it possible to make sense of the idea that recognition is something 
attributable to the subject? In order to see how a positive answer is possible, let me first 
consider two different ways in which we might be thought to be actively involved in 
achieving perceptual recognition. First, we discuss the “ballistic approach” to mental activity 
advanced by Galen Strawson (2003). Then, we discuss Dorothea Debus suggestion of how 
we can shape our mental lives (2016). Reflection on the shortcomings of these positions will 
motivate the proposal of a third account, which, I argue, provides us with a more adequate 
understanding of the agent’s role in perceptual recognition. Finally, I advance a conception 
on which our involvement in achieving recognition is linked to our history in training to 
recognize the relevant elements, in adequate environments.  
On Galen Strawson’s ballistic theory of mental actions, the agent features merely as 
the initiator of mental activity. On this view, the agent is incapable of controlling the 
development of the activity. For instance, a subject might initiate the process of deliberation 
of whether to go out for dinner tonight or stay home. But the development and subsequent 
result of such process, Strawson tells us, is beyond our active control (see Strawson, 2003: 
228-229). On his position, the subject’s involvement in mental activity is similar to her 
involvement in kicking a football, i.e. once the ball has been kicked there is nothing left for 
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the subject to do but wait and see what happens to the ball. If this was the model we applied 
to perceptual recognition, we would have that concept application would not be attributable 
to the agent. For the agent would only be involved in getting the process of achieving 
recognition started. What goes on afterwards would be, ex hypothesi, beyond the subject’s 
control. At most, this model would give us reason to think that the subject can be involved 
in setting the process of achieving recognition in motion. On this view, the role of the subject 
in recognition would be limited in the following two ways. First, the success or failure of the 
capacity to recognize would not be attributable to the agent – for, on this position, the agent 
is responsible only for getting the process started, not for its evolution, nor for its result. 
Second, even if this minimal space is conferred to the agent (i.e. the possibility of setting the 
process in motion), it could be argued that in many cases recognition does not occur in this 
manner. Perhaps in most cases the process of recognition occurs unbidden – i.e. the process 
sets off without us setting it off. On this view, the role of the agent is too limited for 
recognition to be properly attributed to the subject for the given reasons. Can we make sense 
of a more robust involvement of the subject in perceptual recognition? 103  
Perhaps our role in recognition need not be limited to setting the process of achieving 
recognition in motion. Helen Stewart (2012) has highlighted the importance of being capable 
of exercising control over our actions – even though such capacity might not be exercised 
actively all the time. She is interested in exploring the way in which the control we can 
exercise over our actions constitutes an exercise of our freedom to act. We can attempt to use 
the notion of being in control of our actions to elucidate the way in which perceptual 
recognition is something we do. The general idea of being in control of our actions can be 
illustrated by appeal to a simple example. Walking is something we do, something that is 
attributable to us independently of the fact that sometimes we walk mindlessly. One 
suggestion as to why this action is attributable to me is because I can control my walk: I can 
control the speed of my walk, as well as the trajectory I follow; I can even bring it to a stop 
altogether. Nevertheless, if we tried to model the way in which recognition is something we 
actively do by appeal to this notion of being under control of our actions, we would face 
immediate worries. For instance, one problem with this account is that it is not so clear that 
we have such an intimate control of our perceptual recognitional capacities, as we do of our 
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walks. The process of recognition does not seem to be as malleable as our walks are. I submit 
that the process of recognition is not one which we can direct with precision. We can control 
our walk because, in general, we can control how fast and in what direction our legs move. 
There does not seem to be an equivalent for the process of recognition.104  
In order to overcome this difficulty we could appeal to a suggestion advanced recently 
by Dorothea Debus, according to which we can shape some aspects of the course of our own 
mental lives by exercising “indirect” and “imprecise” control over these. For Debus the 
control we exercise over an aspect of our mental lives is “indirect” when we do not act upon 
the relevant aspect of our mental lives we wish to affect, but on a different aspect in the hope 
that this will affect the target aspect. Our control over an aspect of our mental lives is 
“imprecise” when we cannot predict, or control, the results or changes brought about by our 
activity. A paradigmatic example by Debus is our attempt to affect our mood by listening to 
a song in the hope that it will cheer us up. In this case, Debus suggests that our attempt to 
affect our mood is indirect – for we do not act upon our mood itself –, and imprecise – for 
we cannot predict whether listening to a song will succeed in cheering us up (see Debus, 
2016: 350). It could be suggested that something similar goes on with respect to recognition, 
i.e. that the control we exercise over processes of recognition is indirect and imprecise. 
Consider a case in which a bird I can clearly see standing on a branch resists recognition. 
Instead of moving my gaze to a different aspect of the visual scene, I might maintain the 
perceptual contact with the bird and direct my attention to different parts of the animal in the 
hope that recognition will ensue. This type of control might be considered indirect and 
imprecise because it is not directed towards the process of achieving recognition itself and 
because the subject cannot predict or control its result. Although this approach provides us 
with a more robust understanding of the way in which recognition might be actively exercised 
by us, it is not clear that this type of control could be exercised in many cases. As we 
mentioned before, the process of achieving recognition sometimes (perhaps even in most 
cases) occur instantaneously, leaving no time for us to exercise any control over how it 
occurs. More importantly, it is not clear that the success or failure of our recognitional 
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the type of control we might exercise over breathing. Unfortunately, here I lack the space to explore these 
suggestions in any detail. 
  
176 
capacities could be attributed to the subject if she has merely imprecise and indirect control 
over recognition. On this approach, the subject would be responsible merely for the 
modification of the conditions under which our capacities of recognition operate. That is, at 
best, the role of the agent in this conception is that of enabling recognition to occur.  
Is it possible to advance an account in which the role of the agent in perceptual 
recognition is more robust? In the course of discussing the accounts of our role in recognition 
inspired by Strawson and Debus we identified two major obstacles for developing such an 
account. First, the fact that sometimes (perhaps even most times) recognition occurs 
unbidden raised problems for Strawson’s approach. Second, that sometimes (perhaps even 
most times) the process which leads to recognition occurs instantaneously, with no time for 
us to exercise any control over it, raised problems for Debus’ approach. These considerations 
suggest that perhaps in most cases recognition occurs under circumstances which leave no 
space for active involvement of the subject – for when recognition occurs unbidden and 
instantaneously there would be no space left for the agent. But more worryingly, both 
accounts gave rise to limited accounts of the agential role in perceptual recognition in the 
following way. Even in cases where the process of recognition is set off by us and where the 
process of trying to achieve recognition does not occur automatically, the role of the agent 
would not suffice to attribute to the subject responsibility for the success or failure of the 
recognitional capacities.  
Yet, I think there is space for a more robust conception of the way the agent is 
involved in perceptual recognition. In “Other Minds” (1946) Austin suggest that part of what 
explains why we can tell (i.e. know) that the bird before us is a bittern is that we have learned 
to tell bitterns by sight – perhaps because we had plenty of opportunity in our youth to learn 
to tell bitterns by sight. I want to elaborate on this suggestion and evaluate the advantages of 
a conception in which the main contribution made by agents to recognition has to do with the 
fact that they can shape their recognitional capacities through training. On this understanding, 
the fundamental role of the agent in perceptual recognition is not that of controlling particular 
exercises of the capacity, or setting the capacity in motion (although that might be done 
sometimes by us), but that of shaping the capacity itself through training. I submit that on 
this approach the success or failure of the capacity is attributable to the subject because she 
is the one who shaped the disposition. Perhaps drawing an analogy with some athletic 
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endeavours will allow us to explain our proposal better. Many of the bodily movements in 
sports such as tennis, basketball, or baseball occur automatically in the sense that the subject 
does not consciously sets them off in motion. Moreover, if not instantaneously, some of these 
occurrences happen fast enough that the subject cannot exercise control over her activity. But 
naturally we are happy to attribute to athletes the success of their actions. One explanation 
of why this is so appeals to the fact that the athletes themselves shaped their relevant athletic 
capacities through training. These athletes can be considered the agents in these cases 
because they have trained their dispositions to attain success at a far higher proportion, and 
in more difficult circumstances, than a normal person. 
Many of a subject’s athletic capacities might be exercised in an automatic fashion. 
Nevertheless, their being automatic does not mean that the subject is not responsible for their 
operation, nor that their success or failure are not attributable to the agent. For even though 
the subject might lack the opportunity to exercise control over a particular exercise of her 
capacities, the way her capacities operate in a given circumstance is attributable to the 
subject. For the way her capacities operate is a result of her training, thus shaping the relevant 
capacities. I suggest that something similar can be said about recognitional capacities. We 
can train our perceptual recognitional capacities in a variety of circumstances, thus shaping 
the way in which these capacities operate. We can train our capacity to tell American 
goldfinches from female scarlet tanagers by sight, or we can train our capacity to tell praying 
mantis against a background of green leaves by sight. I contend that the approach I advance 
here is in a better position to deal with the issues which the previous two proposals struggled 
with. The proposal I advance here can straightforwardly accommodate the facts that 
recognition sometimes occurs unbidden and in an automatic fashion. For the views inspired 
by Strawson and Debus about agential involvement in recognition would find applicability 
only when recognition is set in motion by the agent and when the opportunity to exercise 
control over the process of recognition arises. But these are no problems for the approach I 
advance here, for even if recognition occurs unbidden and in an automatic fashion, the way 
these capacities are exercised will be attributable to the agent as long as the capacity has been 
shaped by the agent.  
On the previous two proposals it was difficult to sustain the idea that the success or 
failure of our recognitional capacities was attributable to the agent. On the account inspired 
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by Strawson, the agent was responsible merely for setting the process of trying to achieve 
recognition in motion, not for its success or failure. On the account inspired by Debus, the 
subject was responsible for the modification of the conditions under which recognitional 
capacities operate, a modification whose impact could not be precisely predicted, or 
controlled, by the agent. But on the proposal advanced here there is a very clear way in which 
success and failure of our recognitional capacities can be attributable to the agent. For on our 
conception the agent is responsible for the shape of her recognitional capacities. On this view, 
within the reasonable limits imposed by the opportunities afforded by one’s surroundings, it 
is up to the agent to shape her recognitional capacities, such that she might be able to tell 
things by sight or by other sensory modalities. Just as in the case of athletic performances, 
different agents can shape their recognitional capacities to yield a higher proportion of 
successful exercises, and to achieve success under challenging conditions. By studying the 
shape and behaviour of American goldfinches I might become better at telling American 
goldfinches by sight. By attuning my capacity to tell American goldfinches to operate in 
conditions of poor light and in an environment where ringers (such as the female scarlet 
tanager) abound, I might extend the scope of my capacity to cover challenging conditions.  
The proposal advanced here, I submit, provides us with a sketch of a plausible account 
of the role of the agent in perceptual recognition. On this account, the subject is responsible 
for the application of concepts to the elements presented in experience. Admittedly, the view, 
as it has been advanced, remains underdeveloped. Moreover, I do not claim to have advanced 
conclusive arguments for thinking that the proposal advocated here is correct. The strongest 
reason I have advanced in favour of this proposal is that it has the capacity to take at face 
value talk of subject’s recognizing or failing to recognize things in her environment by means 
of perception. Admittedly, this is a modest case for our proposal. I want to conclude, 
nevertheless by sketching how a pattern of argument could be used to highlight the 
explanatory power of the type of position advanced here.  
On our view, we are responsible for the application of a particular concept in a 
particular situation. And, thus, the failure or success of a particular exercise is attributable to 
us. Let use for contrasting a position in which the subject’s role is limited to the acceptance 
or rejection of the conceptual application that arise from perception – call it the “alternative 
position”. Although this possible position is inspired in some remarks by McDowell I should 
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make very clear that it is not McDowell’s conception, for he defends a view in which the role 
of the subject extends beyond this minimal requirement. I merely use the alternative position 
to illustrate the explanatory potential of the view I am advocating here.  
The suggestion I want to advance here is that this difference in how far the realm of 
responsibility extends (on each of the views considered here) might be exploited by a pattern 
of argument in view of lending support to the proposal advocated here. For it is possible to 
exploit this difference by constructing and reflecting on cases where a subject who fails to 
recognize an item by perception is to be held responsible for the resulting (false) judgement. 
Consider, for instance, the case of a professional chef who fails to tell the difference between 
parsley and coriander. What are we to say about a case like this where, moreover, the relevant 
judgement is perfectly consistent with the rest of the subject’s beliefs? What is wrong with 
the subject making that judgements, apart from the fact that it is a false judgement? Is the 
chef who takes the coriander to be parsley making an innocent mistake? It could be suggested 
that a defender of the alternative position would have to answer in the positive the last 
question. For on that view, the subject makes her judgement blamelessly. On our position, 
nevertheless we have the tools to answer this question negatively, for the relevant judgement 
was brought about by the defective exercise of a capacity for which the subject is responsible. 
It is the chef’s mistake to categorize wrongly parsley as coriander. 
The particular argument sketched here might be found too defensive. But what I want 
to illustrate here is that there is a pattern of argument available – a pattern of argument which 
exploits the fact that in our proposal the realm of responsibility in perceptual knowledge 
extends beyond that in the alternative proposal. This difference might be exploited in a more 
developed argument in favour of the conception advanced here. In particular we have to study 
the type of situations in which the proposal advocated here holds an explanatory advantage 
over the alternative position, and other views similar to it. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we advanced a defence of the most distinctive claim of the Radical Anti-
psychologist position, and developed as sketch of how the Austinian approach could be 
developed to yield an original account of the agent’s involvement in recognition. In the first 
part of the chapter I made a case for thinking that concreta, the proposed perceivable reasons 
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in Radical Anti-psychologism, have normative force and can play a motivational role in the 
subject’s cognitive life. In the second part, we defended the claim from several potential 
criticisms made on the basis that Radical Anti-psychologism falls prey to the Myth of the 
Given. We focused on versions of that argument advanced by McDowell and argued that his 
attacks leave impervious the type of position defended here. Finally, a consideration of the 
way conceptual capacities are exercised in experience on McDowell’s position motivated an 
exploration of recognitional capacities in the Radical Anti-psychologist. In developing this 
proposal we drew inspiration from Austin’s suggestions regarding recognition. We advanced 
a conception in which the agent’s involvement in recognition can be found at the level of 
shaping the capacities to recognize through training. It was suggested that this proposal 
shows how the Austinian epistemology embraced in this thesis has the potential to produce 
original suggestions relevant to contemporary philosophical discussions. We had already 
seen that the Austinian approach has this potential when, in Chapter 2, we applied the position 
to a discussion regarding defeaters for perceptual warrant. The discussion in the latest section 
of this chapter goes further in exploring the potential of the Austinian position.  
  
  
181 
Chapter 7 - Concreta are truthmakers 
The final claim of Radical Anti-psychologism we will be analysing in this thesis is the claim 
that concreta are truthmakers for many empirical propositions, in particular for an important 
class of propositions knowable via perception. The relevance of this metaphysical claim to 
the epistemology of perception advanced here lies in the fact that, on our version of Radical 
Anti-psychologism, concreta’s role as reasons for judging is partially explained by their being 
truthmakers for the propositions judged. We made use of this claim in the previous chapter. 
There, we suggested that one way for an item to constitute a reason for judging is by the 
item’s standing in an appropriate relation to propositions – a relation which is, at least in 
principle, exploitable by the judging subject. On Kalderon’s version of Radical Anti-
psychologism, the relation which is meant to play this role is the truthmaking relation. 
Moreover, this relation can be exploited by a subject who is perceptually aware of the 
relevant concretum – so long as the subject has the required recognitional capacities, and the 
circumstances are suitable for the reliable exercise of these.  
  Here, it is worth noting that endorsing the view that concreta are truthmakers for 
many of the propositions knowable via perception might be more committal than is strictly 
required from our Radical Anti-psychologistic position. It might suffice to maintain that 
necessarily, for many of the propositions knowable via perception, it is necessary that if a 
given concreta exists, then the proposition is true. It is an additional step (an additional 
commitment which might not be incurred on) to maintain, in addition, that these entities make 
the proposition true. Of course, on this position, one would need to provide an explanation 
of why this necessary connection holds. The explanation need not be given in terms of a 
truthmaker view where concreta are the relevant truthmakers. Yet, the truthmaker view 
provides us with one way of explaining this necessary connection. Unfortunately, here I lack 
the space to pursue this issue further. I merely want to point out that such a possibility might 
be open for a different version of Radical Anti-psychologism. 
 In this chapter, we will start by presenting the truthmaker view, i.e. the view that 
many empirical propositions are made true by virtue of the existence of an entity. We will 
explain that Radical Anti-psychologism needs to advance a version of this view, where the 
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relevant truthmaking entities are concrete, and explore some candidates in the literature. The 
bulk of the chapter, nevertheless, will be devoted to a defensive move on behalf of the general 
truthmaker view (i.e. the view that there are truthmaking entities, but not necessarily 
concreta). We will defend the position from the recent attacks advanced by Julian Dodd 
(1999, 2000, 2001, 2007). The upshot of the discussion will be quite modest in two respects. 
First, we develop a merely defensive line of reasoning on behalf of the truthmaker view in 
the face of Dodd’s attacks. Second, we defend the general position that there are truthmaking 
entities – not the more specific position that there are concrete truthmaking entities. In 
fairness, Dodd’s discussion of the truthmaker view engages mainly with the position that the 
truthmaking entities are states of affairs. But, as we will see, there are further questions 
regarding whether these are to be considered concrete entities.  
There are two distinguishable, but complimentary, attacks from Dodd. According to 
the first, endorsement of the claim that there are entities which serve as truthmakers 
constitutes an unwarranted and unmotivated expansion of our ontology. In advancing this 
criticism Dodd has in mind truthmaker views which introduce states of affairs or tropes into 
our ontology – the existence of which, on Dodd’s view, we are not ordinarily committed to. 
We will respond to this challenge by arguing that the introduction of states of affairs as 
truthmakers is warranted by independent reasons and that Dodd’s arguments fail to 
undermine these reasons. According to the second attack by Dodd, there is an internal 
problem for views which advance states of affairs as the truthmakers for the relevant class of 
empirical propositions. For Dodd, states of affairs are surrounded by mystery, for it is not 
clear how they exhibit the required unity to distinguish them from the mereological sum of 
its elements. In advancing this criticism, Dodd is thinking of states of affairs as somehow 
built out of more basic elements. On that basis, he raises issues about the supposed modes of 
combination required on this picture (Dodd, 2009). Dodd’s conclusion, a rejection of the 
truthmaker view, ties together these two criticisms in an appeal to ontological economy. On 
his view, we can account for the truth of empirical propositions without appealing to the 
existence of states of affairs or tropes. Given the problems he identifies with endorsing the 
existence of these entities, he suggests that theoretical economy advises against letting them 
into our ontology. In this chapter, we will only be able to challenge the first part of Dodd’s 
attack. But first, let us explain how the truthmaker view is brought into the philosophical 
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scene in the first place. We will also explain what version of the view might be required given 
the theoretical commitments of Radical Anti-psychologism.  
 
7.1 True Propositions and Truthmaking 
The claim that concreta are truthmakers for certain empirical propositions is far from being 
uncontroversial. Yet, a fundamental principle, which finds more widespread support, implicit 
in this claim is that many empirical propositions are true only insofar as reality is the way it 
is described by those propositions. This principle is so basic it need not be rejected by some 
versions of the coherence theory of truth – a view which has been considered to analyse truth 
in such a way that the relation between truth and reality is not fundamental to an appropriate 
account of the notion (see Ayer, 1940: 84-93). Roughly, according to these theorists, a 
proposition is true in virtue of being the content of a belief that belongs to a coherent system 
of beliefs (Glanzberg, 2013: 1.2). Strictly speaking, a coherentist conception of truth leaves 
open the possibility of rejecting the claim that the way reality is determines the truth or falsity 
of propositions or beliefs. But nothing prevents the coherence view from maintaining that 
there is a strong connection (perhaps even a necessary link) between coherence and reality. 
For instance, it could be proposed that propositions are made true by coherence, but reality 
is constituted by coherence. On this view, saying that propositions are made true by 
coherence is extensionally equivalent to saying that they are made true by reality. If there is 
such a strong connection between coherence and the way reality is, then a coherence theorist 
need not reject the claim that some empirical propositions are true in virtue of the way reality 
is. 
 Given its widespread support, here we will be assuming that this principle, which 
links truth to the way the world is, is correct, and we will set aside views which might reject 
it. Julian Dodd considers this principle to be obviously correct and maintains that it should 
be common ground amongst most truth theorists (Dodd, 2001: 73-76). Following Wright, 
Dodd considers this principle to express a platitude concerning truth, and formulates it as 
follows: 
(CP) “P” is true if and only if things are as “P” says they are (Wright, 1992: 27). 
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Wright labels this principle the “correspondence platitude”, as it gives expression to an 
insight which plays a central role in classical correspondence accounts of truth – the idea that 
a proposition is true insofar as it corresponds with a piece of mind-independent reality. Of 
course, this insight, although labelled by Wright as a correspondentist insight, might be 
widely accepted even by participants in the debate who would reject a correspondence theory 
of truth, including coherence theorists and deflationists (Dodd, 2001: 75). 
 One natural way of fleshing out the correspondence platitude is by postulating a 
truthmaker view, i.e. a view in which propositions are true because there are certain entities 
which make them true.105 This type of truthmaker view has been endorsed recently by the 
likes of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and David Armstrong. This view can take several forms, 
but an essential idea of the view is the claim that a given class of propositions are made true 
by virtue of the existence of entities. Here, “by virtue” talk is construed as a form of 
necessitation. In other words, when we say that a proposition is made true by virtue of the 
existence of an entity we mean that the existence of the entity necessitates the truth of the 
relevant proposition (Armstrong, 2004: 5-6).106 For truthmaker maximalism, the claim takes 
an entirely general form and holds that for every true proposition, there is at least one entity 
which necessitates its truth. Truthmaker optimalism holds a weaker version of the claim, 
which holds that there is at least one entity which necessitates the truth of all true 
propositions, except for universal and negative truths. Finally, truthmaker non-maximalism 
simply holds that some entities necessitate the truth of some propositions.107 Given that the 
Radical Anti-psychologist claim is a limited thesis about some empirical truths (i.e. that some 
empirical truths have concreta as truthmakers), it only has to be consistent with non-
maximalism. 
 Thus, given the epistemological interests of the Radical Anti-psychologistic position, 
we need not be committed to truthmaker maximalism – for all we need is that an important 
class of the propositions we know to be true via perception are made true by concrete entities, 
                                                 
105 Below we will see how Dodd challenges the derivation from the correspondence platitude to a truthmaker 
view.  
106 See Bigelow (1988: 125-127), for a different characterisation of the relation between truthmakers and true 
propositions, according to which the relation is one of entailment. Armstrong (2004: 6) criticises this account 
on the basis that a relation of entailment only holds between propositions. See also Smith (1999) for the view 
that the necessitation construal has to be supplemented.  
107 Truthmaker optimalism is, then, merely a form of truthmaker non-maximalism. See MacBride (2013) and 
Rodriguez- Pereyra (2005) for a characterisation of these versions of truthmaker theories.  
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entities that we can perceive. It is important to note here, that the requirement that some 
truthmakers are perceivable entities comes from the Radical Anti-psychologism we are 
advocating here, not from the truthmaker view. Rodriguez-Pereyra advances a truthmaker 
principle in defending a version of non-maximalism (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2005). 
Nevertheless, such a principle would be unnecessarily strong given our purposes. There, 
Rodríguez-Pereyra defends a truthmaker principle for an “important class” of empirical true 
propositions – a class which includes both essential and inessential predications. About this 
class of true propositions, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s principle maintains the following:  
(TM) Necessarily, if <p> is true, then there is some entity in virtue of which it is 
true (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2005: 18).108  
But this formulation of the truthmaker principle holds that for every true proposition (in the 
relevant class) there is an entity in virtue of which the claim is true. On this principle, the 
existence of an entity is a necessary condition for the truth of a given proposition in the class. 
But all we need for present purposes is, rather, the claim that it is sufficient for the truth of 
some propositions (in particular, some propositions knowable via perception) that there is a 
concrete entity, whose existence necessitates its truth. Moreover, our Radical Anti-
psychologism also requires that the relevant truthmakers are perceivable. The following 
principle might be more adequate given these theoretical commitments: 
(TM*) If a concrete entity, e, is a truthmaker for a proposition, <p>, then it is 
necessary that if e exists, then <p> is true.109 
This is not to say, of course, that, for some other theoretical purposes we might require 
(TM). For instance, such a principle might figure in advancing an account of the truth of 
propositions which are made true by the absence of a truthmaker. (TM) would allow us to 
infer that a given proposition <p> is not true (and so, on further principles, false) in the 
absence of a truthmaker which renders it true, which, in turn might allow us to explain the 
truth of <¬p>. This move would be unavailable for someone who only endorses (TM*), for, 
in that case, the absence of a truthmaker would not entail the falsity of <p>.  
                                                 
108 Here we will follow Rodriguez-Pereyra in using angle brackets to refer to propositions. 
109 Importantly, this is the principle endorsed by Kalderon in his defence of Radical Anti-psychologism, see 
his (2011): 226. 
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(TM*) does not say anything about the nature of the concrete entities which can play 
the truthmaking role for the relevant class of propositions. Different versions of the view will 
appeal to different entities to play the truthmaking role. For instance, two prominent ways of 
fleshing out (TM) are the following: (a) that the truthmaking entities are states of affairs, and 
(b) that the truthmaking entities are tropes (or moments).110 On the latter view, tropes are 
understood as particularised properties, such as the blueberry’s purpleness or Sofía’s smile. 
One relevant feature of such entities is that they are spatio temporally located, and that they 
are, prima facie, the sort of thing which can be perceived. Mulligan et al. (1984) introduce 
in their characterisation of tropes the idea that they are “existentially dependent or non self-
sufficient objects” (1984: 290), the idea being that their existence depends metaphysically on 
the existence of something else. For instance, the blueberry’s purpleness depends for its 
existence on the blueberry’s existence. It seems natural to construe these paradigmatic 
examples of tropes to be concrete entities. One of the main objections to a truthmaker view 
in which tropes are the truthmaking entities comes from the possibility that tropes are 
transferable (Dodd, 2000: 8). Consider the following scenario. The blueberry’s purpleness is 
a trope – an entity the existence of which makes true the proposition that the blueberry is 
purple. But when the blueberry is pressed against a white canvass such that the colour is now 
also in the canvass, it would be natural to say that the blueberry’s purpleness is now in the 
canvas.111 Suppose further that the blueberry is destroyed shortly after it is pressed against 
the canvas. Arguably, we have now a case in which the relevant trope exists (in the canvas), 
yet the propositions for which the trope is meant to be a truthmaker seems to be false, for it 
is not the case that the blueberry is purple.  On this reasoning, then, if tropes are transferable, 
then they cannot play the role of truthmakers, for their existence would not necessitate the 
truth of the relevant propositions.112 The viability of a truthmaking view which appeals to 
tropes needs to be able to deal with the transferability worry.113  
                                                 
110 The term “moments” comes from the influential paper by Mulligan, Simons, and Smith (1984) in which 
they postulate moments or tropes as the truthmakers for many empirical truths. The view that states of affairs 
are truthmakers is defended at length in Armstrong (1997). 
111 Extant cases which are discussed regarding the transferability of tropes tend to rest on the plausibility of 
examples where two numerically distinct but otherwise identical tropes swap places. See Ehring (2011: 78). 
112 Similar worries might arise for accounts of transubstantiation in which the qualities of the bread and wine 
continue to exist whilst not inhering on any substance. See Pasnau (2011: 185-190) for a discussion of 
transubstantiation in late medieval metaphysics.  
113 See Molnar (2003: 43-46) and Ehring (2011: 78-80) for a defence of the non-transferability of tropes. 
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The other prominent way of fleshing out (TM*) is by maintaining that the entities 
which make true the relevant class of propositions are states of affairs. These entities can be 
characterised generally as entities constituted by a particular and a property, where these are 
unified, not merely aggregated – this makes them different to mereological sums or sets.114 
The reason why we need unity is that the mereological sum of the blueberry and the property 
of being purple might exist but not necessitate the truth of <the blueberry is purple>. In 
endorsing this position, we have to bear in mind that our view is constrained by the claim 
that the truthmakers perception makes us aware of must be concreta. But on a standard 
account of states of affairs, due to Armstrong (1997), these are constituted by particulars, 
properties, and relations, where the latter two are understood as universals. Introduction of  
paradigmatically abstract entities as constituents of states of affairs makes it difficult to see 
how they could be considered straightforward concrete entities. Thus, if a defender of Radical 
Anti-psychologism is going to defended this version of the view, then she must be able to 
explain how states of affairs can be considered concrete. This position could advance an 
understanding of states of affairs as being constituted by particulars and property instances, 
where the property instances are straightforwardly concrete. Several questions arise for 
proponents of this possible view, such as what would be the difference between this version 
of states of affairs and a trope view? Can this position overcome the worries of transferability 
while maintaining that states of affairs are concrete entities? Unfortunately, here I lack the 
space to pursue this issue further.  
There is a final worry which arises for the prospects of a defence of the truthmaker 
view from a Radical Anti-psychologist position. Apart from physical objects and property 
instances we included events in the list of paradigmatic perceivable concreta. An adequate 
defence of the truthmaker view from a Radical Anti-psychologistic perspective must make 
space for events in the truthmaking picture.115 It must be noted that an exhaustive defence of 
the truthmaker view on behalf of the Radical Anti-psychologist position should be able to 
overcome the worries which have been presented in the few last paragraphs. Unfortunately, 
                                                 
114 See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002) for a conception of states of affairs where these are construed as classes of 
resemblance. 
115 See, for instance, Kriegel (2005) for the view that events are “dynamic tropes”. 
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here I lack the space to pursue this issue further, for an appropriate treatment of these issues 
would require a work of a similar length to this one. 
 A final point of clarification before we embark on an evaluation of Dodd’s arguments. 
We should note that this conception of the truthmaker view does not entail acceptance of a 
strong form of a classical correspondence approach in which each proposition is made true 
by at most one entity.116 The truthmaker view advanced here is consistent with the idea that 
one single entity can act as the truthmaker for many propositions, as well as with the idea 
that a single proposition can have more than one truthmaker. This aspect of the view allows 
it to explain with not much trouble how propositions such as <the rose is red or the rose is 
yellow> are true without positing the existence of a distinctive (perhaps disjunctive) 
truthmaker. For just a single entity can act as a truthmaker for the propositions <the rose is 
red> and <the rose is red or the rose is yellow>, for instance the state of affairs of the rose’s 
being red. Moreover, since the latter disjunctive proposition need not be made true by a 
disjunctive fact, we can allow that this proposition has more than one truthmaker – in 
particular, it can be made true by the rose’s being red or by the rose’s being yellow.  
 
7.2 Dodd’s Case against Truthmaking Entities 
Dodd’s case against truthmaker views depends on the observation that the truthmaker view 
is only one way of fleshing out the correspondence platitude. His attack targets the type of 
truthmaker view advanced by Rodriguez-Pereryra. Thus, Dodd has pointed out that the 
truthmaker principle expressed by (TM) is not equivalent, nor does it follow from, the 
correspondence platitude (CP) characterised by Wright – the claim, let us remember, that “P” 
is true if and only if things are as “P” says they are. For the truthmaker view brings with it 
the commitment that it is in virtue of the existence of some entities that certain propositions 
are true. Dodd thinks that this move tends to sanction the introduction of “extravagant” 
entities (such as states of affairs or tropes) into our ontology, over and above those for which 
we have good reason to think that exist (Dodd, 2001: 81). But, Dodd argues, we do not need 
to let these entities into our ontology if the task is to accommodate the correspondence 
                                                 
116 See MacBride (2013) for a characterisation of such strong correspondence theory. 
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platitude. For this claim does not bring with it the commitment that entities have to play the 
role of truthmakers.  
But I submit that it would be possible to challenge this very first step in Dodd’s 
argument. Here, Dodd claims that an appeal to entities is absent in the correspondence 
platitude, and that such ontological commitment comes only with the advancement of (TM). 
He maintains that the correspondence platitude does not entail the commitment that the 
existence of entities is involved in explaining the truth of propositions. Nevertheless, this is 
not obviously so, for Wright’s Correspondence Platitude does mention “things” in its 
formulation. One plausible way of interpreting that term would be to take it to refer to entities. 
On this interpretation of the platitude, then, we have that propositions are true in virtue of the 
entities there are in the world. Whether or not (CP) brings commitments to entities will 
depend on the adequate interpretation of “things”. Dodd does not say anything against the 
plausible reading we have suggested here. But at least one possible responses is available to 
him. First, he could argue that the correspondence platitude needs to be reformulated without 
appealing to specific entities. This move might amount to question-begging in the current 
dialectical setting. Let us grant, nevertheless, for the sake of the argument, that Dodd has 
established that (CP) does not bring with it commitment to entities. Aside from this remark, 
I will now limit myself to a presentation of Dodd’s case against the truthmaker view. A 
critical assessment of his argument will be undertaken after the exposition is over.  
Dodd’s argument for the idea that we do not need states of affairs to function as 
truthmakers starts by contrasting what could be said, from a truthmaker theorist point of view, 
about the truth of essential predications against what could be said about the truth of 
inessential predications. For instance, some opponents of states of affairs as truthmakers 
could concede that there is nothing wrong with advancing a truthmaker approach to account 
for the truth of essential predications, that is propositions which predicate something that the 
object essentially exhibits in virtue of being the object it is, such as <this ball exists>, 
<Bucephalus is a member of the species Equus Ferus Caballus>, and <Bucephalus is 
identical to Bucephalus>. The reasoning behind this concession is that the existence of the 
objects that these propositions are about do necessitate the truth of the propositions – that is, 
it would be impossible for the relevant objects to exist and the propositions to be false. For 
instance, it would be impossible for Bucephalus to exist and not be identical to itself. Dodd 
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would not see anything wrong with the idea that these entities exist, for he maintains that we 
seem to have independent reasons to include these kinds of object into our ontology.117 But 
the case is very different when it comes to inessential predications such as <the ball is red> 
and <Bucephalus is buried in Pakistan>. To account for the truth of these propositions, the 
same strategy cannot be deployed, for clearly in these cases the existence of the relevant 
objects will not suffice for the truth of the corresponding propositions. The ball might exist 
and not be red, Bucephalus might have existed but not be buried in Pakistan. One way of 
responding to this problem posed by inessential predications would be to argue that there is 
indeed an entity, the existence of which, would necessitate the truth the relevant propositions. 
At this stage of the argument, a truthmaker theorist could appeal to states of affairs. Given 
that states of affairs are entities in which particulars and properties are unified, the existence 
of a state of affairs in which e is F, does necessitate the truth of <e is F>. And this is so even 
in cases where the property predicated of the particular is not essential to the particular. 
Following the examples presented above, in the former case, the relevant truthmaker would 
be the state of affairs of the ball’s being red, in the latter it would be the state of affairs of 
Bucephalus’ being buried in Pakistan. This strategy, the postulation of states of affairs, 
provides the truthmaker theorist with enough truthmakers to account for the truth of many 
inessential predications. 
The way in which Dodd presents his case against the truthmaker view is by calling 
into question the reasons there are for thinking that states of affairs should be accepted into 
our ontology. David Armstrong appeals to the truthmaker principle to advance an argument 
in favour of the existence of states of affairs.118 But in the current dialectical context this 
move is unwarranted. According to Dodd, if all the support for (TM) comes from the 
correspondence platitude, and all the support for states of affairs comes from (TM), then 
introduction of states of affairs into our ontology is bound to seem unjustified. As noted 
before, for Dodd, the correspondence platitude is not equivalent nor does it imply (TM). The 
latter brings with it substantial ontological commitments which need not be incurred by 
someone who accepts the platitude. For Dodd, the truthmaker view brings with it a substantial 
ontological commitment which requires independent justification (Dodd, 2001: 75-77). It is 
                                                 
117 We will explore below what these reasons are. 
118 See Armstrong (1997: 113-119). 
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clear that endorsement of the correspondence platitude does not amount to an endorsement 
of (TM). Moreover, possibility of endorsing the platitude without postulating truthmaking 
entities is live. Dodd’s own positive proposal consists precisely in the suggestion that in order 
to account for the truth of inessential predications we need not appeal to “ontological exotica” 
(Dodd, 2001: 81), such as states of affairs.119 Dodd’s proposal comes down to the claim that 
in order to account for truth along the platitude’s lines, it is enough to appeal to the way things 
are. For instance, we can account for the truth of <the ball is red> by appeal to entities we 
already accept in our ontology, i.e. the ball and the way the ball is, namely red. It is the way 
some of these things are which accounts for the truth of inessential predications:120 
The truth of <the ball is red at t> is not, it seems, determined by the existence of 
some entity (viz. a state of affairs or trope); it would seem to be true because some 
entity (viz. the ball) has the property in question at t (Dodd, 2001:74). 
The items which we are undeniably committed to in our talk of objects 
instantiating properties are properties and their instances, viz. objects (Dodd , ibid. 
78). 
On Dodd’s view, it is possible to explain truth along the platitude’s lines by appeal to the 
entities we have already let in into our ontology (i.e. objects) which can instantiate properties. 
All we need to concede is that there are different ways in which these entities can be, for 
instance the ball can be red, but it can also be soft. Insofar as these ways of being are not 
reified into entities, there is a possible theory of truth which respects the correspondence 
platitude but does not let states of affairs into our ontology. This last step has been called into 
question by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005); on his view the way the ball is can make true the 
relevant proposition only if we understand these ways of being as entities themselves, which 
would be tantamount to introducing tropes, or property instances, into our ontology. Let us 
set aside this worry for the moment. In summary, so far, Dodd’s positive proposal purports 
to show not only that the step from the platitude to (TM*) is not compulsory, it also purports 
to presents a plausible alternative which does not make the ontological commitments incurred 
by the truthmaker view. 
                                                 
119 The reason why he labels states of affairs “ontological exotica” has to do with the idea that states of affairs 
are mysterious entities. This idea will be further explored below.  
120 See Hornsby’s (2005) for a defence of this view. 
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 At this point of the dialectic, Dodd appeals to Ockham’s razor and insist that his 
account of truth is superior to the truthmaker approach (Dodd 2007). Moreover, Dodd 
strengthens his case against states of affairs by arguing that their nature is “mysterious” – let 
us remember that he refers to them as “ontological exotica”. We will have a closer look into 
this latter claim below. But, of course, Dodd’s negative case would only hold if he was right 
in thinking that there are no independent reasons either to endorse (TM) or in favour of the 
truthmaker theorist’s ontological commitments (for instance, in favour of thinking that there 
are states of affairs). In the following we shall call into question the tenability of Dodd’s 
proposal. We will argue that he is mistaken in thinking that there are no independent 
motivations for introducing states of affairs into our ontology.  
 
7.3 A Defensive Move 
One way of rehabilitating the prospects of the truthmaker view in the face of Dodd’s 
objections would be by arguing that the ontological commitments incurred by adoption of 
the truthmaker principle (TM) are not as controversial as Dodd alleges they are. Dodd’s case 
rests on the idea that the introduction of states of affairs serves the theoretical purpose of 
accounting for truth within the lines established by the correspondence platitude. But he 
thinks that this theoretical need can be satisfied without recourse to states of affairs. This 
possibility, he thinks, removes what he takes to be the only motivation for thinking that there 
are such things as states of affairs. Besides, he seems to think that we are independently 
committed to the existence of certain things, and undeniably so, but that among them we do 
not find states of affairs: “The items which we are undeniably committed to in our talk of 
objects instantiating properties are properties and their instances, viz. objects” (Dodd, 2001: 
78). It is worth wondering at this point which are Dodd’s reasons for thinking that this is the 
case. He does not advance an argument for this claim, but he seems to be suggesting that 
these ontological commitments can be derived straightforwardly from the way we talk about 
these things. Thus, a suggestion which could be extracted from this passage might be that 
these ontological commitments can be read off from the way we talk about objects 
instantiating properties.  
 It is worth trying to unpack what might be involved in this quick line of reasoning. 
Why does Dodd think that our linguistic practice of talking about objects and their properties 
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shows that we have this ontological commitment? Is it merely because objects and properties 
are explicitly mentioned in our talk about objects instantiating properties – i.e. that we have 
singular terms for particular objects and properties? There are very simple reasons for 
thinking that, in general, the fact that we have in our linguistic repertoire singular terms for 
something is far from being a conclusive reason to establish that those things exist. After all, 
we have in our linguistic repertoire singular terms such as “witch” or “unicorn”, but this does 
not show that such things exist. It could be argued that, in these cases, there are special 
reasons for not taking these singular terms to be genuinely referential. But in the absence of 
this kind of special reasons it could be argued that having singular terms, in our language is 
a prima facie reason to think their referents should be included in our ontology. Moreover, if 
we take ourselves to state truths by the use of those terms, unlike “witch”, then this is 
additional prima facie reason in favour of them being genuinely referential. Given that we do 
not have reasons to think that we should treat all singular terms which refer to objects and 
properties in the same way we treat “witch” or “unicorn”, we could grant that the centrality 
of the relevant terms in our language provides us with a good prima facie reason to think 
there are such things as objects and properties. Here, I am not interested in exploring the 
possibility of rejecting the idea that these things should be included in our ontology, nor in 
challenging the idea that the way we talk provides us with good reasons to think that they 
exist. Instead, I want to take a closer look at the limitations of our appeals to the way we talk 
to establish ontological claims. More particularly, I want to challenge the claim, implicit in 
Dodd’s passage, that the way we talk about objects instantiating properties does not provide 
us with at least as good a reason to think that there are states of affairs.  
 Let us concede to Dodd the point that particulars and properties are the entities our 
ordinary talk undeniably commits us to. From this it does not follow that ordinary talk does 
not commit us to the existence of states of affairs. If the reason for thinking that there are 
particulars and properties is that we have singular terms which make reference to those, then 
there is no reason to think that a similar argument could not be mounted in favour of states 
of affairs. We do not only talk about, say, the blueberry and purpleness, we also talk about 
the blueberry’s being purple or the fact that the blueberry is purple. As in “the blueberry’s 
being purple (alternatively, the fact that the blueberry is purple) made him think that autumn 
had arrived too early this year”. Why not take this constructions at face value and argue that 
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we are undeniably committed to states of affairs too? If we have a case grounded in ordinary 
talk for particulars and properties, then we also have a similar case for states of affairs. One 
alternative open for Dodd would be to find a reason for thinking that the singular terms he 
favours (i.e. those which make reference to particulars and properties) are genuinely referring 
and deny that those which we favour (i.e. those which make reference to states of affairs) 
also are. But on what basis could this be argued? One natural suggestion might draw from 
the reductionist tradition in philosophical analysis. According to this line of thought, if the 
meaning of all sentences which use singular terms which refer to states of affairs can be 
systematically reconstructed by substituting those terms with terms which make reference 
only to particulars and properties, then the former singular terms are not genuinely referring. 
Importantly, Dodd has done nothing to show that this systematic reconstruction can be 
achieved. But let us follow this possible argument further. This reconstruction, in turn, would 
lead to the thought that we do not need to introduce states of affairs into our ontology, for 
there is a reason to think that the use of singular terms for states of affairs are somehow 
spurious. But, as Crispin Wright (1983) has pointed out, this line of reasoning is flawed. For 
the reductionist line of reasoning depends on the equivalence of any sentence which uses 
terms for states of affairs (call these S-terms) to a sentence which uses only terms for 
particulars and properties (call these P-terms). In general, 
F(s) iif F(p) 
But, as Wright points out, if the obtaining of such equivalence can be used by the reductionist 
to argue that S-terms are not genuinely referring, then nothing prevents us from arguing on 
the opposite direction. That is to say, we can exploit the equivalence to argue that P-terms 
are not genuinely referring. Something else has to be said if the reductionist line of reasoning 
is to be considered something other than an arbitrary way of discrediting S-terms.121  
 We have called into question the first step of Dodd’s case against states of affairs as 
truthmaker entities, namely the claim that in ordinary talk we are merely committed to 
particulars and properties, but that states of affairs are entities alien to ordinary talk. The 
result achieved is quite modest. For we have merely argued that Dodd’s case to think there 
are no positive reasons to posit states of affairs fails. All we have in the form of positive 
                                                 
121 See Wright (1983: 25-36) for a version of this attack on the reductionist approach in the context of Frege’s 
conception of number terms as genuinely referring. Wright credits Alston (1958) for first developing this line. 
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reasons for thinking that there are states of affairs are the prima facie reasons that come from 
our ordinary use of singular terms which seem to refer to them (and our taking to state truths 
by using those terms.) If we are to advance a positive case in favour of states of affairs then 
we need to identify positive reasons for including them in our ontology.  
 
Conclusions 
In the first part of the chapter we advanced an exposition of the truthmaking view and 
explored what versions of the view are especially attractive for a defender of Radical Anti-
psychologism. Then, we focused on defending the view from one specific attack advanced 
by Julian Dodd. Here, our defensive stance has been limited to deal with one of the two 
criticisms advanced by Dodd. Thus, we achieved a very modest conclusion, i.e. that Dodd’s 
attack against the truthmaker view, which is based on considerations about the ontological 
commitments that flow from ordinary talk, is inconclusive.  
We should remember that the second criticism focused on the accusation that states 
of affairs are mysterious entities, and that it is not possible to advance an adequate account 
of the unity these entities must exhibit if they are to play the role of truthmakers. 
Unfortunately, here I lack the space to pursue this line of reasoning by Dodd further. Again, 
it must be noted that an exhaustive defence of a form of Radical Anti-psychologism which 
conceives of states of affairs as truthmakers should, at the very least, address these worries 
by Dodd. 
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Conclusions. What Has Been Achieved and Avenues for Future Research  
In this thesis we have defended a particular account of the way in which perceptual 
experience figures in making perceivers knowledgeable of their environment. The particular 
view we defended here maintains that the concrete entities we are aware of in perceptual 
experience constitute conclusive reasons for making world-directed judgements. I have 
argued that, despite having received relatively little attention in recent discussions, this 
position is a live option and is worthy of serious consideration. 
 In so doing we have accomplished several things. First, we argued that it is possible 
to find an epistemology of perception in Austin’s work – a position which was fleshed out 
by appealing to Kalderon’s Radical Anti-psychologistic proposal (chapters 1 and 3). We also 
advanced arguments in favour of that view. For instance, we argued for the view that human 
reflexive perceptual knowledge is an epistemic standing which is based on reasons possessed 
by the subject (chapter 5). We also argued for the claim that concreta are reasons for judging. 
Two separate lines contributed to this defence. First, we defended the view that concreta have 
normative force and can play a motivational role in the subject’s cognitive lives. Second, we 
argued that McDowell’s attack against views which endorse the Myth of the Given fails to 
discredit the Radical Anti-psychologism defended here. 
 We also streamlined some of the concepts used by the position, such as the notion of 
concreta (chapter 4), and explored the types of commitments which might be required from 
the view in other areas of philosophical enquiry, such as commitments on truthmaker theory 
(chapter 7). In this last chapter we also highlighted that a more exhaustive defence of the 
truthmaker view should be developed on behalf of Radical Anti-psychologism – a task which 
we lacked the space to undertake here.  
 Finally, in several places of this work we found that the proposal advanced here 
yielded good results when applied to contemporary discussions, and showed potential for 
future development. In particular, the contribution of our Austinian picture to the debate on 
perceptual warrant defeaters (chapter 2) showed that the view has potential to be developed 
in that direction, for it advanced a suggestion which could help McDowell to deal with cases 
which are problematic for his position. In chapter 5 we found that Austin’s appeal to 
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recognitional capacities in providing us with perceptual knowledge allowed us to advance an 
original explanation of a common claim made in some reason-based epistemologies. That is, 
the claim that a subject who is credited with reflexive knowledge should be able to articulate 
her warrant for that knowledge. An appeal to Austin allowed us to advance an original 
explanation of why the articulation requirements in cases of reflexive perceptual knowledge 
can be minimal. Finally, we should mention the sketch of an account of the way in which the 
agent is involved in perceptual recognition, advanced in the final part of chapter 6. An 
original account of the way the agent is involved in recognition could provide us with 
elements to extend the way in which subjects are thought to be responsible for their 
knowledge. All these are avenues for future research within the project that has been 
developed in the present work, and which will, hopefully, be carried out elsewhere in future 
work.  
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